Defining Properties: Literary Cultivation and National Character in Early American Literature by Zurawski, Magdalena
  i
v  
 
 
Defining Properties:  
Literary Cultivation and National Character in Early American Literature 
by 
Magdalena Zurawski 
Department of English 
Duke University 
 
Date:_______________________ 
Approved: 
 
___________________________ 
Thomas Pfau, Supervisor 
 
___________________________ 
Thomas J. Ferraro 
 
___________________________ 
Charlotte S. Sussman 
 
___________________________ 
Priscilla Wald 
 
 
 
Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy in the Department of 
English in the Graduate School 
of Duke University 
 
2013 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
ABSTRACT 
Defining Properties:  
Literary Cultivation and National Character in Early American Literature 
by 
Magdalena Zurawski 
Department of English 
Duke University 
 
Date:_______________________ 
Approved: 
 
___________________________ 
Thomas Pfau, Supervisor 
 
___________________________ 
Thomas J. Ferraro 
 
___________________________ 
Charlotte S. Sussman 
 
___________________________ 
Priscilla Wald 
 
 
 
 
An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of 
English in the Graduate School of 
Duke University 
 
2013 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Magdalena Zurawski 
2013 
 
    
iv  
Abstract 
In the decades following the English Civil War, as the Anglophone world began 
transitioning to a social order structured by market and finance capitalism, the word 
cultivation, which earlier had referred exclusively to agricultural processes, acquired 
increasingly figurative meanings referring to the development of an individual’s mind, 
faculties, and manners. This augmentation of meaning reflected the development of new 
conceptions of property as an essential feature of personhood that had begun to alter the 
definition of subjectivity. The circulation of such figurative meanings coincides with the rise 
of print culture, the development of a literary public sphere, and the professionalization of 
writing in the eighteenth century. These cultural developments suggest the relative ease with 
which the new conception of property expressed as literary personality coexisted alongside 
other forms of capital in Britain. Literary criticism of the last forty years, including the work 
of Raymond Williams, Clifford Siskin, Jerome Christensen, and Thomas Pfau, has accounted 
for the many ways in which possessing literary cultivation served the development of a 
middle-class economy and ideology in eighteenth-and-nineteenth century Britain. Though 
the figurative meaning of cultivation appears throughout American literature of the long 
nineteenth century, thus attesting to the concept’s transatlantic migration and adaptation to 
the socio-political climates of the New World, no significant studies of American literature 
have considered the role literary cultivation itself plays in shaping American ideas of 
personality. My study begins to facilitate an understanding of how modern definitions of 
property affected and effected early American literary culture. 
 
By placing American literature of the long nineteenth century in a transatlantic context, I 
show how five works by De Crevecoeur, Franklin, Equiano, Brockden Brown, and Margaret 
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Fuller model the relationship between real and metaphorical cultivation at the level of both 
form and narrative content. I argue that within these works literary personality appears as a 
threat to the American character unless it directly facilitates the acquisition of real property. 
That in an American context figurative cultivation is at all times subordinated to real 
cultivation suggests a suspicion of intellectual development at the very foundations of 
American culture. I draw on new work in early American literature, eighteenth-century 
studies, British Romanticism, and on a tradition of Marxist critique to read American 
personality not as an exceptional and isolated development of the revolutionary era, but as a 
transatlantic migration of cultural forms and conceptions that adapt and mutate upon 
arriving on New World soil. To understand these migrations and mutations, I map the 
importation of European aesthetic concepts and literary sources within American 
productions. My readings make sense of the contradictions within the anti-literary American 
ideology often articulated in the content of works, whose forms nevertheless reveal a 
comprehensive engagement with literary history. Doing so allows me to demonstrate the 
complex ways in which early American authors depicted literary cultivation as either a means 
of acquiring real property or as a moral redress against the self interest of a speculative 
economic culture.
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 1 
Terms o f  Cult ivat ion:  An Introduct ion 
 
            I would like to use the space of this introduction not only to outline in academic 
terms the scope of my research and its intervention in current literary debates, but also to 
articulate my personal motivations for this project. This dissertation in its most general sense 
is an attempt to begin to understand how literary personality figures into definitions of 
American character. In other words, what can the history of American literature teach us 
about the relationship between being a writer and a reader and being a “good” American? 
Can a person dedicate oneself to a life of “letters” and still exemplify the American 
character? If so, on what terms? I examine this question through the term cultivation, which 
over the long eighteenth century increasingly acquired figurative meanings, so that the term, 
that until about the time of the English Civil War, as Raymond Williams notes, referred 
exclusively to “the tending of something, basically crops or animals”1 now also described the 
development of an individual’s mind, faculties, and manners. This metaphorical 
augmentation of the word evidences the emergence and circulation of modern political and 
economic concepts, specifically egalitarian notions of self-possession and private property 
that challenged both the political authority of monarchy and the landed aristocracy’s 
domination of a quasi-feudal  economic landscape in England. Through cultivation we can 
trace how a Lockean conception of property as an essential feature of personhood begins to 
define modern freedom as a confused conflation of democracy and capitalism, so that still 
today western hegemony cannot distinguish political freedom from free market capitalism.  
            As my readings show, through tracing the term cultivation we see how the modern 
subject in possession of literary abilities struggles between literary personality as a form of 
                                                
     1 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 
77. 
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capital and literary personality as a means of developing an ethical standard for a world that 
no longer has what Charles Taylor calls an “ontic logos,”2 “that meaningful order of timeless 
or transcendent values in which the moral existence of specific individuals and historical 
societies may find its ground.”3 The figurative meaning of cultivation appears throughout 
American literature of the long-nineteenth century, thus attesting to the concept’s 
transatlantic migration and adaptation to the socio-political climates of the New World. In 
the readings of early American texts that follow I show that individuals in possession of 
literary cultivation continually struggle with its dual status as both an ethical ground and a 
modern form of mobile capital, so that the intellectual development assumed necessary for 
an individual’s disinterested participation in a liberal democracy finds itself continually in 
danger of capitulating to commercial interests.  
            My own experiences as a writer—what my adviser Thomas Pfau in the preface to his 
book Wordsworth’s Profession: Form, Class, and the Logic of Early Romantic Cultural Production calls 
“biographical ephemera”4—suggest that this project—my research into the historical origins 
of American attitudes towards literary production—is a personal form of circular argument. 
During the four years before graduate school I waited tables in San Francisco while writing 
my first novel. In literary social circles my own “professional” situation was not unusual. It 
seemed that anyone who took literature seriously could not make a living from writing. With 
the hope of attaining stable teaching positions many writers I knew were finishing their 
PhDs in English, or considered beginning one. Some had dropped out of graduate school 
and decided to take low-end office work, which allowed them to write on the job when no 
                                                
     2 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 161. 
     3 Linda Dowling, The Vulgarization of Art: The Victorians and Aesthetic Democracy (Charlottesville and London: 
University Press of Virginia, 1996), 7. 
     4 Thomas Pfau, Wordsworth’s Profession: Form, Class, & the Logic of Early Romantic Cultural Production (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1997), 4. 
 3 
one was looking. Some had essentially stopped writing imaginative works and focused on 
more ‘practical’ academic careers. One poet I knew became a psychotherapist. Many went to 
library school. Some of my favorite writers worked in Silicon Valley and were also the 
anonymous authors of the manuals for software most of us use on a daily basis. These were 
the only writers I knew, besides those with inheritances, who managed to own houses in the 
Bay area. One of the most productive writers in the community, who had not only published 
many novels and collections of poetry, but also edited the works of several forgotten 
American writers, and co-wrote the biography of the poet Jack Spicer, a central figure of the 
Berkeley Renaissance and the New American Poetry, earned his living as the office manager 
for a San Francisco janitorial company. I had visited him at his office once. The walls 
surrounding his desk were covered in framed book jackets, awards, and announcements of 
his publications. His portrait was on the cover of a culture magazine that hung framed 
directly above his desk.  
            The academy, as a creative writing professor once described to me, was a ‘get out of 
jail free card,’ at least at the Master’s level. Most every writer over thirty had completed an 
MFA in Creative Writing, an essentially useless degree except that one could usually earn it 
on fellowship, so that one could write for two or three years, while receiving a modest 
income, teaching experience, and health insurance. Some people went into student debt for 
this degree. That fact pained me because the degree mostly qualified one for adjunct 
teaching afterwards, something I also did in addition to waiting tables. I made more money 
at the restaurant, but at least once a week I got to use my education to make part of my 
living. Some people got lucky with an MFA. If they published enough books after earning 
the degree, they could sometimes get a tenure track job. This scenario was hailed as the 
‘dream job,’ but when the dream came true, it usually required that one leave San Francisco.  
 4 
            Most of this information I know is not surprising to academics in the humanities, 
except that among writers a PhD in English was seen as the practical choice comparatively 
speaking. The PhD in English, we joked, was an MBA for poets. After I won two awards for 
my novel and earned a total of $2,100 in award money and sales, I thought it wise finally to 
make the practical choice. As either a graduate student or an adjunct I knew it would be five 
or six years before I might be eligible for a tenure-track job. The time it would take to 
complete the degree, I assumed, would be equal to the time I would need to write another 
book, if I continued to waitress and adjunct. As a graduate student, however, I would have 
the time to read and gain a deeper understanding of the history of literature, something I felt 
I desperately needed. And, unlike an adjunct, I would have health insurance. Also, the 
popularity of MFA programs had flooded the market. English Departments could now 
demand that their “Professors of the Practice” have the highest terminal degree. I write this 
not to suggest that my decision to earn a PhD was motivated solely by economic decisions, 
but to underline the fact that anyone wishing to dedicate herself to literature in America 
grows keenly aware of the fact that there are few “career” avenues available, that a vocation 
generally thought to be noble, at least at cocktail parties, makes it difficult to pay the rent. I 
knew through lived experience that to cultivate oneself figuratively poses limitations on one’s 
abilities to cultivate real property, to support oneself financially through one’s 
“specialization.” The following chapters attempt to understand the history of a 
contemporary fact of American cultural life, one in which I am very invested. 
            In a sense, the terms of my dissertation were put in place for me one evening while I 
was serving dinner to the owner of the restaurant where I worked. As I set down his plate, 
he turned to his wife and said, “Honey, did you know that Maggie and I are the only two Ivy 
Leagurers in the whole restaurant?” He, a graduate of Dartmouth College, had inherited his 
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father’s thirteen McDonald’s franchises and was now expanding into finer dining. 
Alternately, my European parents, who had sent me to a prestigious private school thinking 
that an elite education would ensure my social and financial success in the world called me 
once a week to tell me in their thick Polish accents, “You did not go to Brown to be 
waitress.” Clearly cultural capital in the States did not translate into material capital in ways 
that made sense to my European family. 
            My earlier studies in Romanticism and eighteenth-century aesthetics suggested that 
these personal experiences were to some degree evidence that European notions of cultural 
capital did not retain their value on the other side of the Atlantic. I know from my reading, 
for instance, that European narratives of the long-nineteenth century often stage literary 
cultivation as central to individual and national development, and, particularly in English and 
German literature, played a relatively uniform and positive role, an essential part of a rising 
middle-class’s social, political, and intellectual capital. The work of scholars such as Jürgen 
Habermas, Clifford Siskin, and Jerome Christensen chronicles the formation and effects of 
the literary public sphere in Europe. Through their work we see how the rise of print culture, 
writing became a profession of its own, suggesting the relative ease with which the new 
conception of property in person expressed itself as literary personality and coexisted 
alongside other forms of capital in European culture. We also see how literary personality 
continually attempted to differentiate itself from other forms of property by operating as a 
disinterested and virtuous voice in the civic sphere, wishing to imitate a fading conception of 
Republican virtue, a role that it could never fully play due to its dependence on a capitalist 
marketplace.  
            Habermas in his focus on the democratization of Enlightenment rationality through 
the creation of a literary public sphere helps us to see that literary cultivation from the start 
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attempted to operate as a modern ground of ethical civic disinterest. In The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere he argues that through a democratization of rational debate 
resulting from the nobility’s move away from a court-centered existence into town life we 
begin to see the emergence of the eighteenth-century literary public sphere. Because “the 
bourgeois avant-garde of the educated middle class” now had access to members of an 
educated aristocracy through such institutions as the English coffee houses this burgeoning 
‘middling class’ “learned the art of critical-rational public debate through its contact with the 
‘elegant world.’”5 As the nobility began to separate itself “more and more from the court” 
the town itself became the “life center of civil society,” not only economically speaking, but 
as the center of civic debate, of debate about itself. “Institutions such as the coffee houses, 
the salons, and the Tischgesellschaften (table societies),” Habermas argues, offered a middling 
class the opportunity to model public discourse on the manners of “the heirs of the 
humanistic-aristocratic society.”6 This town-centered life of ‘conversation’ instantiates “an 
early public sphere” through the nobility’s inadvertent bequeathal to those of lesser social 
rank the means by which to take civic life into their own hands. Habermas’ story suggests a 
relatively problem-less transition of civic authority from the court to the town, as if such 
public debate expressive of Enlightenment rationality easily democratized into a virtuous 
self-rule. As he moves to a discussion of print culture we see, for instance, in his description 
of Addison that such democratization of cultivation served chiefly as a modern ethical 
ground free from the influence of church authority: “[Addison] worked toward the spread of 
tolerance, the emancipation of civic morality from moral theology and of practical wisdom 
                                                
     5 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991), 29. 
     6 Ibid, 29. 
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from the philosophy of scholars.”7 What is striking about Habermas’ analysis is his 
understanding that the rational debate proliferating through print culture remained 
uncomplicated by the market capitalism that made printed materials so easily available, as if 
the public sphere’s origins in rationality could hold in check any civic actions motivated by 
economic self-interest. 
            What is important in Habermas’ discussion is his understanding that the European 
middle-class, as it slowly emerged as such over the course of the eighteenth-century, 
modeled itself upon aristocratic culture in such a way that metaphorical cultivation in 
Europe continually attempted to establish itself as the moral ground of disinterested civic 
virtue for a burgeoning modernity. Other critics have elaborated this aspect of Pocock’s 
famous history of republicanism through analyses of the moral issues informing aesthetic 
philosophy, showing that culture persistently endeavored to embody the virtuous disinterest, 
which had earlier defined the neo-classical conception of the aristocratic landowner’s role in 
public life. For instance, Linda Dowling in her account of Shaftesbury’s struggles to find a 
moral ground for modernity through the development of aesthetic taste describes the 
philosopher’s predicament as the impossible task of transferring a classical conception of 
civic responsibility into modernity’s evacuated definition of the human subject: “Even as 
Shaftesbury struggles to relocate what he believed to be the innate and disinterested human 
moral capacity to the newly shrunken realm required by Locke’s epistemological revolution, 
then, he continually strived to invest that realm with the larger dimensions of the older 
transcendental order of the ontic logos.”8 Shaftesbury’s solution, of course, was an appeal to 
the aesthetic realm, making beauty a natural sense that analogously proved the existence of 
an innate moral capacity. Cultivation as a form of mobile property embedded within the 
                                                
     7 Ibid, 43. 
     8 Dowling, The Vulgarization of Art, 9.  
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personality of an individual, however, seems to have never quite managed to operate as the 
moral ground Shaftesbury searched for in the context of a capitalist marketplace. 
            As we see in Clifford Siskin’s The Work of Writing: Literature and Social Change in Britain 
1700-18309 and Jerome Christensen’s Practicing Enlightenment: Hume and the Formation of a 
Literary Career10, literary cultivation adapts to market capitalism and evolves into several 
forms of professionalism due primarily to the pressures imposed by commercial publishing. 
Siskin’s ultimate argument, that writing as a technology took hold in England in the early 
eighteenth century and ultimately changed “society’s ways of knowing and of working” by 
helping inaugurate “modern disciplinarity, on the one hand, and modern professionalism, on 
the other”11 helps us to see that once subjected to the laws of the market, writing emerges as 
a variety of specialized labors. Where in Habermas’ model cultivation appears as a 
democratization of aristocratic independence free from the specialization of labor, here in 
Siskin, though the literary public sphere continues to define the eighteenth-century, the 
discourse it produces does not necessarily promote the health of civic life, but rather simply 
constitutes it in the form of culture: “that writing was work that worked on an individual 
level and a national one, producing cultured individuals privileged in sharing a national 
culture.”12 Where Habermas’ argument idealizes the democratization of civic discourse 
through the literary public sphere, Siskin suggests that writing as a form of capital begins to 
regulate one’s entrance into civil society itself by creating divisions of social class based on 
one’s ability to correctly rehearse culture through literacy.  
                                                
     9 Clifford Siskin, The Work of Writing: Literature and Social Change in Britain, 1700-1830 (Baltimore and London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). 
     10 Jerome Christensen, Practicing Enlightenment: Hume and the Formation of a Literary Career (Madison: The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1987). 
     11 Siskin, 2. 
     12 Ibid, 6.  
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            Emerging from its originary noblesse oblige writing begins to reproduce the same 
class boundaries that the literary public sphere appeared initially to break-down, so that, as 
Siskin describes, “a market of readerly domains was constituted and matched hierarchically 
to levels of writerly expertise.”13 As “culture was divided tastefully into high and low as 
serious writing and reading was marked off from mere entertainment,”14 periodicals such as 
Addison’s The Spectator in the first half of the century and philosophical aesthetics in the 
second half aided in making culture a way of maximizing the value of the property held in 
one’s own person. The result was a mobile marker of class displayed in the form of aesthetic 
discernment that “perform[ed] [the] critical task of naturalizing socioeconomic difference as 
‘refine[ments]’ of ‘Taste.’”15 The morality implicit in exhibitions of taste (for they were 
assumed to display innate sensibilities) became synonymous with the behavior of the wealthy 
and upwardly mobile. This division between high and low literature, Siskin argues, helped 
establish the modern conception of authorship. As laborer the eighteenth-century author on 
the one hand produced commodities in the form of books, while “on the other, he or she 
perform[ed] the function of capital, facilitating the appropriation of surplus value by 
relocating it ideologically within the individual.” Siskin’s succinct description of the author 
function in Britain suggests that the personality of the author operated as the embodiment of 
capital itself, but a form of capital that could reduce the same individual to wage laborer, a 
producer of surplus value.  
            Jerome Christensen’s analysis of David Hume in Practicing Enlightenment: Hume and the 
Formation of a Literary Career  instantiates Siskin’s description of the eighteenth-century British 
author as a site in which literal and metaphorical forms of property enable one another’s 
                                                
     13 Ibid, 160. 
     14 Ibid, 160. 
     15 Ibid 162. 
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reproduction. Christensen’s overall project intends to show that Hume, who in his 
philosophical work conceived of  “social reality…as discursive through and through,”16 so 
that his career as a ‘man of letters’ “exploited, facilitated, and epitomized the operations of 
the commercial society which it persuasively represented.”17 Christensen’s focus on Hume as 
a man of letters offers us an example of another personality fostered by Britain’s literary 
public sphere, one that aims to resist the specialization and disciplinarity described by Siskin, 
but still operates under the same commercial laws. If the man of letters specializes in 
anything, Christensen emphasizes, it is generality, and what this generality, this lack of 
specialization, attempts to replicate is both the independence of the aristocracy and the 
Enlightenment thinker. Christensen’s description of Hume’s attempts to create such 
independence through literary production accentuates both the corruption of the quasi-
feudal world to which the Enlightenment responded and to the product of the 
Enlightenment, the man of letters, who Hume exemplified: “It is the singularity of the 
Enlightenment man of letters that his lack of anything in particular is the condition of his art 
of the general, of his ability to form by affiliation a class that could reasonably hope to 
dominate not by virtue of a God-given right or a historically sanctioned prerogative but by 
means of a refined and refining pose.”18 By emancipating himself from the irrational tyranny 
of political and religious institutions the man of letters both frees himself and theoretically 
avoids the replication of such political forms of domination. But as implied in Christensen’s 
use of “refined and refining,” and as we already saw in Siskin’s references to “taste,” the 
problem of class transfers itself to the metaphorical category of culture through the 
exhibition of taste.  
                                                
     16 Christensen, 3. 
     17 Ibid, 3. 
     18 Ibid, 6. 
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            Hume in Christensen’s narrative represents a midway point, where the term man of 
letters still suggested an “authorial independence from court and church”19 rife with 
republican idealism. Soon Romantics such as Coleridge would understand the man of letters 
as simply “a wage slave to anonymous capitalists.”20 Christensen’s reading of Hume’s 
commercial handling of his philosophy suggests, however, that corruption emerges in the 
man of letters himself precisely because independence in modernity by definition is 
expressed as economic self-interest in the form of the Author’s incessant self-reproduction 
“through different agents in different packages to different markets at different times.”21 
Hume’s career displays the modern contradiction of independence in a capitalist market 
system, for culture as a form of neo-classical republicanism cannot separate from self-
interested, commercial publication: “The disinterested propagation of ideas, which was the 
aim of the republic of letters, was never separate from the individual’s ambition for the 
success of his own writings.”22 Hume’s decision “(made roughly around 1762) to write no 
more books at all but to devote the rest of his life to the correction of the editions of his 
work that continued to pass through the press” shows that the commercial press as the 
means of production for the republic of letters reduced ideas to real commodities possessed 
by their producer. Hume does achieve the “independence which is the true measure of the 
success of a man of letters, an autonomy which elevates him even above the monarch,”23 an 
independence supposedly signifying a political freedom achieved through the emancipation 
of reason from the Old World order, but in fact signifies neither intellectual nor civic, but 
economic freedom. 
                                                
     19 Ibid, 8. 
     20 Ibid, 9. 
     21 Ibid, 122-123. 
     22 Ibid, 127. 
     23 Ibid, 134. 
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            Through Habermas, Siskin, and Christensen’s accounts we see the pressures that the 
political and economic structures of European modernity place upon literary cultivation as 
an extension of an individual’s personality. Plagued by confused definitions of independence, 
literary cultivation alternately attempts to replicate aristocratic political and economic 
freedom, and Enlightenment intellectual independence. Because it must do so under the 
auspices of a commercial publishing industry structured by capitalist market relationships 
and because linguistic performance can never rid itself of socio-economic signifiers that 
stratify British political life, literary cultivation never quite achieves the ability to work “as an 
alternative construction of human motive and energy, in contrast with the assumptions of 
the prevailing political economy.”24 The Romantics, however, as we see in Wordsworth’s 
Preface to Lyrical Ballads and Shelley’s Defence of Poetry, continue to argue for cultivation through 
poetry as a means of expanding the depleted definition of human subjectivity that has 
emerged through industrialism and the capitalist marketplace. Wordsworth’s manifesto in 
particular argues for poetry as a means of returning individuals to a species identity as human 
beings, rather than the professional identity they have acquired as specialized labor within 
the modern economy: “The Poet writes under one restriction only, namely, the necessity of 
giving immediate pleasure to a human Being possessed of that information which may be 
expected from him, not as a lawyer, a physician, a mariner, an astronomer, or a natural 
philosopher, but as a Man…”25 Again, however, this species identity locates itself in the 
individual profession of the poet. 
            What scholarship over the last several decades has shown, and what I have tried to 
briefly outline above through three individual studies, are the complexities and 
contradictions of literary cultivation and personality as they emerge in the eighteen century in 
                                                
     24 Raymond Williams, Culture and Society 1780-1950 (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 42.  
     25 William Wordsworth, Poetical Works quoted in Raymond Williams, Culture and Society, 41. 
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a British context. The work of Raymond Williams, Clifford Siskin, Jerome Christensen, 
Thomas Pfau, and many others has accounted for the numerous ways in which possessing 
literary cultivation served the development of a middle-class economy and ideology in 
eighteenth-and-nineteenth century Britain, while it also attempted to position itself against 
the capitalist culture that appeared to reduce the definition of human subjectivity itself to 
homo economicus. The wide scope of this research, however, suggests that in a British context 
literary cultivation in general was never questioned as a valuable aspect of personality, even if 
the terms of its value varied.   
            Though the figurative meaning of cultivation appears throughout American literature 
of the long-nineteenth century, no significant studies of American literature have considered 
the role literary cultivation itself plays in shaping ideas of American personality. This study 
begins to facilitate an understanding of how modern definitions of property affected and 
effected early American literary culture. By placing American literature of the long 
nineteenth century in a transatlantic context, I show how five works by De Crevecoeur, 
Franklin, Equiano, Brockden Brown, and Fuller model the relationship between real and 
metaphorical cultivation at the level of both form and narrative content. Despite the deep 
engagement with European literature these early works display, the purported value of 
literary cultivation as an extension of national character, as an example of model citizenship, 
within the works themselves is less predictable than within European texts. Crevecoeur’s 
Farmer James, for instance, fears that his children would ruin their economic future, if they 
read anything other than the Bible, while the family in Brockden Brown’s Wieland, on the 
 14 
other hand, grows murderous due in no small part to the fact that their father “entertained 
no relish for books.”26  
            Though the forms of these works reveal a comprehensive engagement with English 
and European literary history and draw on various literary traditions, including Augustan 
poetry, early modern Protestant conversion narratives, and Shaftesburyan and early British 
Romantic aesthetics, the texts themselves often seemingly contradict their rich intertextuality 
by promoting an American personality that is anti-literary. By mapping the migrations and 
mutations of European aesthetic concepts and literary sources within American productions 
I demonstrate the complex ways in which early American authors depicted literary 
cultivation as either a means of acquiring real property or as a moral redress against the self 
interest of a speculative economic culture. Ultimately, I argue that within these works literary 
personality appears as a threat to the American character unless it directly facilitates the 
acquisition of real property. That in an American context figurative cultivation is at all times 
subordinated to real cultivation suggests a suspicion of intellectual development at the very 
foundations of American culture.  
            My work benefited greatly from recent studies in Early American literature and 
culture, which variously analyze the cultural exchanges produced by eighteenth-century 
colonial networks, especially Susan Scott Parrish’s American Curiosity: Cultures of Natural 
History in the Colonial British Atlantic World, Ralph Bauer’s The Cultural Geography of Colonial 
American Literatures: Empire, Travel, Modernity, and Elizabeth Maddock Dillon’s as of yet 
unpublished work on transatlantic print culture. The larger historical scope of their studies 
support my own findings unearthed at the level of the symbolic through formal analysis. 
Edward Cahill’s Liberty of the Imagination: Aesthetic Theory, Literary Form, and Politics in the Early 
                                                
        26 Charles Brockden Brown, Wieland; or the Transformation. An American Tale with Related Texts, ed. Philip 
Barnard and Stephen Shapiro (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2009), 8. 
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United States published this past year as I was just beginning my chapter on Margaret Fuller’s 
use of the British picturesque aesthetic in Summer on the Lakes makes an important 
intervention, demonstrating through a grand narrative the pervasive use of European 
aesthetic theory throughout Early American literature and print culture, an argument I make 
here through focused readings of individual works of literature. The carefully edited and 
thoroughly annotated edition of Charles Brockden Brown’s Wieland by Philip Barnard and 
Stephen Shapiro, which argued heavily for the novel to be read in the context of world 
literature, may have been the inspiration for this project as a whole, for as I was reading 
Wieland for my exams I thought it strange that no Americanist had yet presented an 
argument for Brown’s use of a contemporary German author’s name for his American 
family. Barnard and Shapiro’s edition let me know that I was onto something, and that they 
were working on it, but there was plenty more to be done. I hope the following chapters add 
to this burgeoning interest in aesthetics in Early America and make a cogent case both for 
the historical we find in the formal and the necessity of reading American literature, or any 
other literature for that matter, beyond an isolationist conception of ‘national literature.’
          In my opening chapter, “Crevecoeur’s Georgic Fields: The Limits of Literary 
Cultivation in Letters from an American Farmer,” I challenge traditional readings that see 
Crevecoeur’s Letters from an American Farmer (1782) as a sentimental depiction of American 
exceptionalism and more recent ecocritical studies that understand the text as a non-fictional 
account of eighteenth-century agricultural practices. I show that in the text’s initial letter 
literary cultivation emerges as a direct threat to the American farmer for it represents an 
aristocratic ideal to which he feels he has no rightful access, a sign of leisure that threatens 
the cultivation of his real property, i.e. his farm, and a reminder to a feudal European past 
that oppressed his ancestors. Specifically, I show that the content of James’s minister’s 
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speech against the Grand Tour in the opening letter presents literary cultivation as a 
continuation of aristocratic principles and, hence, antithetical to American values. The 
ideological content of his argument, however, is ultimately overturned, for the text stages 
this speech through a vocabulary rich with allusions to the classical and Augustan tradition 
of georgic poetry. Because of the disconnect between narrative content and its formal 
presentation the speech functions for readers as an analogy for the characters’ cultural 
blindness—their inability to see America’s slave economy as a continuation of oppressive 
feudal practices. The success of this critique pivots on the reader’s ability to recognize the 
transformation and transposition of an earlier Classical and British literary form, the Roman 
and Augustan traditions of georgic poetry. At the level of artifice, then, Crevecoeur’s Letters 
argue that consciousness of specific literary traditions does not eo ipso amount to the 
continuation of an oppressive aristocratic order, as James and his minister claim, but deploys 
literary history as a vehicle by means of which to establish new forms of historical self-
awareness and political self-critique. 
            In my second chapter, “Writing as Self-Possession, Self-Possession as Generic Limit: 
Franklin, Equiano, and the Form of Eighteenth-Century American Autobiography,” I take 
up two eighteenth-century examples in which literary cultivation functions as a sign of an 
individual’s self-possession, his ability to be the master of his own person and property. By 
reading Olaudah Equiano’s The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano or Gustavus 
Vassa, the African Written by Himself (1789) alongside Benjamin Franklin’s Autobiography 
(written 1771-1790; pub. 1814) I show that within the narratives of these texts and through 
the material production of the texts themselves Franklin and Equiano express an 
understanding of writing as a means to economic self-actualization for men possessing no 
material property. Reading Equiano’s Interesting Narrative alongside Franklin’s Autobiography, I 
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argue that the traditional generic differences between slave narrative and modern biography 
result from the writing subject’s right to property. Where the two texts differ formally results 
from each writer’s access to modern property law, ultimately a question of race. Franklin’s 
seemingly effortless rise to economic and social prominence through self-cultivation within 
the context of a nation-state creates a narrative that posits the modern subject as a self-
authoring individual in a secular world. Equiano, on the other hand, adapts the form of the 
Protestant conversion narrative for his autobiography, for by retaining a transcendental 
sphere, he attempts to protect his own subjectivity in an Atlantic world that does not 
recognize his ‘universal rights’ through national citizenship. A sign of literary cultivation, the 
art of writing affirms both his literal and figurative mastery over his own person. At the same 
time, the fact that such self-authorship is framed within a normative transcendental order 
also contests the authority of the political system that enslaves him. Though for both writers 
literary cultivation functions as a form of improvement, for Franklin autobiographical form 
confirms an essentially Lockean notion of autonomy, whereas Equiano’s autobiography aims 
to demonstrate his own human reason so as to be granted that very same self-possession 
denied him by slavery. 
            Chapter Three, “Charles Brockden Brown: The Romance Writer as Virtuous 
Patriot,” explores Brockden Brown’s theory of fiction as an argument for American literary 
cultivation aimed at counterbalance to the self-interest of the young nation’s speculative 
economy. I argue that German literary culture of the second half of the eighteenth century 
enabled Brown to envision the American writer as a secular moral authority. Specifically, 
through tracing Brown’s references to German literary life in his essay “Walstein’s School of 
History” (1799), I argue that the veil of eighteenth-century German literary culture enabled 
Brown to propose the American romance writer rather than the religious minister as a 
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national guide against speculative self-interest. I show that sophisticated rhetorical strategies 
allowed Brown to avoid potential controversy in American circles by presenting his 
decisively secular and radical political argument not as a new proposition for U.S. politics, 
but as an established fact of German cultural life. Drawing on Shaftesburyan and early 
British Romantic aesthetics, and also on the ideal of Bildung associated with Weimar 
Classicism, Brown’s theory of fiction conceives literature as a moral institution designed to 
reinvigorate the early eighteenth-century project of civic republicanism. Ultimately, I argue 
that Brown’s knowledge of the political role German writers played within Enlightened 
Absolutism enabled him to envision literary cultivation as a necessary component of 
American political life. 
            In “An American Picturesque: Margaret Fuller’s Summer on the Lakes,” the final 
chapter, I argue for Fuller’s travel narrative from 1843 as an example of literary cultivation in 
the service of American expansionism. Placing Fuller within the context of the British 
aesthetic tradition of the picturesque, I read her extensive use of picturesque codes and 
conventions as a transformation and continuation of the English eighteenth-century 
aesthetic practice, which enabled a rising middle-class to “possess” English land through the 
development of literary and painterly sensibilities. Fuller’s adoption of the picturesque, I 
show, enables her own literary cultivation to mediate an imaginary and subjective possession 
of formerly Indian land and thus serves as a psychological means of expanding real national 
territory. I argue that Fuller’s extension of European literary tradition into an American 
sphere as expressed through the excessive literary citations within the text aestheticizes her 
encounters with native Americans and permits her to imagine her encounters as an 
expansion of poetic tradition rather than as a hostile political act. Fuller’s dependence upon 
European literary traditions in order to mediate her quasi-colonial position in formerly native 
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territories presents a compelling example of intellectual cultivation in service of New World 
expansionism
 20 
Limit ing the Muse :  Writ ing ,  Vocat ion,  and Proper ty  in Crevecoeur ’s  
Letters from an American Farmer 
 
“Who would have thought that because I received you with hospitality and kindness, you 
should imagine me capable of writing with propriety and perspicuity?” 
            —Farmer James1 
 
“We might posit, then, a third level of reading where the vocative of apostrophe is a device 
which the poetic voice uses to establish with an object a relationship which helps to 
constitute him…One who successfully invokes nature is one to whom nature might, in its 
turn, speak. He makes himself poet, visionary. Thus, invocation is a figure of vocation.”  
           —Jonathan Culler2 
 
 
            The opening epistle of Letters from an American Farmer takes as its subject matter no 
fact of American agricultural life, but rather functions as lyric apostrophe in prose, 
transforming Farmer James not into a poet, but a writer adequate to the task of defining the 
American personality in written correspondence to a British aristocrat. Over the course of 
this first letter we see the farmer accept his calling to be the writer of the text at hand and we 
can read the text’s opening question as the first action towards that end.  But unlike Homer, 
whose first line seeks the aid of the Muse in composition (“Sing to me of the man, 
Muse…”)3 or Rilke whose invocation syntactically resembles James’s first line, but mourns 
modernity’s loss of a world in which there is the possibility of seeking metaphysical 
assistance ala Homer (“Who, if I cried, would hear me among the angelic/orders?”)4, James’s 
                                                
     1 J. Hector St. John De Crevecoeur, Letters from an American Farmer and Sketches of Eighteenth-Century America 
(New York: Penguin, 1986), 39. 
     2 “Apostrophe,” Jonathan Culler, Diacritics Vol. 7, No. 4 (Winter, 1977), pp. 59-69. 
     3 Homer, The Odyssey. Trans. Robert Fagles (London: Penguin Books, 1996) 77. 
     4 Rainer Maria Rilke Duino Elegies. Trans: J.B. Leishman and Stephen Spender (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, Inc., 1939), 3.  
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opening neither invokes his muse nor doubts his muse’s existence, but rather, like Mary 
visited by the Angel Gabriel questions his own adequacy towards producing the word.  
            As the epigraph from Jonathan Culler above suggests, lyric apostrophe in its 
invocation of a transcendental sphere functions as a type of speech act that results in 
constituting the poet as a prophetic or vatic figure. But Letters from an American Farmer in its 
opening line replaces lyric verticality with the horizontal of epistolary correspondence. What 
kind of vocation, then, is Farmer James entering when he begins his correspondence with an 
English aristocrat? My answer to this question and the basis of the argument I wish to make 
here is that the vocation is simply an economic one. Within this opening letter the purpose 
of James’s correspondence, the diegetic function of the exchange between Farmer James and 
Mr. F.B., becomes clear: both parties wish to enter this correspondence because it holds for 
each of them the possibility of developing their real property. For Mr. F.B. this means 
attaining both information about the colonies and botanical samples, while for James the 
correspondence means access to scientific knowledge that may help him capitalize upon the 
natural resources of his land.5  The reader of the letters, who, like the reader of a lyric poem, 
overhears the speaker’s address to an invisible and absent “you” (Mr. F.B.’s letters do not 
appear in the volume) observes the American farmer as synonymous with possessive 
individualism, a political personality defined chiefly through property: “The instant I enter 
on my own land, the bright idea of property, of exclusive right, of independence, exalt my 
mind.”6 This initial chapter of Letters from an American Farmer, then, adapts lyric models to a 
                                                
5 For more on the relationship of colonists to the London-Based scientific community and how botanical 
samples from the New World were exchanged as commodities see Susan Scott Parrish’s American Curiosities 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006) and Ralph Bauer’s The Cultural Geography of Colonial 
American Literatures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
     6 Crevecoeur, 54. For more on possessive individualism see C.B. Macpherson’s classic study, The Political 
Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964). For a reading of 
Farmer James as “the possessive individual of social contract theory” see David Carlson’s “Farmer versus 
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proto-novelistic form in its initiation of James as narrator and representative American. 
Where traditionally the epic is the literary genre associated with narratives important to the 
history of a nation or people, Letters’ prose form, its decidedly non-epic structure, forces us 
to consider what Georg Lukacs in The Theory of the Novel calls its “historico-philosophical 
realities.”7 Its very existence as prose form already anticipates some of the aspects of national 
character the text promises to define.  
            We can, for instance, read the difference between the classic examples of lyric 
apostrophe above and Farmer James’s opening question, the fact that his words do not 
attempt the creation of a transcendental correspondence but a transatlantic one, as an 
adolescent modernity’s still hopeful view of a cosmic totality collapsing into the worldly 
contiguity of economic relationships. James’s letters are not yet exactly the “transcendental 
homelessness”8 Lukacs uses to describe the novels that follow Crevecoeur roughly a century 
later. Instead, James’s words above evidence what Max Weber calls “Luther’s Conception of 
the Calling,” a transformation of the traditional Catholic understanding of Beruf (vocation or 
calling)9 as a religious disavowal of the world into the mundane Protestant notion of calling: 
“The only way of living acceptably to God was not to surpass worldly morality in monastic 
asceticism, but solely through the fulfillment of the obligations imposed upon an individual 
                                                                                                                                            
Lawyer: Crèvecoeur's ‘Letters’ and the Liberal Subject.” Early American Literature, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2003), 257-
279.  
     7 Georg Lukacs, The Theory of the Novel , trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), 56. 
     8 Ibid, 41. 
9 The German Beruf illustrates more clearly for us Weber’s description of the transformation of the concept of a 
“calling” in a post-reformation world. Beruf with its root word Ruf (call or cry) parallels etymologically the 
English words vocation and invocation--each of these words has at its root the notion of a voice. It’s this 
relationship to the voice, the calling out, that makes lyric apostrophe both vocation and invocation. Contemporary 
German, however, uses the word Beruf interchangeably for vocation, profession, or career. Though the English 
vocation could be used as a synonym for profession, it still retains in standard usage the notion of a stronger 
spiritual calling to a person’s life work. For example, in German we could describe any medical doctor as 
having a Beruf (profession), but in English the choice to describe a medical doctor as having a vocation implies a 
special dedication to the field. Vocation in English still retains some notion of being divinely ordained for a 
specific role in a social or religious order. 
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by his position in the world. That was his calling.”10 This transformational notion of worldly 
duties as a fulfillment of religious obligations is according to Weber the underlying ethic that 
creates the spirit of capitalism, “the idea of a duty of the individual toward the increase of his 
capital, which is assumed as an end in itself.”11 Seeing James’s opening line as a collapse of 
lyric invocation into Luther’s mundane and proto-capitalist calling begins an examination of 
what I contend is one of the implicit arguments of Letters from an American Farmer: poetry is 
excluded from the definition of American personality because it is at odds with the spirit of 
capitalism.  
            Both James our narrator and his minister, who James cites extensively in his letter, 
profess literary cultivation to be antithetical to American character for both economic and 
psychological reasons. Ultimately, however, the text critiques this rejection of literary 
cultivation as ethically dangerous for the national character. The text wages this critique of 
its character’s ideologies through its structural transpositions of lyric modes within the 
introductory letter. By establishing intertextual relationships between its own aesthetic 
presentation Letters places itself within a western literary tradition and questions its 
characters’ claims that America is in fact ‘a new past,’ and that its foundation upon a 
philosophy of possessive individualism precludes it from mirroring and repeating the 
violence of Europe’s feudal economy. The irony established through the presentational 
surface, one which firmly places its American narrator’s rejection of the past within a 
European poetic tradition, enables readers to proceed through the text aware of James’s 
blindness to the continuities between the colonists’ former ‘enslavement’ in a feudal system 
and their implementation of a slave economy in order to convert their own earlier 
oppression into a political self-mastery. The fact that this critique succeeds only through the 
                                                
     10 Georg Lukacs, Theory of the Novel, 80. 
     11 Ibid, 51. 
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reader’s ability to identify the transformation and transposition of earlier European literary 
forms within Letters suggests that a consciousness of literary tradition is not the continuation 
of an oppressive aristocratic order, as James and his minister claim, but a means through 
which to establish a historical self-consciousness that serves as a viable mode of political 
self-critique.  
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What is  American Cult ivat ion? 
 
“Who would have thought that because I received you with hospitality and kindness, you 
should imagine me capable of writing with propriety and perspicuity?....It is true I can 
describe our American modes of farming, our manners, and peculiar customs with some 
degree of propriety because I have ever attentively studied them; but my knowledge extends 
no farther.”  
—Farmer James 
 
          Beginning with the text’s opening question we can read the entirety of James’s first 
letter as the process of being called to the vocation of writing, one that is not so much a 
literary enterprise, as an economic one. Through deliberating the pros and cons of entering 
into correspondence with Mr. F.B., James, his wife, and minister revise British intellectual 
cultivation as they understand it into an acceptable American model. From their discussion 
we can glean that this revision amounts to an amendment of a classical liberal education—
what Martha Nussbaum calls the “higher education that is a cultivation of the whole human 
being for the functions of citizenship”12— into a curriculum for economic liberalism, 
suggesting an implicit reduction of the American farmer as defined by James to homo 
economicus. Until listening to the words of his wife and minister, James is unable to accept the 
idea of himself as a writer  and it is only by the end of the letter that the text itself changes 
from consisting mostly of  a transcription of the words of his wife and minister to the 
written meditations of James himself.13 Only once writing is figured as a means of 
developing real property rather than a sign of literary cultivation can James begin to produce 
the words of these letters himself with confidence. In this first letter the characters present 
                                                
     12 Martha Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classic Defense of Reform in Liberal Education (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1998), 9. 
13 To highlight that much of the letter is transcribed, long sections of it are formatted as a script, where the 
speaker’s name precedes her actual words. For example, “MINISTER: I do not very well know…” 
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writing as an activity that holds the possibility of either metaphorical or real cultivation. They 
present us with a clear division of those parts of British culture that may be kept and those 
that must be rejected by the American farmer. This turning at times towards and at others 
away from English culture functions as a central trope throughout the entirety of the Letters 
and is signaled in the minister’s labeling of James’s writing practice as “conversation.” 
James’s conversation does not exemplify Enlightenment conversation as a means of 
exchange to develop an individual’s rational capacities, but rather conversation here becomes 
a peculiar rhetorical operation that highlights both the root word’s notion of turning and the 
text’s function as a kind of denuded lyric.  
            In looking at the epigraph above taken from the first paragraph of the first letter in 
Crevecoeur’s collection we can begin to read James’s own understanding of his limitations as 
a writer and thus his concerns about his own adequacy to represent the American farmer as 
a coherent political class to an English aristocrat. If we mine the rhetoric of this short 
passage we begin to see that the central concern of Letter I—the  question of the farmer’s 
ability to write this text at all—emerges from Mr. F.B.’s confusion of two definitions of 
culture: the literal cultivation of land for agricultural and all that this might entail, and the 
metaphoric cultivation of one’s own intellectual abilities, represented here specifically as the 
ability to communicate one’s knowledge through writing. These two sentences, which appear 
to function simply as direct, everyday speech and shy away from any figurative uses, 
nevertheless utilize a vocabulary that begins to signify the complicated ways in which the 
literal and metaphoric definitions of cultivation compete to define Crevecoeur’s farmer as a 
representative American14.  
                                                
14 Letters within the discipline of American Literature has often been understood as the first work of the 
national literature. Albert Stone, the editor of the Penguin edition which I have used as my source text, echoes 
this view in his introduction: “American literature, as the voice of our national consciousness, begins in 1782 
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            James’s opening implies that English conceptions of cultivation do not directly 
transfer to the American farmer.  In these first sentences he interrogates the Englishman’s 
assumption that an American farmer is intellectually cultivated, i.e., must write well enough 
to engage in a literary correspondence, simply because he has the means of property to host 
a foreigner. Simply put, the former guest’s request for a written exchange, for James, 
emerges from a false proposition of sorts, a proposition that might read something like this: 
‘If James the American farmer possesses the means to house me, then he must also possess 
the means to write well.’ James is apprehensive that Mr. F.B. assumes a level of education 
that James does not have, just because he owns a farm. Despite James’s discomfort with Mr. 
F.B.’s  assumption, the formulation of the farmer’s question suggests the logic of the 
proposition. We learn through James’s locutions that intellectual cultivation is a form of 
property which emerges from the attainment of cultivated lands, another form of property. 
If one is wealthy enough to welcome a guest “with hospitality and kindness,” then one is 
wealthy enough to write “with propriety and perspicuity.” The etymologies on both sides of 
this equation conflate for us these two forms of culture. To be “hospitable”15 is literally to 
have a hospice, a piece of real estate, in which to offer someone shelter. To write “with 
propriety”16 is to write both with “correctness or purity of diction,” and to write as someone 
with “a landed property or estate.” This also suggests that as a man with an estate one’s 
                                                                                                                                            
with the publication in England of Letters from an American Farmer.” (7) That the prestigious English publisher 
Davies & Davis initially printed the work and French publishers demanded a French edition from Crevecoeur 
shows, however, that not only Americans, but Europeans viewed the work as a portrait of the new nation. 
Crevecoeur’s text in the Post-World War II era was often taught at the high school and college level in abridged 
form. The chapter, “What is an American?” often anthologized as if it represented the ideology of the text as a 
whole, served to bolster Cold War patriotism with its declarations of American superiority: “Here are no 
aristocratical families, no courts, no kings, no bishops, no ecclesiastical dominion, no invisible power giving to 
a few a very visible one, no great manufactures employing thousands, no great refinements of luxury.” (67)  
     15 "hospitable, adj.". OED Online. June 2013. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/view/Entry/88721?redirectedFrom=hospitable (accessed July 04, 
2013). 
     16 "propriety, n.". OED Online. June 2013. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/view/Entry/152846?redirectedFrom=propriety (accessed July 04, 
2013). 
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writing should demonstrate an “Appropriateness to circumstances or conditions; suitability, 
aptness, fitness” to one’s rank. 
            As James’s wife warns, “‘James, would’st thee pretend to send epistles to a great 
European man who hath lived abundance of time in that big house called Cambridge, where, 
they say, that worldly learning is so abundant that people get it only by breathing the air of 
the place?”17 His wife’s words underline the fact that a man of property in England gets 
access to another “big house,” the one of the university, and that entrance (“breathing”) 
alone transforms his being. Here Lawrence Stone’s essay “The University,” helps us to 
understand exactly why Farmer James’s wife would express such anxiety about James 
corresponding with such an individual. As Stone notes, by the seventeenth century though 
“[p]lebians could acquire gentle status by a university education and a career in the church,” 
the more important role of the universities in England, was “[to give] the gentry a common 
educational experience [in order] to create a national elite which was both unified in outlook 
and culture and clearly distinguished from the rest of the nation.”18 Training in rhetoric and 
belles letters in the eighteenth century marked this “national elite” as distinctly different 
from those belonging to other social ranks, and those unable to replicate the speech of the 
educated were often seen as outside of the life of the nation. As Olivia Smith argues, “What 
we might regard as different types or styles of language were discussed in the eighteenth 
century as if they were actually different languages…Arguments stressing that vulgar and 
refined English were the same language were invariably written by radical thinkers.”19 Smith’s 
statement implies that one’s own citizenship could be devalued or questioned on the basis of 
language. One’s linguistic abilities, in other words, decided whether one gained access to 
                                                
     17 Crevecoeur, Letters 40.  
     18 Lawrence Stone, The Past and Present (Boston, London & Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), 205. 
     19 Olivia Smith, The Politics of Language 1791-1819 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), x. 
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certain economic and political spheres, or if one would be significantly disenfranchised in 
public life.  
            Hugh Blair’s Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, which were published in 1783, 
illustrate the significant power linguistic ability had in determining class boundaries in the 
eighteenth century. The very fact that Blair’s lectures were given at the University of 
Edinburgh, where Blair was Chair of Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, begins to communicate 
what was at stake for an eighteenth-century individual in written and oral communication. In 
his introductory lecture Blair offers a defense of his discipline, first arguing the benefits of 
direct but eloquent rhetorical styles for those in the sciences and other fields requiring them 
to present and defend their knowledge in public. For our purposes here, however, it’s Blair’s 
second reason for the importance of his work:  
In an age when works of genius and literature are so frequently the subjects of 
discourse, when every one erects himself into a judge, and when we can hardly 
mingle in polite society without bearing some share in such discussions; studies of 
this kind, it is not to be doubted, will appear to derive part of their importance from 
the use to which they may be applied in furnishing materials for those fashionable 
topics of discourse, and thereby enabling us to support a proper rank in social life.20 
 
Here Blair is arguing not simply for correct and eloquent speech as a class marker, but also 
for the materials through which such educated speech should be displayed, a function that is 
chiefly social. By knowing “works of genius and literature” a person can enter into 
conversations that “support a proper rank”—that support one’s entrance and acceptance in 
“polite society.” Blair’s commentary shows us it’s not only the form of Farmer James’s 
speech, but the content that matters.  
            The comments James makes throughout the text about his own book learning and 
the education he believes his children should receive supports Lee Soltow and Edward 
                                                
     20 Hugh Blair Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. Ed. H. Harding (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern 
Illinois Press, 1965), 9. 
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Stevens’ research into literacy in eighteenth-century America. Until the era of the early 
republic, religious leaders were the chief advocates of literacy, believing that the ability to 
read scripture would underwrite morality and social cohesion. Even during the early 
republican era when many political and social leaders called upon classical republican 
conceptions of citizenry in their proposals for advancing national literacy, Protestant 
attitudes towards education dominated the cultural landscape. Though “[e]arly republican 
sentiments [] testif[ied] to the emergence of a civic-national model for literacy,” “a well-
established Protestant tradition [was] shaping attitudes toward literacy and education,”21 so 
that few Americans would have understood Blair’s model of Belles Lettres as a model of 
education and literacy necessary for the citizenry of the new republic.  
            As Farmer James assesses the extent of his learning, we see that the only books he 
possesses were bequeathed to him by his father, whose father had brought them over from 
England, before the family began its life as freeholders in the American colonies, attesting to 
the fact that polite letters would not socially advance most individuals in the colonies: 
My father left me a few musty books, which his father brought from England; but 
what help can I draw from a library consisting mostly of Scotch divinity, the 
Navigation of Sir Francis Drake, the History of Queen Elizabeth, and a few miscellaneous 
volumes?22 [italics in original] 
 
This passage provides evidence of James’s anxiety about his own abilities to write well. That 
Farmer James voices a concern claiming his “knowledge extends no farther” than the 
boundary of his farm and the few books left him shows us that he is both well aware of the 
social codes of polite British society and also of his inability to fulfill such codes as an 
                                                
     21 Lee Soltow and Edward Stevens, The Rise of Literacy and the Common School in the United States: A Socioeconomic 
Analysis to 1870 (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), 48. 
     22 Crevecoeur, Letters from an American Farmer, 52.  
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American farmer. He admits that he can  “describe,”23 i.e., “write out of” his experiences, his 
“peculiar customs,”24 those customs which relate to his “peculium,” his “private property,” 
but the development of his mind is defined by the limits of his experiences cultivating his 
property. He cannot “extend” his knowledge beyond his property line into those spheres of 
knowledge acquired through books. He, unlike the students of Hugh Blair, is not ready for 
“polite” company according to current British standards. Where Mr. F.B. assumes that 
owning a farm implies being educated, James lets us know that having a farm in fact 
prevents formal education, or, perhaps more accurately, makes it unnecessary. Instead, his 
farm functions as his sole object of study. For Mr. F.B. developing land leads to developing 
the mind in many possible directions, whereas for James cultivating land leads to cultivating 
one’s understanding of land cultivation.  
            If we return for a moment to the specific titles mentioned by James we see a 
different kind of evidence that will accrue significance as we proceed through the first letter. 
At one level, the function of this passage is to underline the difference in education between 
the American farmer and his British correspondent. That is, James wants to tell us that he is 
different from an Englishman in this specific American way. Yet, the titles his family retains, 
on the reign of Queen Elizabeth and the expeditions of Drake, i.e. the history of Britain’s 
imperial endeavors, underline that Farmer James’ American is still a British colony, albeit not 
for long. Drake and Queen Elizabeth as political figures, then, represent an economically 
transformational enterprise that ultimately led to the American possessive individualism 
praised by James throughout the Letters. The book titles begin to cue us to a verbal gesture 
                                                
     23 "describe, v.". OED Online. June 2013. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/view/Entry/50732?redirectedFrom=describe (accessed July 04, 
2013). 
     24 "peculiar, adj. and n.". OED Online. June 2013. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/view/Entry/139494?redirectedFrom=peculiar (accessed July 04, 
2013). 
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repeated by James throughout the text. Assertions that aim to emphasize an American break 
with a European past tend also to signify an economic continuity between the continents, 
calling into question both the claim that geographically America signifies modernity’s radical 
break and the notion of there being a radical historical break at all. For this reason James’s 
presentation of his books functions as an example of many paradoxical turns in his 
transatlantic “conversation”—what he uses to establish America’s separation from Britain 
and British culture inevitably reveals an American continuation of imperial practices.  
            James’s notion that literary cultivation is at odds with his economic circumstances 
seems to align itself with the historical accounts of the eighteenth-century’s emerging 
middle-class. James’s relationship to intellectual cultivation appears to be an accurate 
representation of the economic and cultural opportunities for a burgeoning colonial middle-
class.  The wife’s repeated warnings concerning culture mirror Adam Smith’s, for instance, 
who in Wealth of Nations labels professions related to literature and art as “the most 
frivolous.”25 These professions for Smith include “men of letters of all kinds; players, 
buffoons, musicians, opera-singers, opera-dancers, &c”26 and are dismissed by him because 
they are unable to produce surplus value for they result in “nothing which afterwards 
purchases or procures an equal quantity of labour.”27 For Smith these professions are 
economically unviable because by nature they are limited in their material existence to the 
fleeting moment of performance and thus can never exist as either commodities, or capital: 
“Like the declamation of the actor, the harangue of the orator, or the tune of the musician, 
the work of all of them perishes in the very instant of its production.”28   
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            Practically speaking, Smith’s argument held true in America more so than in 
England. As Kulikoff notes, “during the last half of the eighteenth century, between two-
thirds and three quarters of householders [in America] were freeholders…a far greater 
proportion than in England.”29 Roy Porter’s description of culture as commodity in 
eighteenth-century England, however, suggests that the literary profession, i.e. metaphorical 
cultivation, did offer an English middle-class economic opportunities. Porter’s citation of 
Defoe’s portrayal of commercial publishing from 1725 underlines the fact that England’s 
culture industry offered men of letters a means of professionalization within a commercial 
industry:  
…writing is become a very considerable part of the English commerce. The 
booksellers are the master manufacturers or employers. The several writers, authors, 
copyers, subwriters, and all other operators with pen and ink are the workmen 
employed by the said manufacturers.30  
 
The historical evidence, then, signals the economic impracticality of developing literary 
cultivation in America. A burgeoning culture industry with the literary public sphere at its 
center may have offered James’s English counterparts an economic incentive to acquire a 
literary education, one that would have been impractical in the industrially underdeveloped 
colonies. Where in England agricultural cultivation became a less reliable means of economic 
support, in America, even if the possibility for land ownership, as some recent scholarship 
suggests, was exaggerated, agriculture still provided a reliable source of income.31 These 
material facts would seem enough to explain James’s portrayal of literary culture as alien to 
the American farmer.  
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            Once we begin to examine the wife’s and minister’s statements carefully, a more 
nuanced stance towards intellectual development comes forth, one that rejects what we 
would call the humanities, but does accept the study of natural sciences as a legitimate 
intellectual pursuit. A suspicion towards those fields of study that involve musing upon the 
past emerges through a discussion of Mr. F.B.’s Grand Tour. James’s wife suggests a kind of 
decadence in Mr. F.B. when she notes that he “never felled a tree” but has been “to the city 
of Rome itself...the factory of brimstone at ‘Suvius and town of Pompeii underground...to 
Paris, to the Alps, to Petersburg,”32  but it’s James’s minister who is most critical of the 
Grand Tour. His initial commentary judges the preoccupation of wealthy travelers with the 
historical past as a useless exercise of both financial and intellectual resources, but ultimately 
betrays a desire to dismantle the origin narrative of the aristocracy:  
I fancy their object is to trace the vestiges of a once-flourishing people now extinct. 
There they amuse themselves in viewing the ruins of temples and other buildings 
which have very little affinity with those of the present age and must therefore 
impart a knowledge which appears useless and trifling.33 
 
The minister dismisses the Grand Tour as a “useless” intellectual exercise because of its 
historical nature. The sites visited on the tour refer to a past, a “people now extinct,” 
supposedly bearing no direct connection with “the present age.” This attitude we can 
interpret as a kind of practicality on the part of the minister, a judgment on the activities of a 
privileged class in the Old World by a man whose economic position in the present does not 
permit the luxury of contemplating the past simply for educational purposes. We can 
assume, then, when he uses the word “amuse”34 here that it carries all of its etymological 
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weight,  a “stupid staring,” a “gaping,” an “idle loafing” done by rich young men as they tour 
ancient sites. When he deems this activity “trifling,”35 again, the roots of that word, 
“deceptive” and “laughable,” deepen the minister’s claims for us, as if he were speaking 
more directly to the reader: ‘Look at those young men, deceiving themselves into believing 
they are learning something as they stare at those ruins that have nothing to do with the 
world we live in today.’  
            We can also read the minister’s critique of the Grand Tour as a challenge to the 
preservation of the aristocratic class itself. If one of the chief functions of the Grand Tour is 
to produce a conception of European history through which the genteel English tourist can 
see himself as the inheritor of a valorized past, then such a tour serves chiefly as a means of 
self-identification for an aristocratic class. As William Edward Mead notes, by the eighteenth 
century the Grand Tour was a necessary practice for Englishmen of a certain class: “A man 
in such a circle who had not seen Paris, to say nothing of The Hague, the Rhine, and, above 
all, Venice and Florence and Rome, could not aspire to be a leader of fashionable society. 
Something provincial, some lack of savon-faire, would inevitably betray him.”36 In other 
words, what began more than a century earlier as a mandatory practice for a young 
gentleman to understand the development of a western culture that resulted in his own 
privileged position in the world, by the eighteenth century functioned more or less as a 
required but empty cipher of membership in a particular privileged social class. The 
minister’s suspicion of the Grand Tour and its preservation of the past for these reasons 
carries with it a class-based resentment. His desire to dismiss such touring suggests that the 
                                                
     35 "ˈtrifling, adj.". OED Online. June 2013. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/view/Entry/205967?rskey=wFXGlq&result=2&isAdvanced=false 
(accessed July 04, 2013). 
     36 William Edward Mead, The Grand Tour in the Eighteenth Century (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1914), 128. 
 
 36 
minister might be what historian Isaac Kramnick calls the “radical bourgeoisie,” those 
members of an eighteenth-century burgeoning “middle class, [for whom] the mystery and 
awe of ancient institutions and ancient ideas were part of the barbaric feudal past.”37  The 
minister’s use of the word “affinity” foregrounds this class critique and the role that tradition 
has played in securing property for a class from which the minister and the farmer have been 
excluded. “Affinity,”38 which literally means a “relationship by marriage,” makes a subtle 
allusion to the traditional aristocratic practice of securing and increasing property through 
marriage, so that when the minister denies an “affinity” between the ruins and the present, 
he attempts to assert the idea that the past has little bearing on his own ability to accumulate 
property. Denying the validity of the past’s connection to the present is a gesture towards 
writing a new present into existence by questioning the need to preserve the very social class 
that emerges and benefits from the preservation of a certain understanding of history. 
            But the minister’s words also have a direct bearing on our examination of the kind of 
intellectual cultivation that is suited to the American character. The past for the minister 
holds no ties to the present, and associatively, contemplation and all things produced from 
such “amusement” for him is “useless.” Implicit here is a rejection of the aesthetic realm for 
its proto-Kantian definition of such cognitive activity as a purposeful purposelessness. The 
minister wants to reject the ‘muses’ for the purposelessness of the knowledge they produce. 
For the aristocrat the amusements of Italy lead to contemplation, where memory serves 
musing and all those things inspired by it: poetry, architecture, the liberal arts in general. If 
memory is mother to the muses, then the past produces through contemplation something 
we might call a humanist tradition, a body of artifacts, literary or otherwise, which connect 
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everything in the present to a past.  The minister’s dismissal of the contemplative practice 
induced by the Grand Tour, and by implication the humanities, is a rejection of birth rights 
for natural rights, at the expense of cultural tradition. Through the minister’s commentary 
we can travel a subtle route to liberalism’s dismissal of literary production and the liberal arts 
in general. If the minister took seriously the question implied in Lamb’s comment to 
Coleridge, “Think what you would have been now, if instead of being fed with tales and old 
wives’ fables in childhood, you had been crammed with geography and natural history!,”39 no 
doubt he would answer, “a productive member of society, rather than a loafing poet.” For 
this reason, the aristocrat’s heritage that functions as his main claim to power is for the 
minister false and deceptive. Like James who creates a break between the books he inherited 
and his identity as an American farmer, the minister disassociates himself from Europe’s 
cultural past. 
            A passage from Letter II presents us with the significance of both James’s and the 
minister’s need to break from the past through the denial of the importance of cultural 
objects. In a kind of revision of his earlier description of his educational inheritance 
discussed above, James communicates that the most significant marker of his heritage was 
no cultural object or education, but the farm itself: 
He left me no good books, it is true; he gave me no other education than the art of 
reading and writing; but he left me a good farm and his experience; he left me free 
from debts, and no kind of difficulties to struggle with….My father left me three 
hundred and seventy-one acres of land…40 
 
This passage gives us a curious piece of information. We are forced to consider what reading 
and writing might mean for a man who has “no good books.” What kind of writer is James 
expected to be, if his father over the course of one generation has altered the inheritance 
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from a few volumes of “musty” texts to “three hundred and seventy-one acres of land”? If 
we return to Letter I, James’s wife offers us an alternative definition of writing not related to 
imaginative literature, but rather to the production of wealth. The writing of certain wealthy 
Englishmen for James’s wife has nothing to do with memory or the muses or any kind of 
literary cultivation, but rather marks them as men who do not earn their living through real 
labor but instead through trade and capital investment:  
These Englishmen are strange people; because they can live upon what they call bank 
notes, without working, they think that all the world can do the same…And now I 
think on it, when wilt thee send him those trees he bespoke? But if they have no 
trees to cut down, they have gold in abundance, they say; for they rake it and scrape 
it from all parts far and near. I have often heard my grandfather tell how they live 
there by writing. By writing they send this cargo unto us, that to the West, and the 
other to the East Indies. But James thee knowest that it is not by writing that we shall 
pay the blacksmith, the minister, the weaver, the tailor, and the English shop.41 
[italics mine] 
 
What is significant about this passage is the way the wife’s language both differentiates 
James’s economic position from that of the Englishmen but also implicates him within a 
colonial system of exchange of which she appears distrustful precisely because it is not 
founded upon a labor theory of value. For the wife writing is decidedly part of an English 
imaginary act of a non-literary kind: the seemingly magical accrual of surplus value produced 
through capital—a wealth earned not through real work but through the symbolic exchange 
of “bank notes.” She warns James that his epistolary writing would fall on the wrong side of 
the cultivation line. Because his writing is not the writing of bank notes, she fears it to be a 
detrimental leisure activity that would take James away from the real labor he must do in 
order to sustain the farm. Where James must clear real “trees” in order for his property to 
function primarily as a source of subsistence for him and his family, the Englishmen 
perform a symbolic labor of “raking” and “scraping” gold into a global network of exchange 
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that also involves earning a profit on James.  The Englishmen bring in gold from the 
colonial periphery back to England where they presumably trade this gold for goods which 
they then export back to the colonies. His wife warns James that his writing is not capable of 
paying the family’s debts at “the English shop,” the place where James is able to purchase 
those goods that he and his family are incapable of producing themselves. Her words show 
us that prior to entering into this correspondence, James already existed within the economic 
cycle of the Englishmen as a consumer in the colonial store, but in a relatively powerless 
position, since his money was earned through his own labor and not through the accrual of 
capital.  
            But if we return now to the image of the tree, we see that once James enters into 
correspondence with an Englishman, the tree that at first represented the real labor that 
James must perform on his farm has accrued an exchange value here through the possibility 
of writerly exchange. In an aside that interrupts her speech (“And now I think on it, when 
wilt thee send him those trees he bespoke?”)42, the wife seemingly inadvertently 
communicates the existence of a trade agreement between James and Mr. F.B. As a botanical 
sample wanted by Mr. F.B., a natural scientist, the raw material of James’s farm, an 
uncultivated tree, has an exchange value that brings James into a more economically 
empowered position within the colonial network of exchange. If we now return to James’s 
opening question, we see that it is actually quite logical for Mr. F.B. to assume that because 
James owns a farm he must also be capable of writing. Though James says he will only 
“describe our American modes of farming, our manners, and peculiar customs,” the very 
fact of his owning a parcel of land outright enables him to become a purveyor of goods. The 
exchange of letters and a botanical sample is the entrance into a system where James 
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theoretically speaking has the possibility of accruing enough capital to one day write his own 
bank notes.  
            The wife’s revision of writing into an act of finance capitalism functions as the first 
step in the letter’s attempt to split the traditional liberal arts, the marker of freemen and men 
of leisure, into one domain for those studies that relate to natural science and economics and 
another for the humanities. We will see below that this split is made according to whether a 
field bears the potential of developing  the material present and future or if it functions as a 
means of preserving a historical past. To emphasize the fact that the colonial ideology does 
not reject learnedness wholesale, but specifically a humanist tradition, we must return to the 
minister, who, immediately following his rejection of the Grand Tour, discusses how the 
farmers of the colonies might themselves benefit from the arrival of learned scientists from 
England and the continent: 
As it is from the surface of the ground which we till that we have gathered the wealth 
we possess, the surface of that ground is therefore the only thing that has hitherto 
been known. It will require the industry of subsequent ages, the energy of future 
generations, ere mankind here will have leisure and abilities to penetrate deep and in 
the bowels of this continent search for the subterranean riches it no doubt contains. 
Neighbour James, we want much the assistance of men of leisure and knowledge; we 
want eminent chemists to inform our iron masters, to teach us how to make and 
prepare most of the colours we use.43 
 
Here the minister sets out for us a developmental strategy for the colonies. Unlike the words 
of Farmer James that often seem to espouse a labor theory of value intended to secure the 
independence of the farmer, the minister’s vision for the “ages,” demands diligence and toil 
on the part of the colonists in order that eventually the “future generations” will, like the 
current English aristocracy, possess “leisure and abilities,” i.e. capital and advanced 
education, so that they may develop new scientific means to extract and capitalize on the 
resources available to them through their land. The leisure the minister envisions allows for 
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breaking the surface of the ground “to penetrate deep and in the bowels” of the property the 
colonists already possess. Such leisure is therefore about building capital, “raking gold” like 
the Englishmen of the present, and thus forces us to revise our understanding of the 
American farmer’s attitude towards education. It is not that all education represents a kind of 
aristocratic decadence, but rather, because the American freeholder has not yet reached the 
same level of leisure as the Englishmen, an American education should be used as an 
opportunity to acquire such wealth and ensure the accumulation of capital in the future. The 
minister understands the liberal American project as one in which a new industrious middle 
class of people seeks, to paraphrase Isaac Kramnick, not equality but fairness.44 It is not that 
a proponent of liberalism, like the minister, understands a leisure class to be morally 
reprehensible in a world, where an underclass is necessary in order to create the 
accumulation of capital that sustains such leisure, but rather that a liberal like the minister 
believes in a “morally acceptable inequality,” one based on “talent and merit” rather than 
“aristocratic privilege.”45 By piquing the “curiosity” of natural scientists through the wonders 
of the New World, by entering into a correspondence with Mr. F.B. the minister hopes that 
James can speed this process of development along by exploiting the leisure of the 
aristocracy to their own advantage. The minister’s wish for an “eminent chemist” in order to 
help extract “subterranean riches” helps us understand the economic system at work in the 
minister’s imagination. Here his earlier use of the word “affinity” with its implications in the 
field of chemistry attains more meaning. He would like the aristocrat to break his affinities 
with his own class and instead help the American farmer through his knowledge of 
chemistry create affinities to a learned class in order to develop his own capital.  
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            His wish for a learned aristocrat “to teach us how to make and prepare…colours” 
moves figuratively in several directions, alluding both to the search for gold or other valuable 
minerals and to a heraldic flag. “Colours” as an allusion to precious metals of some sort 
suggests a future transition to the economy of the colonies. If, as Locke states, “in the 
beginning, all the world was America…for no such thing as money was any where known,”46 
and as the minister agrees, America is the new beginning, the aim here again is not to keep 
this purer economy, where men take possession of property only according to need, rather 
than accumulating wealth through capital investment, but to eventually introduce “colours,” 
of gold or silver as currency. These “colours” of gold and silver will also eventually lead to 
aristocratic “colours.” To lure a leisured and learned man of science to the colonies provides 
the possibility of democratizing aristocracy itself, of attaining heraldic colours for one’s 
family through accumulation of a symbolic currency.  
            In this opening letter James, then, with the help of words from his wife and minister, 
takes pains to define for us both the terms of American intellectual cultivation and two 
different understandings of British intellectual cultivation. Splitting what traditionally were 
called the liberal arts into two separate categories of learning, James, his wife, and his 
minister seek to benefit from Mr. F.B.’s knowledge as a natural scientist, but reject his 
education in literature, the arts, and history as the continuation of an oppressive feudal 
order. As will become clear below, the Americans privilege those aspects of Mr. F.B.’s 
education that enable them to capitalize the value of their land, but feel threatened by those 
fields that we would call the humanities, for the humanities offer a means of understanding 
the present as continuous with a historical past. From James’s discussion we can extrapolate 
a new kind of American curriculum developing in this letter, changing the liberal arts into 
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something we might call liberalism’s arts, a pragmatic curriculum focusing on developing 
knowledge in those areas of study that could lead directly to the farmer’s economic well-
being through the development of his real property. Once James’s letter disassociates writing 
itself from any kind of literary or imaginative activity, but instead, like the letters themselves, 
connects it to a series of economic activities central to the implementation of an imperial 
system of trade, he quickly is able to abandon the words of his wife and minister and write 
for himself. The American farmer can write as soon as the writing is an economic rather 
than an aesthetic activity. 
 
 44 
The Transformation o f  James into A Writer  
“MINISTER: You can write full as well as you need, and would improve very 
fast…It is good for American farmers to have friends even in England. What he 
requires of you is but simple—what we speak out among ourselves we call 
conversation, and a letter is only conversation put down in black and whites.”47 (italics 
mine) 
 
            I began this essay by positing James’s opening question as an example of lyric 
apostrophe that has collapsed into what Max Weber calls Luther’s calling. Beginning a 
discussion of the rhetorical aspects of the text as formal registers of a socio-historical 
situation enables us to understand the political significance of the divisions that James and 
the other characters in the opening letter make between British and American culture. As 
long as writing is associated with the aesthetic realm of literature, James, as the exemplary 
American Farmer, cannot bring himself to enter into a vocation of writing. Only after the 
wife and the minister refigure writing into a “worldly duty” of capitalist expansion does 
James take up the call of written correspondence. In other words, only after it is clear that 
the musing required to produce an epistolary correspondence with Mr. F.B. does not 
constitute James into a lyric poet, but into a budding capitalist, can he accept his role as a 
writer.  
            Curiously, as a final gesture of encouragement to James, once writing is fully 
understood to be solely an economically motivated activity, the Minister offers James a 
generic ascription for the writing he produces. As the above citation shows, he encourages 
James to understand his writing as conversation. The word choice is crucial for it maintains an 
etymological connection to lyric production through its root word, versus, but underlines that 
the verse of James operates upon a horizontal axis, turning back and forth, towards and away 
from England. The maintaining of a relationship to lyric production through this word 
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choice highlights for the reader that the amusement or musing dismissed earlier by the minister 
in his criticism of the Grand Tour can be provisionally accepted as an aspect of American 
character so long as it relates to activities associated with the development of material 
wealth. Conversation as a self-imposed literary genre for James maintains a strong association 
with his real property. It allows him to imagine his correspondence as a continuation of the 
spoken words he had already exchanged with Mr. F.B. under his roof. Conversation thus 
continues Mr. F.B.’s crucial assumption about the connection between hospitality and writing, 
something the minister encourages when he asks James to “imagine…Mr. F.B. is still 
here…Suppose the questions he will put to you…to be asked by his viva-voce.”48 By 
domesticating the writing to the limits of his farmhouse parlor, the minister permits James a 
kind of lyric imagination in which Mr. F.B. calls to him “viva-voce” not from the heavens of 
Homer’s muses, but from a farmhouse armchair. Fittingly, the minister figures James’s 
writing style as a kind of parlor activity, where James handles the tool of the writer’s trade 
with ease, as if the establishment of an economically productive correspondence has already 
admitted James into the leisure of another class: “you love description, and your pencil…is 
not a bad one for the pencil of a farmer; it seems to be held without any labour.”49  
            The transformation of writing into the cultivation of real property further enables  
the minister to imagine the possible roughness of James’s writing not as a marker of his lack 
of education, but as an distinctly American aesthetic: “perhaps you will be a more 
entertaining [correspondent] dressed in your simple American garb than if you were clad in 
all the gowns of Cambridge. You will appear to him something like one of our wild 
American plants, irregularly luxuriant in its various branches…”50 Here, the American farmer 
                                                
     48 Ibid, 41. 
     49 Ibid, 46. 
     50 Ibid, 46. 
 46 
is likened to a plant, an uncultivated one, the type requested by Mr. F.B. for his scientific 
studies, conflating the correspondence with the commodity Mr. F.B. desires to acquire from 
James. The comparison suggests that the uncultivated style of James’s writing through its 
exotic “luxury” will not be a mark of James’s poverty, but will underline Mr. F.B.’s material 
wealth through its exoticism. The minister continues and extends the tree comparison to 
suggest that Mr. F.B. must be bored of the writing he receives from cultivated Europeans: 
“Were I in Europe, I should be tired with perpetually seeing espaliers, plashed hedges, and 
trees dwarfed into pygmies.”51 Here James’s writing then becomes an aesthetic alternative to 
a style that figures the repressive order of eighteenth-century British landscape aesthetics and 
all the social and economic exclusions it signified in the century of enclosure and 
improvements. The “espaliers” and the “trees dwarfed” have had their natural life forces, 
their “exuberance” thwarted and directed in order to ornament the properties of the rich, 
while the “plashed hedges” have sealed off the commons. But of course we have fallen into 
a series of the Minister’s comparisons here and must remember that this “wild” American 
plant under discussion is not a plant, but James in “simple American garb.” And what the 
minister is calling James’s garb is actually his writing style. James’s style of writing is then 
“simple,” “exuberant,” “wild,” “fertile,” and “irregular,” while the European writing is 
ornate, thwarted, and regulated. James’s writing through its commodification becomes an 
aesthetic, a marker of American literary cultivation. Writing can only be refigured as an 
aesthetic by the Americans, if it can function as a commodity that serves as a means of entry 
into a British colonial system of exchange. 
            With the figuration of writing as a sign of economic cultivation, farm labor itself is 
reinscribed as a leisure activity conducive to imaginative musing.  Earlier the American 
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speakers frequently used ‘the felling of trees’ as a phrase to signify their real labor as property 
owners in contrast to the learned activities of an English leisure class sustaining itself via 
capital investments. Now that James has agreed to enter into a conversation with Mr. F.B. 
plowing as an activity becomes synonymous with the culture and aesthetics of independence 
and leisure criticized via the Minister’s discussion of the Grand Tour. In a curious gesture, 
the minister offers plowing as a means of instigating the kind of musing that results in 
literary production. He offers his own method of composing sermons as a model for James’s 
writing: 
I have composed many a good sermon as I followed my plough. The eyes not being 
then engaged on any particular object leaves the mind free for the introduction of 
many useful ideas…it is as we silently till the ground and muse along the odoriferous 
furrows of our lowlands, uninterrupted either by stones or stumps it is there that the 
salubrious effluvia of the earth animate our spirits and serve to inspire us; every 
other avocation of our farms are severe labours compared to this pleasing 
occupation: of all the tasks which mine imposes upon me, ploughing is the most 
agreeable because I can think as I work; my mind is at leisure; my labour flows from 
instinct…52 
 
Here plowing permits the minister to “muse” and aids him through its sense of “leisure” to 
keep “the mind free” and “compose[] many a good sermon.”  The free-play of the mind 
described by the minister signals once again a kind of proto-Kantian aesthetic experience, 
creating a link between literary production and its ‘musing’ with religious vocation, not 
unlike the invocation of the transcendental sphere performed through lyric apostrophe. 
Importantly, the minister describes the other work of farmers as “avocation”—those 
activities that distract the minister from the real spiritual work that gives his earthly life 
meaning. This passage in isolation would serve as an example against a Weberian 
interpretation of James and his community. Given that the minister presents his way of 
composing sermons as a model for James in writing his letters, however, the passage 
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conflates these spiritual sermons with the mundane and self-interested aspirations of the 
letters, evidencing the collapse of spiritual life into material existence. The fact that James 
has called his minister in for counseling at all in this worldly matter and that the minister has 
been the character most able to imagine and articulate the economic benefits for American 
farmers of entering into Britain’s economic network again underlines that the world in Letters 
has abandoned vocation in a traditional sense in favor of economic concerns. It’s no 
surprise, then, after the minister’s encouragement, that James describes his own plowing as 
an imperial act: “The father thus ploughing with his child, and to feed his family, is inferior 
only to the emperor of China ploughing as an example to his kingdom.”53 Here we might 
imagine, given the economic hopes placed upon James’s entrance into conversation, that the 
father plowing with his child as a literary image is a commodity in itself. As a self-portrayal 
within the correspondence the image functions within a circle of transatlantic trade, an 
emblematic package of an American belief in the value of labor exported by James for 
consumption by the Englishman. The literary image of the American farmer functions as an 
exotic specimen as easily traded within an imperial economic network as the exotic botanical 
samples requested by Mr. F.B. For this reason, the very request for a self-portrayal makes it 
possible for the American farmer to appear as the “emperor of China” in miniature.  
                                                
     53 Ibid, 55. 
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An American Georgi c  
           Above I have argued that the opening epistle of Letters from an American Farmer 
presents literary cultivation as antithetical to American personality. I have also attempted to 
show that writing can only be accepted as an aesthetic practice by James if such a literary 
endeavor develops into a viable commodity form suited for trade within a colonial system. 
In order to make the next point of my argument—that the text ultimately critiques such a 
rejection of literary cultivation except for economic gain as politically and ethically 
dangerous—I must ask us to reexamine more carefully the minister’s speech criticizing the 
Grand Tour. My claim here is that Crevecoeur creates intertextual relationships within the 
minister’s speech that remain invisible within the diegetic space of the text and thus by 
definition illegible to both the minister and James. Given that the minister’s speech against 
European cultural tradition is laden with references to the classical and Augustan tradition of 
georgic poetry, the speech functions as an argument against itself by way of irony. For the 
reader to whom these references are legible, it is as if the characters are unable to read their 
own words through a self-imposed cultural blindness. Thus the intertextual relationships 
empower the reader in this inaugural chapter and warn her that she finds herself within a 
text where the speakers willfully choose to ignore, or as implied in the term conversation, to 
turn to or away from certain socio-historical realities. She becomes attuned to the kind of 
reading practice necessary to navigate the Letters and continues with the knowledge that a fair 
reading of the text demands an awareness both of those things acknowledged and ignored 
by the narrator.     
            Before I begin my discussion of the passage itself, it will be useful for us here to 
rehearse a short history of the georgic genre itself because it provides us with a greater 
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means of interpreting the socio-historical significance of Crevecoeur’s references. Over the 
past decade critics within American Studies have applied the term georgic to texts dealing 
with the use of land for agricultural production. This loose use of the term has enabled 
scholars, most notably Timothy Sweet, to trace a history of American ecological attitudes 
beginning with the colonial period, but we must remind ourselves that this label has been 
assigned to such texts with twenty-first century critical hindsight and does not necessarily 
express the original author’s own awareness of his or her participation in a georgic tradition. 
Though Crevecoeur’s text is often discussed with this distinctly Americanist understanding 
of the georgic in mind, the allusions to georgic poetry in Letters from an American Farmer self-
consciously reference an eighteenth-century English literary tradition, one that would have 
been known to any well-read English speaker on either side of the Atlantic, but remains 
elusive to most twenty-first century readers.   
            The popularity of the georgic as a poetic form in the long-eighteenth century 
stemmed from the late-seventeenth century translation of Virgil’s Georgics by John Dryden, 
which spawned English imitations and a general interest in the classical form. Kevis 
Goodman in her recent study on the georgic also shows that as a mode, what she defines as 
“a rhizomatic underpressance,”54 rather than a full-fledged genre, the georgic influenced 
literary production through the Romantic period. Though not the earliest example, Virgil’s 
Georgics is arguably the genre’s most famous and influential one. His text written between 37-
30 B.C. as a didactic poem in four parts both offers practical prescriptive advice for 
cultivation (“when to plant, how to test the soil, how to graft, what to do about sheep-scab, 
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how to deal with a swarm of bees”)55 and portrays farming as a virtuous labor foundational 
to securing civic stability and peace. Chalker notes the political motivation behind Virgil’s 
text and the importance of the relationship between peace and agricultural development for 
Virgil: “[t]he poem is a response to the national and political situation of Rome in the period 
from the death of Julius Caesar to the Battle of Acticum and it is prophetic of the Augustan 
peace…an ideal as yet unrealized.”56 Certainly this political function of the georgic would 
have resonated with Crevecoeur as he attempted to portray the small-scale farmer as an 
exemplary American character. James as narrator makes an argument for the civilizing effect 
of independent farming throughout Letters. In “Distresses of a Frontier Man,” he argues for 
instance that farming keeps his family from adopting the seemingly more primitive Indian 
hunter-gather social formation—something into which the frontier settlers are at risk of 
devolving because they must survive by hunting: “As long as we keep ourselves busy in 
tilling the earth, there is no fear of any of us becoming wild; it is the chase and the food it 
procures that have this strange effect.”57 Likewise, the plantation owners threaten the 
development of modern civilization with their aristocratic-like decadence and reliance on 
“poor slaves, from whose painful labours all their wealth proceeds.”58 As a representative of 
a middling class the independent freeholder moderates what James sees as the 
underdevelopment of the frontier and the decadent, overdevelopment of quasi-aristocratic 
plantation life. James’s view of the socio-political benefits of the farmer we might say is a 
                                                
     55 John Chalker, The English Georgic: A Study in the Development of a Form (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 
1969), 27.  
     56 Ibid, 5. 
     57 Crevecoeur, Letters, 220. 
     58 Ibid, 168. James throughout the text ignores or underplays his own use of slave on his farm. My 
contention ultimately is that his inability “to read” his own participation in a slave economy is the result of his 
rejection of literary culture, for the rejection of literary culture is ultimately a rejection of a historical 
consciousness. I develop this point more explicitly below in my reading of “On Charles Town and Slavery.” 
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Virgilian view of the virtuous farmer adapted to modernity’s middle-class philosophy of 
possessive individualism. 
            The tension between agricultural and literary cultivation that I have been arguing as 
central to understanding Letters has traditionally been an overt feature of georgic poetry. A 
key characteristic of Virgil’s Georgics specifically is its discussion of “the nature and function 
of poetry itself,” “the relationship between literature and public life, poet and statesman,”59 
i.e., the relationship of literary to national character. Also, in classical and Augustan georgic 
verse the artifice often demands a kind of literary cultivation seemingly at odds with the 
poetry’s agricultural subject matter. Kevis Goodman by stressing the importance of “Virgil’s 
generative pun” on versus for it refers to “both the furrows of the field and the lines of verse 
on the page,”60 emphasizes that georgic verse has always taken both poetry and farming as its 
subject matter. And critics as early as Addison have noticed that Virgil’s Georgics are just as 
much about the labor of poetry as the labor of farming. Addison specifically notes the class 
issues implicit in the poet’s labor of transforming farming into material adequate for poetry: 
“Similarly, the ‘low phrases and terms of art that are adapted to husbandry’ must be banished 
and more elevated circumlocutions sought out. These will give the verse ‘greater pomp and 
preserve it from sinking into the plebian style.’”61 Goodman describes how the Georgics 
themselves required a different kind of cultivation than the one they describe. Loaded with 
allusions to previous classical works and displaying “a glittering verbal teckne” the Georgics 
“were understood by the linguistically self-conscious seventeenth century to…stimulat[e] a 
work of reading that was not assumed to be the same as the work it described.”62 Though 
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Letters appears in prose and attempts to imitate the speech patterns of a farmer, to some 
degree Crevecoeur continues this feature of the traditional form, albeit in a less ostentatious 
manner, through extensive intertextual relationships, alluding to  
            My point here is not to argue for labeling Letters a georgic poem in prose, but to 
uncover the georgic strains at work within the initial letter and their implications in 
understanding the work as a whole. In recent years there have been many useful studies 
showing the many eighteenth-century genres employed within Letters.63 Crevecoeur does not 
give any of these literary genres primacy in his composition, but rather deploys them on an 
as-needed basis within his complex political allegory. It seems that rather than argue for the 
primacy of one generic form or another within the text, it is more useful for scholars to 
simply identify the different generic strains at work within the text, for only by identifying 
the codes of the genres are we able to begin the task of interpretation.64  
 
                                                
63 For a summary of the generic debates surrounding Letters see Christine Holbo, “Imagination, Commerce, 
and the Politics of Associationism in Crèvecoeur's Letters from an American Farmer,” Early American Literature , 
Vol. 32, No. 1 (1997), 20-65. 
64 Despite expounding on the georgic influences within the text, I am not arguing for the georgic as a generic 
ascription for Letters as a whole. Rather, I agree with David Carlson that it is a political allegory, albeit one that 
deploys the strategies of many eighteenth-century genres on an as-needed-basis. 
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Virgi l ian Turns 
 
 “Here everything would inspire the reflecting traveler with the most philanthropic ideas; his 
imagination instead of submitting to the painful and useless retrospect of revolutions, 
desolations, and plagues, would, on the contrary, wisely spring forward to the anticipated 
fields of future cultivation and improvement… there the half-ruined amphitheaters and the 
putrid fevers of the Campania must fill the mind with the most melancholy reflections whilst 
he is seeking for the origin and the intention of those structures with which he is surrounded 
and for the cause of so great a decay. Here he might contemplate the very beginnings and 
outlines of human society, which can be traced nowhere now but in this part of the 
world…” 
—The Minister 
 
“A time shall come when in those lands, as the farmer toils at the soil with crooked plough, 
he shall find javelins eaten up with rusty mould, or with heavy hoe shall strike on empty 
helms, and marvel at the giant bones in the upturned graves.”  
—Virgil 
 
            In the opening sections of this essay I have shown that James, his wife, and minister 
reject those areas of a liberal education that perpetuate a consciousness of a European 
historical past, for such studies, according to their logic, aid in continuing aristocratic 
dominance of political economy. As the above quote from the minister’s speech against the 
Grand Tour shows, this rejection of feudalism’s brutality is not staged through a rational 
critique of historical facts, but through the outright denial of the past’s existence. The 
minister attempts to diminish the influence of history through a kind of rhetorical 
geographic erasure. The new world of the American colonies is staged as a new past, “the 
very beginnings and outlines of human society,” a falsehood made possible by the lack of 
material reminders, the ruins, seen “there,” back in Europe, but not “here.”  
            Kevis Goodman identifies an image that stages a similar problem of history at the 
end of Virgil’s first Georgic, one she calls the “representative anecdote for the pervasive 
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georgic influence in eighteenth-century poetry.”65 In singling out this image she begins a 
persuasive argument that georgics aren’t poems about farming, but poems that deal with the 
difficulty of understanding history, and the appearance of history in the form of either 
material fact or cultural artifact. Virgil’s tableaux presents the difficulty of encountering the 
material fact as history as his speaker imagines a farmer in a distant future turning up the 
ruins of Rome’s violent present as the incomprehensible markers of the past. But the 
complex temporality of this emblematic moment, the present imagined as a past in the 
future, implicates the lines of verse themselves through the pun on versus, making the central 
issue for Goodman “not that the plough or the pen buries what should be disclosed,”66 but 
rather that it stages “the difficulty of recognizing the historical meanings of what does get 
turned up, not under, by their lines.”67 In other words, implicit in Virgil’s image is that the 
poem itself could one day pose for its reader the same difficulty that the ruins posed for his 
farmer. Given its preoccupation with traumatic history and its role in the ordering of the 
present, the georgic tradition offers Crevecoeur a rich vocabulary with which to take up the 
portrayal of what he sees as a middle-class colonial desire to limit and control the influence 
of history by rejecting cultural traditions.  
            It’s not surprising, then, that we see a transposition of Virgil’s central image in Letters. 
Where in Virgil’s poetry history operates along a vertical axis of the plow’s turning over and 
under, in Letters the prose transforms it to the horizontal axis of “here” and “there,” as if 
translating history from the metaphoric genre of poetry to the metonymic form of prose 
rendered the zeitgeist into a spatial reality capable of being left behind. This transformation 
of the traditionally vertical axis into a horizontal also once again underlines that the purpose 
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     66 Ibid, 1. 
     67 Ibid, 1. 
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of the symbolic arena of the text within the diegetic space of the narrative is ultimately an 
economic one. Where Virgil places his farmer within a field, unable to make sense of the 
casualties of the past, the minister imagines himself able to create a new past in the present 
by circumnavigating such fields of vision, an empiricist’s denial: ‘It didn’t happen, if I can’t 
see it.’ Here, we might think again of James’s opening claim that his “knowledge” does not 
“extend” beyond his farm. Such blindness suggests that James, the minister, and his wife 
remain “strangers to those feudal institutions which have enslaved so many,” but, as 
Crevecoeur will soon show us in his chapter on Charles Town, such blindness to the 
“enslaved” past has the strange effect of extending into the present. As the reader carries the 
reverberations of the minister’s speech with her through the text, she sees the faultiness of 
the minister’s strategy. The irony in the minister’s speech will soon suggest that those 
traumas buried with the past will also be denied when they are perpetrated in the present.  
            Though the ruins in theses two passages by Virgil and Crevecoeur echo against one 
another, Crevecoeur more obviously links his passage to the Georgics by infusing the 
minister’s speech with a Virgilian geography. As the minister delves deeper into his 
assessment of the aristocratic practice, he reduces the terrain of the journey to include only 
sites emblematic of the Roman empire, referring both generally to “half-ruined 
amphitheaters” and to the specific southern Italian region of “the Campania,” where Virgil 
lived and wrote the Georgics. Though Englishmen on the Grand Tour in the latter half of the 
eighteenth century may have traveled to the city of Naples in the Campania in order to see 
the newly-discovered archeological sites of Herculaneum and Pompeii (James’s wife has 
already mentioned Mr. F.B.’s visit to Pompei) the minister’s choice of “the Campania” to 
describe the region rather than the cities’ actual names would easily have signaled the life of 
Virgil to any educated eighteenth-century reader. Similarly, by choosing to name “the temple 
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of Ceres” rather than other more famous sites in Italy, ones which travelers would have been 
more likely to visit, Crevecoeur elects instead to reference the Roman goddess of agriculture, 
whose invocation was one of the hallmarks of the poetic genre instituted by Virgil and 
carried on by his eighteenth-century British imitators, Crevecoeur’s contemporaries.68 
Recognizing the minister’s references as literary rather than geographical sabotages the 
purported function of the speech itself. Instead of functioning as a convincing piece of 
rhetoric against the need to preserve cultural sites, the passage begins to function on an 
extra-diegetic level linking the work directly to a western literary movement, both classical 
and contemporary.  
                                                
68 For instance in “Windsor Forest” Pope writes “Here Ceres' gifts in waving prospect stand, And nodding 
tempt the joyful reaper's hand.” (l. 39) and Thomson in “The Seasons,” “…what their balmy meads/ Their 
powerful herbs and Ceres void of pain?” (l. 863) 
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Turning “There” to “Here” 
            Earlier I had discussed the rejection of European culture by the American farmer as 
simply motivated by economics, and though here above I have to some degree utilized a 
vocabulary of psychology (trauma, denial, etc.) to describe aspects of the minister’s speech, I 
have yet to discuss at any length the rhetoric of affect presented within this passage and the 
implied relationship of such discourse to the political structures described by the minister. 
The structuring device of the minister’s speech, his use of the deictics “here” and “there” to 
signal the alternative political and historical realities of the colonies and Europe betray a 
distinctive self-preservational strategy, one aimed at protecting the “imagination” from 
“painful” sites/sights, and the “mind” from “melancholy.” Though at the diegetic level the 
reader comprehends history as functioning horizontally in the turns of the minister’s version 
of fort/da, there emerges through the various allusions to the Virgillian mode another level 
of meaning, what Jonathan Culler calls, borrowing from Todorov, vraisemblance, or the way in 
which “a text may be brought into contact with and defined in relation to another text which 
helps to make it intelligible.”69 (140) Recognition of this second layer of signification 
demands that the reader include “the artifice of forms”70 to make meaning of the passage.  
            Contending with Letters as a political allegory, the reader observes the trope of 
conversation, the perpetual breaking and coupling between the old world and new initiated by 
the characters within the narrative space, transformed by the georgic materials at the level of 
artifice into a vertical field of signification. The minister’s attempt at conversation that separates 
him from the old world in essence transforms the literary space into something resembling 
the turning up and down of Virgil’s versus. At this second level of reading the text inserts 
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quite literally the past into the minister’s present. The reader sees the minister standing in a 
linguistic field turning up the remnants of a georgic tradition. The text then functions as a 
kind of allegorical paradigm for the political situation it narrates. The reader comprehends 
that just as James and the minister are unable to recognize the history turned up in the field 
of the text, so to are they blind to the entirety of their own terrain. The reader sees that the 
result of James’s inability to know anything that “extends” beyond his farm also denies him 
the capacity for self-reflection—something that the reader has been able to do through the 
possession of literary character, a component of political personality denied by the text’s 
characters. The text through activating several layers of signification suggests that the 
character’s inability to see their own involvement in a system of slavery results directly from 
the rejection of literary character as part of the American personality. The result of this 
blindness is seen throughout the opening chapters in the characters’ ability to name their 
own slavery in a feudal past, but never to name their own slaves as such. We have already 
seen the minister’s use of “enslavement” to describe the past and James himself in “What is 
an American?” describes the transformation of a German immigrant in America: “from a 
servant to the rank of a master; from being the slave of some despotic prince, to become a 
free man.”71 Whereas when mentioning their own slaves, James and his wife do not 
transport the vocabulary of slavery from a feudal context to their own. For instance, in 
warning James about what the neighbors might think if he takes up writing, his wife presents 
the healthy and kempt look of the slaves as a marker of their own wealth as farmers and as a 
fulfillment of their paternalistic duties, “[H]ow would’st thee bear to be called at our country 
meetings the man of the pen?...Better hear them as usual observe…‘Look how fat and well 
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clad their Negroes are.’”72 Similarly, in delineating the productivity of his farm,  James lists 
the attitude and health of his slaves as a mark of his relative success as a freeholder: “Every 
year I kill from 1,500 to 2,000 weight of pork, 1,200 of beef, half a dozen of good wethers in 
harvest; of fowls my wife has always a great stock; what can I wish more? My Negroes are 
tolerably faithful and healthy.”73 In the face of the minister’s speech, the inability of the word 
“slave” to cross from the “there” of Europe to the “here” of James’s farm operates along 
the same unsustainable logic as the opening letter’s other claims of the American 
freeholder’s complete separation from a violent past.  
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The American “There” and “Here” 
 
“The following scene will, I hope, account for these melancholy reflections and apologize 
for the gloomy thoughts with which I have filled this letter: my mind is, and always has been, 
oppressed since I became witness to it. I was not long since invited to dine with a planter 
who lived three miles from ______ , where he then resided. In order to avoid the heat of the 
sun, I resolved to go on foot, sheltered in a small path leading through a pleasant wood.” 
 
—Farmer James, Letter IX, “On Charles Town and Slavery” 
 
             
            Above I have aimed to make two significant points concerning the transposition of 
lyric forms within Letters from an American Farmer. My initial claim was that the opening of 
Letter I collapses lyric apostrophe into a Weberian model of Lutheran calling and that such a 
transformation of apostrophe from a vertical to a horizontal axis signals that the writing of 
these letters functions primarily to establish economic relationships. James’s can only enter 
into written correspondence with Mr. F.B. if the function of the writing is to gain entrance 
into a colonial system of economic exchange that would allow him to increase his own 
capital. Central to James becoming the writer of this text is the understanding that the only 
intellectual cultivation appropriate for the development of the American personality is the 
study of the natural sciences for they hold the potential to develop the American’s real 
property and do not subject the American to the painful reminders of a feudal past. The 
study of the human sciences are rejected for they perpetuate a feudal culture which once 
oppressed the class of men who now find themselves freeholders in America. This rejection 
of literary cultivation in order to ensure the development of the American farmers real 
property creates a relationship between the American farmer and the Old World that 
operates as a trope of conversation, a back and forth that allows the American farmer to feel as 
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though he can reject certain aspects of European culture and accept those functions of 
aristocratic culture that enable his own economic rise.  
            Ultimately, the text establishes intertextual relationships between its own aesthetic 
surface and the georgic tradition of English poetry in order to critique the farmer’s rejection 
of a literary tradition, for by rejecting knowledge of the past the farmer chooses to deny that 
the possibility of his own status as a freeholder in the colonies is coextensive with an 
imperial economic system emerging from a feudal order. Such a denial further allows him to 
see his own freedom as a landowner not as a reversal of his earlier subservient existence in a 
feudal order, but as a new political reality independent from any early historical-political 
realities. This willful rejection of a cultural past permits a kind of political ignorance of his 
own present, allowing the farmer to falsely experience his existence as a colonial farmer as 
separate and disentangles from a network of slave labor.  
            Above I have shown in my examination of the minister’s speech that the past as the 
sight of economic oppression is figured geographically, where Europe is a painful “there” 
left behind for the new “here” of America. In this final section of my paper I would like to 
examine how this trope of geographical segmentation not only functions within the narrative 
as a means for the American farmer to separate himself from Europe, but also aims to 
separate his own operations as a property owner from a domestic slave system exemplified 
by the plantation culture of the colonial south.  As I have argued above, James’s claim that 
he only has knowledge of those customs related to farming is a claim that his “knowledge 
extends no farther” than his property line. Crevecoeur tests the implications of this claim 
most explicitly in Letter IX, “On Charles Town and Slavery” by once again refiguring the 
trope of conversation, a means of selective rejection and acceptance of social realities, through 
the literal wanderings of James off his property into the uncultivated space of “a pleasant 
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wood.” Here, in perhaps Letters most famous scene, James encounters the tortured body of a 
slave still alive “suspended in [a] cage and left there to expire.” Crevecoeur, as if to cue the 
reader to the repetition of what the minister would have named a feudal violence, has James 
introduce his horrific description of the slave’s mutilated body with a long meditation against 
slavery, then, before presenting the reader with the actual description of the encounter, 
explains that “the following scene will, I hope, account for these melancholy reflections.” (my 
italics) In other words, Crevecoeur has James directly quote the minister’s earlier description 
of Europe’s traumatic sights: “there the half-ruined amphitheaters and the putrid fevers of 
the Campania must fill the mind with the most melancholy reflections.” Through the direct 
repetition of the minister’s words James again ignorantly undermines his attempted 
presentation of his own political reality as distinct and separate from historical system of 
violence.  
            In deciding to wander “there” beyond his property line, James must apprehend 
“here” first hand the “enslavement” that makes possible his own political present. And 
though in the preceding pages he has attempted the same trope of mastery as his minister, 
repeating “there…there” as he describes Charles Town’s slavery as if it were just as distant in 
time and space as the ruins of the Roman Empire, still he cannot avoid his own implication 
in the matter. Though unable to name his own slaves as such, his encounter with the slave in 
the woods results from his movement beyond his farm to accept the hospitality of the 
plantation owner responsible for the torture, where James “intended to dine.” Given that 
earlier in the text moving beyond the boundaries of his property was figured as the 
acquisition of literary cultivation, Crevecoeur’s decision to have James encounter the horrors 
of slavery as the direct result of extending his own movements beyond the real cultivation of 
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his farm functions as an argument that the American neglect of literary cultivation is directly 
linked to the perpetuation of slavery in the colonies. 
            Curiously, despite his literal confrontation with the horrors of slavery, James never 
quite acquires the ability to see his own participation within the colonial network, despite 
being able to sketch the systemic nature of the slaves in Charles Town as the result of a 
global capitalist system: “With gold, dug from Peruvian mountains, they order vessels to the 
coasts of Guinea; by virtue of that gold, wars, murders, and devastations are committed in 
some harmless, peaceable African neighbourhood where dwelt innocent people…”74 Here 
gold reappears in the hands of the Charles Town planters operating within the same network 
earlier outlined by James’s wife in her description of the speculative “writing” of 
Englishmen, but despite its geographical proximity to James, he still understands himself 
separate from the system. Unable to make the connection between the minister’s earlier 
speech of the developmental potential of his own farm to provide such “colours” and his 
own words in this letter, James continues to believe that the small nature of his own 
property does not exist within an economic continuum with American plantation life. It is 
beyond his ken to comprehend that the plantation economy is the systemic telos of entering 
into conversation with Mr. F.B. As if to underline this fact, Crevecoeur has James move from 
the terrain of the violence to the comfort of the plantation property in a single sentence: 
“Oppressed with the reflections which this shocking spectacle afforded me, I mustered 
strength enough to walk away and soon reached the house at which I intended to dine.”75  
James traverses a cohesive terrain of various sites of the colonial political economy that had 
earlier been rhetorically denied through the deictics “here” and “there.” He finds himself at 
the table of the man responsible for the slave’s torture and seemingly critically writes, “They 
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told me that the laws of self-preservation rendered such executions necessary.”76 The reader, 
however, has already herself traversed the rhetorical terrain of the American farmer’s 
campaign of self-preservation and can only answer in affirmation the presumably rhetorical 
question James’s had asked earlier in the letter: “Can it be possible that the force of custom 
should ever make me deaf to all these reflections and as insensible to the injustice of that 
trade and to their miseries as the rich inhabitants of this town seem to be?”77
                                                
     76 Ibid, 179. 
     77 Ibid, 170. 
 66 
A National  Formation:  Equiano and the Gener i c  Limits  o f  Moderni ty  
 
 
“I had often seen my master and Dick employed in reading; and I had a great 
curiosity to talk to the books, as I thought they did; and so to learn how all things 
had a beginning. For that purpose I have often taken up a book, and talked to it, and 
then put my ears to it, when alone, in hopes it would answer me; and I have been 
very much concerned when I found it remaining silent.” 
——Equiano1 
 
 
            Equiano’s ‘talking book’ passage above is arguably the most famous passage from 
the Interesting Narrative, not least of all because of the pressure that Henry Louis Gates, Jr. 
places on “the trope of the talking book” in The Signifying Monkey, for he sees in it “the 
beginning of the Afro-American literary tradition.”2  Because the talking book appears in 
late-eighteenth century Anglophone slave narratives by James Gronniosaw, John Marrant, 
John Jea, Ottobah Cugoana, and Olaudah Equiano, it displays “the extent of intertextuality” 
in these autobiographical works, marking the beginnings of what is for Gates a national 
literary tradition.3 Chiefly, the talking book, both due to its function within each narrative 
and its migration from text to text, displays the efforts of slaves and ex-slaves “[to meet] the 
challenge of the Enlightenment to their humanity by literally writing themselves into being 
through carefully crafted representations in language of the black self.”4 By understanding 
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Equiano’s narrative as a Bildungsroman, a story that portrays “a dynamic self that once was 
‘like that’ but is now ‘like this,’”5 a process facilitated to a great degree by Equiano’s 
interpellation into an Anglophone literary culture, Gates codes the narrative as modern.6 
This self-charting of one’s development has been indeed one of the chief marker’s of 
modern prose delineated in theories of the novel and in studies of both secular and religious 
autobiography, from critics as varied as Georg Lukacs to Charles Taylor.  
          Gate’s desire to code the trope in general as modern results, however, in an 
overzealousness to interpret slave narratives as variations of Enlightenment narratives of 
rational self-improvement, a pressure that forces Gates to argue the inherent secularity of 
these slave texts. In his discussion of Gronniosaw, the first author to use the trope, for 
instance, Gates provides a forcefully secularized interpretation of the talking book, despite 
its overtly religious character in Gronniosaw’s narrative, where, just as in Equiano’s text, the 
book that refuses to address the slave is, in fact, his master’s prayer book. In understanding 
Gronniosaw’s process of acquiring literacy as an “abandonment” of his “African heritage”7 
and the beginning of Gronniosaw’s “strange passage from black man to white,”8 Gates finds 
it imperative to interpret the slave’s narrative of westernization as nonreligious, arguing that 
“the text represents this procedure as if it were a rite of baptism, but a secular or cultural 
cleansing or inundation that obliterates (or is meant to obliterate) the traces of an African 
past that Gronniosaw is eager to relinquish.”9 Gates’ erasure of the text’s religious 
component suggests that he sees Christianity as antithetical to the intellectual development 
the narrators undergo as they enter an eighteenth-century literary public sphere and for this 
                                                
     5 Ibid, 155. 
6 For more on the Bildungsroman see T. Pfau. ""Bildungsroman"." Blackwell Encyclopedia of Romantic Literature Ed. 
Frederick Burwick, Nancy Goslee, et all (London: Blackwell, 2011) and F. Moretti, The Way of the World: The 
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     7 Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Signifying Monkey, 138. 
     8 Ibid, 139.  
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reason he as critic succumbs to the pressures of the dominant grand narratives of the 
development of English literature itself. By offering secular interpretations of the trope he 
adapts early slave writings to fit historical narratives of British prose forms argued by critics 
such as Ian Watt and Michael McKeon, among others, which state that during the 
eighteenth-century novelistic forms became progressively more secular as they developed 
into a technology through which individuals could display modern notions of possessive 
individualism. This historical narrative assumes that eighteenth-century Anglophone prose 
texts depict a model of literary cultivation symbolic of a development of one’s property in 
person, thus marking a significant break from the genre of spiritual autobiography. Gates’ 
secular reading of the talking book trope, then, suggests that narrators of eighteenth-century 
slave texts adapt themselves to conceptions of freedom produced by a capitalist marketplace, 
rather than resist such adaptation. Perhaps, given the grand narratives of the development of 
western prose, Gates fears acknowledging that slave narratives adapt the conventions of 
spiritual autobiography, for to do so is to risk suggesting that the texts do not exemplify 
generic developments demonstrative of modernity’s ‘break’ with the past in a field of study 
that values texts for their ability to display such historical changes at the level of form.  
            Through Equiano’s passage above, however, we can begin to revise the history of 
modern prose genres to include the autobiographical works of slaves and ex-slaves in which 
such adaptations of Christian tropes and conventions work as symbolic political challenges 
to the western secular rationality that denied these writers their property in person. This in 
turn recovers a model of modern literary cultivation emerging from the literature of the 
state-less space of the Black Atlantic that posits a form of liberty disentangled from 
conceptions of personhood defined through property. Equiano’s text thus challenges us to 
reconsider both the dominant historical narratives of eighteenth-century prose genres that 
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gauge a text’s modernity according to its progressive secularity, but also to see the limitations 
of such historical narratives that define generic evolution solely through texts emerging in 
the political context of specific nation-states, where the modern and theoretically universal 
rights of man are upheld by civic institutions.  
        The development of one’s property in person that is the basis of literary cultivation as a 
form of mobile capital emerges through “the rights which were spoken of in the eighteenth 
century as natural rights”10 but such rights, as Alasdair MacIntyre argues, though abstractly 
universal “always have a highly specific and socially local character.”11 They only exist if 
administered through the legislative structures of a particular civic society. Equiano’s political 
condition as a citizen of no state—the text presents itself as a plea to British parliament for 
the recognition of his personhood and the personhood of other slaves and ex-slaves—then  
denies him access to those universal and abstract rights of man that grant property in person, 
a dilemma that defines many of the episodes in the Interesting Narratives. In comparing 
Equiano’s model of literary cultivation to Benjamin Franklin’s we begin to see that Franklin’s 
membership within a civic society that protects his property rights enables him to exercise a 
modern conception of personhood and thus use literary cultivation primarily as a form of 
capital. Alternatively, Equiano’s adoption of a Christian ontological order results from his 
inability to access universal rights due to the fact that no state recognizes him as a citizen. 
Normally, a text positing such a Christian ontological order according to the dominant 
theories of English prose genres signals a pre-modern form, but through Equiano we see 
that his adoption of such an ontology is in fact a product of what David Kazanjian calls 
modernity’s “philosophical problematic of the relationship between universalism and 
                                                
     10 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1984), 69. 
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particularism.”12 Equiano, as a state-less person, helps us to understand how a religious 
model of literary personality can challenge, at least at the level of the symbolic, modern 
conceptions of possessive individualism by positing an ontological order that remedies the 
inability of modern law conceived of as ‘natural rights’ to operate as a universal.  
                                                
     12 David Kazanjian, Colonizing Trick: National Culture and Imperial Citizenship in Early America (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 4. 
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What is  Improvement? 
            In the previous chapter much of my analysis focused on the term cultivation and the 
resonances between its literal and figurative uses in Letters from an American Farmer. In both 
Franklin and Equiano we find instead a parallel term, improvement, to denote both real and 
figurative property and both narrators label literary cultivation as such. Franklin, for instance, 
in expressing his economical advantages over another person states “My Mind having been 
more improv’d by Reading…”13 Similarly, Equaino writes, “I had long wished to be able to 
read and write; and for this purpose I took every opportunity to gain instruction, but had 
made as yet but little progress. However, when I went to London with my master, I had 
soon an opportunity of improving myself, which I gladly embraced.”14 Staging a youth’s 
acquisition of literacy as improvement is not unusual in eighteenth-century narratives of 
development. We see it, for instance, in Goethe’s novel Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship (1795-
96) and in Rousseau’s Emile, or On Education (1762). Similarly, the inversion of the concept—
middle-class improvement foiled by ‘bad education’—often appears in the Romantic genre 
of the uncanny, suggesting the social force of literary cultivation as a widespread western 
form of middle-class improvement. For instance, we find protagonists destroyed by their 
misguided studies in Hoffmann’s “The Sandman” (1816) and in Mary Shelley’s imitation of 
such German tales Frankenstein (1818). 
            Though by the mid-to-late eighteenth century improvement came to stand for any 
advancement, betterment, or simple amelioration of a wide variety of private or public 
situations, including those of an economic, educational, psychological, political, or moral 
nature, its “earliest uses,” as Raymond Williams notes “referred to operations for monetary 
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profit…[and in the eighteenth century] it was a key word in the development of  
modernizing agrarian capitalism.”15 Williams also writes that from the mid-eighteenth 
century on “there is the characteristic ‘improve oneself,’ and such phrases as ‘improving 
reading’ followed.”16 That it could mean both an individual’s ability to develop capacities 
within him or herself or the development of real property suggests that its evolution as a 
term reflects the same socio-economic changes that we see through the term cultivation. The 
figurative uses that abound in eighteenth-century literature never completely lose their 
connection to this notion of individual gain and material profit, for even actions deemed 
moral improvements were often meant to correct the greed or self-interest implicit in forms 
of material improvements through education or argument.  
            In British literature perhaps the most common use of improvement refers to the 
“modernizing agrarian capitalism” described by Williams. Over the course of the eighteenth 
century radical improvements to the landed gentry’s property often resulted in the severance 
of an estate’s traditional integrated relationship to the surrounding community, spawning 
much debate in the literary public sphere. For this reason improvement signified both 
negatively and positively the new economic and moral philosophy that favored economic 
self-interest over the fulfillment of one’s traditional duties to the community at large. 
Discussions in the public sphere concerning what defined proper or improper improvements 
in reality were debates defining, in the words of Alistair Duckworth, “between proper and 
improper responses to an inherited culture.”17 In The Tory View of Landscape Nigel Everett 
shows us that what was at stake politically, socially, and philosophically for England in the 
                                                
     15 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 
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     16 Ibid, 133. 
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debates surrounding improvements to the landscape was essentially the moral ground upon 
which England would build its future. Generally speaking Tories understood “those who 
abandoned the landscape to the market were also abandoning the order of civil society to 
fragmentation.”18 To make decisions based upon a market rationality that ignored communal 
bonds was to go against the idea that man is “a dependent part of a system, and Self in large 
part a contradictory idea.”19 For an English landowner to balk on his duties to the 
inhabitants of the surrounding landscape was to deny his own place in the natural systems of 
“the whole creation” and thus to renounce the divinity of those “natural systems” that were 
“the productions of the mind of God.”20 In the Tory view, as Everett shows in his 
discussion of this tradition of analogical thinking, improvements were to be moral and gentle 
ameliorations of abuses, conscious of “our imperfect view of things”21 and attentive to the 
pattern of nature. In other words, in this view improvement could only be seen as actually 
improving the surrounding world if it aimed to keep in place the ordered chain of being 
which saw the political and social world as analogous to a hierarchy of a transcendent 
religious sphere. Though the social and political position of England’s landed gentry and 
Equiano is incomparable, Equiano’s strategy of adopting a Christian ontology to validate his 
humanity represents an analogous conservative strategy of fending of the harms of a modern 
mercantile capitalism. 
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Benjamin Franklin & the Modern Model  o f  Literary Improvement 
            For Ian Watt Daniel Defoe’s prose presents the earliest novelistic evidence of “a 
confusion of religious and material values,” a result of “the Puritan gospel of the dignity of 
labour,”22 Specifically, in Robinson Crusoe the Protestant work ethic evolves into a privileging 
of material over spiritual life and the human over the divine: “once the highest spiritual 
values had been attached to the performance of the daily task, the next step was for the 
autonomous individual to regard his achievements as a quasi-divine mastering of the 
environment.”23 Watt argues that Defoe’s materialism does not emerge exclusively from 
Protestantism’s turn to the mundane, but also results from modern ontology, specifically 
Cartesian philosophy. Like the Protestant conversion narrative Descartes’ philosophical 
practice of self-examination makes knowledge and “the pursuit of truth” a private, “wholly 
individual matter.”24 Defoe’s reliance upon “the pattern of the autobiographical memoir” 
synthesizes both these religious and philosophical impulses in his fictions by upholding “the 
primacy of individual experience.”25 Michael McKeon’s work on the novel develops the 
implications of the Protestant literary self-scrutiny that Watt addresses. In particular 
McKeon argues that religious literary self-examination served an eighteenth-century 
progressive ideology by providing members of a rising middle-class who wished to challenge 
aristocratic ideals of “elevated birth” with a means of documenting civic and economic 
virtue. Narrative thus served progressive ideologies by accounting for what Thomas 
Jefferson called “natural aristocracy,” allowing an individual to break class ranks “by upward 
mobility through state service, private employment, or any other method of industrious self-
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application.”26 Such ideas of class mobility required a means of demonstrating that virtue was 
not a static state determined at birth but could be continually improved and demonstrated 
through an individual’s actions over the course of an entire lifetime.  
            Theories of autobiography complement these elements of Watt’s and McKeon’s 
historical narratives of the novel as a modern genre, suggesting that the generic differences 
between the two forms, at least through the eighteenth-century, are minimal. Georges 
Gusdorf in “Conditions and Limits of Autobiography,” largely held as the inaugural study of 
western autobiography, also places autobiography’s origins in the tradition of religious self-
examination, beginning with Augustine, whose practice in turn evolves into the written form 
of Protestant introspection exemplified in English literature by Bunyan’s Grace Abounding. 
Like Watt and McKeon, Gusdorf understands the historical telos of eighteenth-century 
prose forms as the public presentation of an economically-oriented individualism. The self-
reflection that begins as a religious practice used for personal moral accountability by the end 
of the sixteenth century emerges as a mode of self-fascination. 27 For instance, Gusdorf 
notes, Montaigne “discovers in himself a new world, a man of nature, naked and artless, 
whose confessions he gives us in his Essays, but without penitence.”28 Such introspection for 
its own sake enables a solipsistic view of the world which Gusdorf acknowledges serves 
European capitalist expansion well: “[Autobiography] expresses a concern peculiar to 
Western man, a concern that has been of good use in his systematic conquest of the 
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universe.”29 (29) The economically-oriented vocabulary Gusdorf uses to describe the 
personality capable of producing secular autobiography makes clear that the once religious 
first-person form now serves to establish a property in one’s person: “The man who takes 
delight in thus drawing his own image believes himself worthy of a special interest…In 
narrating my life…[I] can preserve this precious capital that ought not disappear.”30 (italics 
mine) Phillipe Lejeune’s compact and wry analysis of the genre in terms of human rights in 
his On Autobiography brings into relief the fact that theoretical conceptions of freedom and 
self-possession from the revolutionary period onwards in practice defined political autonomy 
chiefly through property rights: “Autobiography is a human right. Become the owner of your 
life!”31 Autobiography in such a political context develops into an exercise of freedom for it 
displays an individual’s right and ability to possess and capitalize upon his or her own 
personality.32  
            If we turn now to examine the nature of literary improvement in Benjamin Franklin’s 
Autobiography, we find that Lejeune’s emphatic “Become the owner of your life!” aptly 
paraphrases Franklin’s own declaration of his motivations for writing this work. We see in 
the text’s opening that Franklin blurs the line between biological life and literary 
representation, 33 so that the act of Autobiography becomes synonymous with improving his 
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achievements through literary “Recollection,” which as a form of revision ensures a glorified 
and redeemed afterlife not in the religious sense, but in the form of earthly fame:  
…I should have no Objection to a Repetition of the same Life from its Beginning, 
only asking the Advantage Authors have in a second Edition to correct some Faults 
of the first…The Thing most like living one’s Life over again, seems to be a 
Recollection of that Life; and to make that Recollection as durable as possible, the 
putting it down in Writing.34  
 
Franklin’s ability to control through writing his earthly afterlife emphasizes how the process 
of writing itself aided in secularizing an initially religious form. Michael Mascuch in his study 
of the emergence of modern individualism through the autobiographical form explains that 
authorship as self-improvement replaces divinity with the writer’s humanity, so that on the 
page the author becomes his own alpha and omega, the divine creator of himself writ small: 
“By acting as author, the individualist self becomes its own telos: it constitutes a beginning 
and an end in itself.”35 Completed during Franklin’s “Country Retirement” the act of 
Autobiography grants Franklin the hindsight to organize the episodes of his life into a logically 
sequenced narrative of economic self-creation that culminates in a “State of Affluence & 
some Degree of Reputation in the World.”36 Writing through its ability to ensure the 
‘durability’ of Franklin’s reputation insures the value of the Franklin name for his son, to 
whom the book is dedicated and who inherits the social capital of the family name. Through 
writing, the narrative of Franklin’s humble origins transforms into an inheritance, one that 
instantiates the validity of  the egalitarian market system it describes. Franklin’s self-creation, 
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as he claims early in the narrative was an intellectual self-development achieved primarily 
through writing: “Prose Writing…was a principal Means of my Advancement.”37 
            The “advancement” through “prose writing” that Franklin describes, however, is not 
one of literary fame per se, but rather something akin to facilitating a social sphere aptly 
summed up by Jerome Christensen’s description of David Hume’s career where “reality 
[exists] as discursive through and through.”38  
            We see this in Franklin’s description of his development as a ‘writer’ in which he 
continually conflates written language with social conversation, so that “prose writing” for 
Franklin appears not as and end in itself but as what Hugh Blair describes as a means of 
“furnishing materials for those fashionable topics of discourse, and thereby enabling us to 
support a proper rank in social life.”39 Through his ability to ‘converse’ both in writing and in 
oral speech, Franklin gains access to a public sphere that cannot be differentiated from an 
economic one.  
            We see this conflation of writing and speech in Franklin’s description of his 
development as a youth and in his analysis of how cultivating a literary personality improved 
his social standing. Franklin’s critical examination of his own evolution as a 
‘conversationalist’ ultimately recommends to the reader a turn away from disputatious 
engagement to a form of sociable agreeableness. In his descriptions of his self-directed 
exercises that appear to prepare the young Franklin for what Habermas calls “the art of 
critical-rational public debate”40 such disputations begin as oral arguments but then continue 
in written form. From the start Franklin describes his weakness as a lack of eloquence, 
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noting that even his father, for instance, after examining his written response to his friend 
Collins, with whom he practiced the art of debate, noted that Collins, the “more eloquent” 
in argument, who “had a ready Plenty of Words” won against Franklin “more by Fluency 
than by the Strength of his Reasons.”41 Franklin remedies his weaknesses through an intense 
study of “an odd Volume of the Spectator,”42 attempting to reproduce much of the writing 
from memory. This focus on eloquence over reasoned argument is Franklin’s first step 
towards sociability. 
            When Franklin describes his teenage adoption of the Socratic method from 
Greenwood’s Grammar, he warns his reader that his appropriation of the form was a 
mistake precisely for its ability to offend. “Charm’d” by “a Specimen of a Dispute in the 
Socratic Method” he originally chooses to adopt the debate style in order to hide his view on 
religion, having become “a real Doubter in many Points of our Religious Doctrine”43 after 
reading Shaftsbury. Thus the Socratic method appears “safest” for it allows him to never 
reveal his own views. The results in terms of argumentation work favorably for Franklin, for 
he draws “People even of superior Knowledge into Concessions the Consequences of which 
they did not foresee, entangling them in Difficulties out of which they could not extricate 
themselves.”44 But he ultimately gives up the method because it offends his interlocutors by 
exposing their faulty logic and such disagreements are against the ultimate “Ends of 
Conversation [which] are to inform, or to be informed, to please, or to persuade.”45 Ultimately, 
Franklin stresses that:   
[Argument] is apt to become a very bad Habit, making People often extreamly (sic) 
disagreeable in Company, by the Contradiction that is necessary to bring into 
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Practice, & thence, besides souring & spoiling the Conversation, is productive of 
Disgusts & perhaps enmities where you may have occasion for Friendship.46  
 
Clearly Franklin’s model of “conversation” differentiates itself from Habermas’ “critical-
rational debate” in that the objective of such writing and conversation is not to eliminate 
erroneous thinking about the nature of civic society, but to “have occasion for Friendship.” 
Jon Mee’s recent work on what he calls “conversability” in the eighteenth century helps us to 
understand both Franklin’s fluid boundary between writing and speech and his emphasis 
upon politeness in conversation. Mee tracks a tension between “politeness and 
improvement”47 over the course of the eighteenth-century in the period’s literature on 
proper conversation, ultimately arguing that Shaftesbury’s neoclassical Platonic model of 
conversation from the beginning of the century, a style displaying an Enlightenment 
“commitment to rational enquiry,” softens into Addison’s and Steele’s conversational style 
favoring “agreeableness” 48 over candor. Franklin’s own thinking moves away from 
Shaftesbury, towards the amiable style of The Spectator. Mee accounts for this change in 
conversability as the result of a middle-class reliance upon sociability in an increasingly 
commercialized world. Shaftesbury, Mee notes, “sees commercial society as corrosively 
effeminizing through its reliance on ‘scrupulous nicety’ rather than what he calls those 
‘masculine helps of learning and sound reason’,”49 whereas Steele already describes 
eighteenth-century society as a “world in which conversations take place…where there is 
constant intercourse with ‘either those above you or below you.’”50 Mee’s work highlights for 
us the tensions emerging from the Enlightenment, which through its privileging of 
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rationality enabled such conversation between men of different stations, yet because of this 
never allowed for improvement to be defined separately from economic or class interests. In 
particular Mee sees the writing of David Hume’s “as the product of a culture of intellectual 
sociability in Edinburgh committed to ‘politeness’ and ‘improvement.’”51 Though Hume 
promoted conversation among the Scottish literati, Mee notes “politeness and improvement 
could form a tense relationship if a commitment to rational enquiry privileged candour over 
agreeableness.”52  
            We see Hume’s own desire to ameliorate the tensions between critical-rational debate 
and “agreeableness” in the extended trade metaphor in “Of Essay-Writing,” which proposes 
the form of the essay as a practical means of bridging “the learned and conversible Worlds.” 
Expressing that a dialogue between the academic and social worlds would produce “mutual 
Advantage,” Hume offers himself “as a as a Kind of Resident or Ambassador from the 
Dominions of Learning to those of Conversation.” Speaking of his own essays as 
“commodities” that will enable a trade between both spheres, so that “I shall give 
Intelligence to the Learned of whatever passes in Company, and shall endeavour to import 
into Company whatever Commodities I find in my native Country proper for their Use and 
Entertainment.”53 In other words, Hume proposes himself as middle-man, a gate-keeper of 
academia, his “native Country,” who also knows what “Materials” will offer “Advantage” to 
a social world beyond academic circles, where men from different economic backgrounds 
need to engage with one another without incurring offense. As producer of essays that 
provide in essence the raw material of conversation, Hume naturally ensures himself a 
generous ‘cut’ of the transaction. Hume’s figuration of essays themselves as a raw material 
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produced by the ‘nation’ of academia highlights the necessity of learnedness as a property in 
a world where ‘polite’ and sociable verbal exchange mediates economic relationships. For 
both Hume and Franklin literary improvement ultimately is in the service of economic 
improvement. 
            In Franklin’s description of the “Junto,” “a Club, for mutual Improvement” started 
by him and several other business men in Philadelphia we see David Hume’s model of the 
commerce between learned and ‘social’ circles instantiated. Though the men meet to debate 
both in speech and in writing “in the sincere Spirit of Enquiry after Truth,” ultimately they 
“acquire[] better Habits of Conversation.” Franklin explains to the reader that he presents 
the history of the Junto to show that members were through the years “exerting themselves 
in recommending Business to us.”54 What appears on the service as a club for the 
development of intellectual ideas in reality operates as a means of facilitating business 
relationships. Franklin’s founding of a newspaper for which he is the principle writer has 
similar effects, “the leading Men, seeing a News Paper now in the hands of one who could 
also handle a Pen, thought it convenient to oblige & encourage me”55 by sending work to 
Franklin’s print shop. Franklin’s facility with language in the form of “conversation” displays 
his qualifications for admittance to an economically mobile merchant class.  
             If we turn for a moment to David Kazanjian study of eighteenth-century U.S. 
mercantilism we can begin to understand how Franklin benefited from the fact that both 
“modern liberal citizenship”56 and “modern economic freedom,”57 the two conditions that 
make Franklin’s social and economic rise possible, were only available via Franklin’s 
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membership in a nation-state, first as a subject of the British empire, then later as a citizen of 
the new U.S. republic. As Kazanjian points out, in eighteenth-century political practice the 
construction of freedom as “modern liberal citizenship” ignores the particularities of 
individuals—“trade, heritage, wealth, race, gender, religion, the list is supposedly infinite”—
and “agrees not to value or hierarchically codify such differences in order to see only the 
citizen, a subject formally abstracted from its particularisms and hence formally and 
abstractly equal to all its fellow citizens.”58 Through such abstraction, by existing theoretically 
in the eyes of the state simply as ‘citizen,’ all political subjects gain equal access to the rights 
granted to them by the state. Similarly, abstract labor as the value form becomes the basis of 
modern economic freedom, a point that Marx makes in the Grundrisse, because it is through 
the ability to exchange his or her labor that the subject achieves economic equality with 
other subjects: “the laborer who sells his or her abstract labor, is the free economic subject of 
capitalism because he or she is said to be formally and abstractly equal to all other laborers.”59 
For this reason, equality, or perhaps more accurately, equivalency, serves as the basis of 
modern freedom in the political and economic sphere.  
            Through Kazanjian’s reading of the discourse of eighteenth-century U.S. mercantilist 
practices, we can see how Franklin’s political and economic powers result from eighteenth-
century mercantile practices that enabled “the nation form [to become] the dominant 
political form for capitalism.”60 Specifically, in his analysis of the first tariff bill passed by the 
U.S. Congress on July 4, 1789, Kazanjian shows how mercantilist practices equated 
economic and political freedom and limited universalist conceptions of egalitarianism and 
                                                
     58 Ibid, 2.  
     59 Ibid, 18. 
     60 Ibid, 42. 
 84 
free labor within national boundaries. Such economic laws, by limiting the citizens’ social 
relations with outsiders, Kazanjian argues, in effect created the nation itself:  
These subjects will recognize their full fellowship as citizens once they have been 
recognized in state policy and by each other as exchangers rationally abstracted from 
their differences and antagonisms and represented as formally equivalent units of 
population engaging in lively economic exchange.61 
 
Here the discourse of the state in the form of a trade regulation that encouraged inter-state 
trade and discouraged international trade in essence localized a universal conception of 
freedom within the boundaries of the nation, but expanded the definition of universal rights 
to include free trade, but only with other free actors, i.e. other U.S. citizens. Here we see 
state policy running a parallel route to the historical development of “improvement” itself. 
We see the emergence of modern state policy developing along the same lines as other 
iterations of “freedom.” Where initially “improvement” as an exercise of liberty emerged in 
the form of literary cultivation within a public sphere where men of different social classes 
engaged in “critical-rational debate,” such “improvement,” as we see in the examples of both 
Franklin and Hume, devolved into a form of literary personality meant chiefly to serve 
capitalist relations. Kazanjian’s work shows us that the modern state follows a similar path 
where the modern state emerged to support a formally abstract freedom defined as 
citizenship, state policy soon instantiates such freedom most visibly in the form of free trade.   
            The example of Franklin’s business contracts suggests that the relationship between 
the state and citizen is mutually constitutive. Through his public displays of literary 
personality that verify him as an ‘improved’ and worthy citizen, Franklin consistently finds 
himself contracted by local government agencies. Perhaps most telling of the 
interconnectedness of individual literary improvement and the expansion of state economic 
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power is Franklin’s story of how he as a laborer working for the printer Keimer oversaw the 
project of printing money for the then province of New Jersey. As Franklin notes a 
committee of the province frequented the print shop to “take Care that no more Bills were 
printed than the Law directed.” These influential representatives of state power sought 
Franklin out on their visits rather than his master Keimer, for, according to Franklin, “My 
Mind having been more improv’d by Reading than Keimer’s, I suppose it was for that 
Reason my Conversation seem’d to be more valu’d.” These “principal People of the 
Province” predict that Franklin “will soon work this [Keimer] out of his Business & make a 
Fortune in it at Philadelphia.” “These Friends were afterwards,” Franklin ultimately remarks, 
“of great Use to me.”62 But perhaps the greatest evidence of Franklin’s ability to use literary 
personality in a public sphere that conflated political freedom and free market capitalism is 
the fact that his reputation as a man of letters and business earned him the right to aid in the 
writing of the U.S. constitution. 
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Equiano’s  Improvement 
            Writing in Equiano is not a form of middle-class economic improvement adapted to 
the specific conditions of a slave caste, but rather a means of proposing a moral 
improvement to a western conception of freedom that limits personhood to homo economicus, 
an “egalitarian” form of citizenship enabled via a slave economy. Though, like Franklin, 
Equiano names his own progressive literacy as “improvement,” Equiano’s presentation of 
the talking book must remain religious, for as we saw in the example of Franklin, modern 
personhood and thus modern literary form as defined by Watt, McKeon, and Gusdorf, can 
only emerge in a political sphere that recognizes both abstract citizenship and abstract 
labor.63 The fact that Equiano as a subject historically co-exists with Franklin, albeit outside 
of the boundaries of the nation-state forces us to consider that his literary production, 
though it assumes a traditional Christian ontology, differs historically from the spiritual 
autobiographies seen as precursors to both the novel and modern autobiography.  
            If we examine closely the nature of his literary improvement, we see that it is a 
symbolic attempt to remedy the limitations of modernity’s ‘universal’ rights of man. Though 
Equiano does not name the talking book as the Bible or a book of prayer, his statement that 
speaking to the book would allow him “to learn how all things had a beginning”64 links it 
directly to the preceding paragraph in which Equiano visits a Christian church service for the 
first time and is so “amazed” that he “ask[s]” the parishioners everything he can about the 
service upon which he learns its purpose is “worshipping God, who made us and all 
                                                
63 Describing one of his stays in London, Equiano notes, “I had long wished to be able to read and write; and 
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through scripture. (81)  
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things.”65 For this reason to talk to the book is not simply to begin to read, to cultivate one’s 
rational mind in preparation for one’s entrance into a social and economic network as we see 
in Franklin, but to educate oneself of one’s own divine origin through the book’s mediation.  
            By noting that his child-self was “amazed” during the church service, Equiano as 
narrator marks his initial contact with an Anglo-Protestant culture as a major turning point 
in his development, calling the reader’s attention to the fact that his literal entrance into a 
Christian church both mirrors and breaks from earlier sections of the narrative that describe 
his “astonishment,” “wonder,” and “surprise,” when encountering white men. From the 
moment Equiano boards the European slave ship until the passage of the talking book, he is 
perpetually “amazed”—this vocabulary repeats itself in various forms nearly twenty times 
within this short span of narrative plot.66 His first “astonishment” occurs as he enters the 
slave ship because he understands the white men “as bad spirits, and that they were going to 
kill [him],” a scene that stages the middle passage as voyage into an Ovidian underworld, 
where the boy cannot recognize Europeans as human because of their “complexions” and 
“hair” and the fact that upon their ship “a large furnace or copper boiling and a multitude of 
black people, of every description, [are] chained together, every one of their countenances 
expressing dejection and sorrow.”67 Such “astonishment” repeats itself for the boy Equiano 
as he alternately describes incomprehensible wonders of both modern European science and 
acts of cruelty as he travels from Africa to Barbados, then to Virginia, and, ultimately, 
England. 
            He is “amazed” by the ship, that it “[goes] on” when “there [is] cloth put upon the 
masts by the help of rope” and “lost in astonishment” when the ship meets another upon 
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the ocean. “Observ[ing] the vessel stop” the boy and other Africans (“I and my 
countrymen”) are convinced it is “magic.”68 Similarly, it is “with astonishment” that he 
observes the crew’s “use of the quadrant.”69 When allowed to look through the instrument, 
Equiano comprehends the clouds as a moving land mass in the sky, only “heighten[ing] his 
wonder.”70 Landing in Barbados, he imagines men who ride horses as “full of nothing but 
magical arts.”71 Equiano stages this wonder not only as his younger self’s childish 
understanding of a new reality, but also as a marker of his cultural primitivism, given that he 
often shares his “astonishment” with his “countrymen.” For this reason the text appears to 
be establishing a narrative of assimilation, the kind of “cultural cleansing” Gates sees at work 
in Gronniosaw’s narrative, as he journeys from African primitivism to western 
Enlightenment. Equaino’s initial ‘savage’ inability to understand the mechanical laws at work 
around him, his experience of the natural world as enchanted, appears on the surface as part 
of a rhetorical strategy aimed at mirroring notions of European intellectual and technological 
advancement back to a western readership.  
            As these episodes in which Equiano fearfully and superstitiously interprets his new 
environs progress, however, they emerge as a sophistically staged critique aimed at garnering 
the sympathy of the reader. By the time the boy enters the Virginia plantation house where 
he is briefly kept as a slave, his fetishistic impressions of the modern objects he encounters 
no longer function as a representation of his own ignorance but rather as a critique of 
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western modernity. Allowed entrance into the plantation house in order to fan the sick and 
sleeping master, Equiano is “astonished and shocked” upon encountering a female slave 
“loaded with various kinds of iron machines” including an “iron muzzle,” which “locked her 
mouth so fast that she could scarcely speak, and could not eat or drink.”72 For the reader the 
repetition of the now familiar locutions of surprise links the iron muzzle with the other 
machines that had induced wonder in Equiano. Now affiliated with the earlier encountered 
technology of the quadrant and the ship, the iron muzzle brings into relief a regime of 
control facilitated by the sciences, one made possible through the very rationality so foreign 
and strange to the young boy. This scene of the iron muzzle transforms Equiano’s next 
display of naïve wonder—once again demarcated by his repeating vocabulary of surprise—
into a rhetorical device capable of inducing a Shklovskian estrangement effect in the reader. 
Where at first his wonder seems a marker of his own ignorance, now it emerges as a critique 
similar to Adorno and Horkheimer’s understanding of the Enlightenment as a 
“disenchantment of the world” that becomes itself a mythology suspicious of “anything 
which does not conform to the standard of calculability and utility.”73  
            As the third in the sequence of decisively modern objects—and the first encountered 
on land once Equiano is officially a slave—the iron muzzle serves as the symbolic telos of 
the ship and quadrant in this unfolding narrative of objects, suggesting that the ultimate end 
of knowledge is the exploitation of the labor of others.74 This strange and estranging 
emergence of the iron muzzle as the product of the quadrant and ship moves the reader into 
affective alignment with Equiano. As he next narrates his perceptions of the objects 
surrounding him in the room where he fans his sleeping master, the reader newly empathetic 
                                                
     72 Ibid, 65. 
     73 Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2007), 2-3. 
     74 Ibid, 2.  
 90 
to Equiano’s “wonder” perceives the decorative accoutrements as the fetish objects of 
another kind of mythology—the western belief in the development of reason as an ultimate 
good. Here we find Equiano once again “surprised”—this time by the noise of the clock on 
the chimney. Anxious after witnessing the iron muzzle, he fears the object has him under 
surveillance and thinks it capable of telling “the gentleman any thing I might do amiss.”75 
Similarly, he describes a portrait hanging in the room as also monitoring his actions: “[the 
picture] appeared constantly to look at me.”76 Within the implicit teleology that appears in 
the final lineal arrangement of objects—ship, quadrant, iron muzzle, clock, portrait—
Equiano’s original fearful and anxious surprise serves now as a rather adequate response, 
connecting those earlier technologies to the more disturbing machinery of plantation life. 
The clock here reads as the more benign ‘parlor’ version of the iron muzzle, monitoring, 
despite its genteel form, the efficient extraction of the young boy’s labor, a labor that 
produces the wealth and sense of self-worth that results in the portrait of “the great men.” 
The slave boy’s reaction to the portrait, his projection of a spiritual dimension onto the 
painting as “some way the whites had to keep their great men when they died,”77 highlights 
for us the rhetorical function of his bewildered ignorance and his belief in a supernatural 
organization of the world. Through Equiano’s vocabulary of surprise this portrait marks the 
endpoint of the first leg of Equiano’s adventure, so that in a very literal sense we can say that 
the ship and quadrant were deployed with the intention of bringing some black boy to this 
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room to fan the sickly descendents of the portrait, i.e. “[to] serve[] all the purposes of the 
bourgeois economy.”78  
            If we return once again to this same narrative span beginning with Equiano’s 
boarding of the ship and ending with his entering the church service in England, we see a 
second category of surprise, one that suggests an understanding of western Enlightenment 
sympathetic with Alasdair MacIntyre’s, where a shared ethical ground no longer guides 
human behavior, and “[r]eason is [solely] calculative; it can assess truths of fact and 
mathematical relations but nothing more.”79 In addition to emerging at moments in which 
the boy witnesses the technology of the west, Equiano’s vocabulary of surprise also appears 
when the white sailors violate what the boy understands as fundamental laws of community. 
Specifically, the fact that the white sailors reveal their own capacity to treat “some of the 
whites themselves” with the same “brutal cruelty” that they “[show] towards…blacks”80 
leaves the boy unable to understand the social laws at work onboard the ship. When he 
witnesses one “white man in particular” who was “flogged so unmercifully…that he died in 
consequence of it,” Equiano “fear[s] these people more” for he could expect “nothing less 
than to be treated in the same manner.”81 For the white sailors to murder one of their own 
race suggests to Equiano that there is no social code in place to limit the overall brutality 
among human beings. The effect of this incident is the young Equiano’s persistent fear of 
being eaten by the crew.82 His fear of cannibalism escalates during his passage from Virginia 
to England during which food is rationed and the captain and crew jokingly play on his fears: 
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“In our extremity the captain and people told me in jest they would kill and eat me, but I 
thought them in earnest, and was depressed beyond measure, expecting every moment to be 
my last.”83 When finally the crew catches a large shark the boy is relieved, thinking at last the 
food crisis aboard alleviated and himself no longer in danger of being eaten, but “to [his] 
astonishment”84 the sailors remove the shark’s fin and throw the remainder of the fish back 
into the ocean. The rejection of the fish as meat projects a cultural cruelty for Equiano, for it 
suggests that the crew has chosen the alternative of consuming his human flesh.    
             In relationship to previous episodes—this incident appears after the boy witnesses 
the iron muzzle and the white man’s murder by other white sailors—his “astonishment” 
threads together a complex narrative. Together these moments reveal a difference between 
the ethical codes of the west and Equiano’s home nation of Benin and the other African 
nations he describes in the opening auto-ethnographic sections of the Interesting Narrative. 
Specifically in his analysis of slavery as it is practiced in Africa he notes that in Benin slaves 
“do no more work than other members of the community, than even their master; their 
food, clothing, and lodging, were nearly the same as theirs, except that they were not 
permitted to eat with those who were free-born.”85 When one African nation captures a 
member of another, though the person loses his freedom, Equiano seems to suggest, there is 
a code in place that limits the brutality with which one human can treat another. That white 
sailors are more violent with one another than an African is to his slaves suggests 
comparatively that technological advancement is inversely proportionate to moral 
advancement, again echoing Adorno and Horkheimer’s analysis that that “[w]hat human 
beings seek to learn from nature is how to use it to dominate wholly both it and human 
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beings.”86 Equiano’s affect of surprise asks the reader to consider the relationship between 
technology and violence. As a rhetorical device it implicitly argues that modern systems of 
intellectual and economic rationality erode traditional social codes and communal security by 
creating social networks primarily motivated by self-interest and profit. That such events 
occur mostly at sea, outside of the jurisdiction of any nation state, such scenes underline the 
problems that both Kazanjian and MacIntyre see emerging from the fact that ‘universal’ 
rights of man only exist as “local” phenomena.87  
            If we examine the nature of  Equiano’s surprise as he witnesses his first church 
service, we see, however, how the affect functions as a rhetorical means of differentiating  
between a secular western modernity and Christian culture. Here in his final significant 
moment of surprise, Equiano declares, “I was astonished at the wisdom of white people in 
all things I saw.”88  The only stated example of such “wisdom,” however, has to do with the 
Christian rejection of slavery, a position translated for Equiano by his white American 
friend, the young sailor Dick: “[A]nd what I could understand by [Dick] of this God, and in 
seeing these white people did not sell one another, as we did, I was much pleased; and in this 
I thought they were much happier than we Africans.”89 Otherwise the Christians appear 
deficient for several reasons including, “their not sacrificing, or making any offerings, and 
eating with unwashed hands, and touching the dead.”90 Christianity’s moral superiority, then, 
in comparison both to African culture and to western modernity, arises entirely from its 
rejection of slavery.  
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             Equiano’s rejection of Enlightenment possessive individualism and his acceptance 
of Anglo-Protestantism due to its condemnation of slavery undermines Gates’ definition of 
the trope as a sign of a slave’s attempt “[to meet] the challenge of the Enlightenment.” 
Gates’ analysis of the trope overall erases the rejection of possessive individualism implicit in 
Equiano’s religious understanding of reading as improvement, marking a significant 
difference between literary cultivation in Equiano and other western texts. Equiano’s 
purpose for reading is “to learn how all things had a beginning”—which again connects to 
his definition of God in the preceding paragraph, “God, who made us and all things.” 
Explicit in this definition of divinity is an acknowledgment of the slave’s humanity. As the 
indirect speech of Equiano’s translator, a young white man, Richard Baker, the statement 
makes clear the fellowship between Baker and Equaino, including them together in the “us” 
resulting from their attendance of a Christian service together. Reading then does not 
validate Equiano’s humanity by displaying for him his own cognitive abilities, or his ability to 
develop his own person as a form of capital, but rather functions as a proof of his own 
divine origins, and thus the humanity denied him by Europe’s modern economy. To go to 
“the beginning” through the book is to engage in an alternative social reality in the present 
through a religious social structure in which all humans are recognized as such, whether 
within or without national borders.    
             With its interest in origins the trope of the book retains mystical qualities rejecting 
reading as a solely rational activity. Rather, the book is the site of divine intercession. 
Through a Calvinistic model of salvation scripture offers the slave and former-slave—note 
Equiano’s use of the perfect tense—a continual arena in which to validate his own humanity: 
“I have often taken up a book, and talked to it, and then put my ears to it, when alone, in 
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hopes it would answer me.”91 The retention of a Christian belief structure overrides any 
social or political hierarchies by providing an alternative transcendental hierarchy, so that 
only a rejection from divine intervention threatens Equiano’s human status. For this reason 
when the book does not ‘talk back’ Equiano feels threatened: “I have been very much 
concerned when I found it remaining silent.”92 Inherent in this model of reading is the way 
that a literary personality functioned in the eighteenth century: a validation of one’s 
subjectivity. But here the validation comes from a Godhead, as in earlier Protestant 
conversion narratives, rather than from the literary public sphere. Here personhood because 
it is not abstracted is truly universal. 
          Ignoring the religious and mystical dimensions in Equiano’s particular staging of the 
talking book, Gates’ appears stubbornly wedded to a particular limited model of eighteenth-
century writing that equates textual self-authorship with political and social self-mastery. 
Simply put, Gates wants to show that the talking book is proof that slaves battled the regime 
of rationality that enslaved them on its own terms: “Through the act of writing alone, 
Equiano announces and preserves his newly found status as a subject.”93 Grouping the 
talking book with the watch and portrait as “objects [endowed] with his master’s 
subjectivity,” thus “a surrogate figure of the master’s authority,”94 the book becomes a part 
of the nexus of objects that deny Equiano human subjectivity within the diegetic space of 
the narrative. Gates is able to do so only by ignoring the conditional construction of “the 
shift of tenses”95 in the final phrase of the passage: “and I have been very much concerned 
when I found [the book] remaining silent.” Gates interprets the sentence as an absolute 
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grammatical construction that through the perfect tense continues into Equiano’s narrating 
present, permitting Gates to declare: “Of course the book does not speak to him.”96 
Grammatically, Equiano’s use of the adverb “when,” however, implies that at times the book 
does speak to him, and only in the moments that it does not does Equiano find himself 
“concerned.” Gates’ disregard for the conditional adverb leads him to equate the book with 
the watch and portrait, despite his summary of “the movement of [Equiano’s] plot” as one 
“from African freedom, through European enslavement, to Anglican freedom.”97 Despite 
marking Enlightenment culture, i.e., “European enslavement” as distinct from the 
“freedom” of Christianity in his terse plot synopsis, Gates ultimately denies the religious 
quality of the trope of the book and its political implications. This reading allows Gates to 
claim the extra-diegetic act of writing the narrative and putting it into the literary public 
sphere as the sole means through which the narrative serves as an argument, an exclusively 
rational, secular argument, for Equiano’s human subjectivity: “Equiano’s text [makes] a 
representation of becoming, of a development of a self that not only has a past and a present 
but which speaks distinct languages at its several stages which culminate in the narrative 
present.”98 Slave narratives undoubtedly garnered sympathy from an eighteenth-century 
readership because they symbolically enact what Charles Taylor calls “the enjoyment of the 
rights of self-creation”99 denied the authors in all other spheres of existence. Adopting 
modern notions of self-creation centrally featured in such eighteenth-century narratives as 
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Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe and Benjamin Franklin’s Autobiography they thus aided the 
abolitionist cause by functioning as a proof of the slave’s human subjectivity. But to deny 
Equiano’s religious faith is to ignore a much more politically complex definition of 
improvement at work. 
            My focus upon Gates’ interpretation of the talking book passage aims not to 
discredit one reading of Equiano among, no doubt, thousands, but rather to suggest that 
Gates’ ‘misreading’ of the trope points to the limitations of the dominant theories of both 
the novel and autobiography in deciphering the socio-political origins of the rhetorical 
features defining the Interesting Narrative. These limitations ultimately prevent us from seeing 
the cultural model of writing at work in the text as the product of a slave economy and thus 
a product of modernity, despite its adaptation of tropes from the Protestant conversion 
narrative, a genre understood as a precursor of modern prose forms. Instead, the dominant 
genre theories have resulted in critics adapting the Interesting Narrative to fit historical 
teleologies derived from national literary productions, text such as Franklin’s, that cannot 
account adequately for Equiano’s generic innovation. The Interesting Narrative as a text of the 
Black Atlantic written by a subject in search of a state is a text without a nation, but claimed 
at times by both British and American literary traditions and most often analyzed within the 
discursive paradigms of national literatures.100 By suggesting that writing functions primarily 
as a technology that Equiano uses to define, order, and present life experiences as a cohesive 
and developmental narrative in order to gain public validation of his humanity, Gates argues 
that the Interesting Narrative does not ultimately differ from a text like Franklin’s and thus fits 
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both the dominant critical narratives of the development of modern prose forms and 
eighteenth-century conceptions of subjectivity as a self-rationalizing process. Both 
conceptions assume, however, that literary improvement functions as a political technology 
aiding in the mutually constitutive relationship between the modern citizen and his nation-
state, a requirement that Equiano’s subject position cannot fulfill.  
           If we turn for a moment to Adam Potkay’s interpretation of the Interesting Narrative in 
his essay “Olaudah Equiano and the Art of Spiritual Autobiography,”101 we can begin to see 
another limitation of the dominant developmental narratives of modern prose forms. Where 
Gates wishes to rescue Equiano for modernity by adapting his narrative to the paradigms we 
find in the genre theories of Watt, McKeon, and Gusdorf, Potkay, because he admits the 
religious nature of Equiano’s text, must alternately adapt his reading to fit conventional 
understandings of British spiritual autobiographies. Given that Gates is claiming Equiano for 
the American canon, while Potkay reads the Interesting Narrative as British literature, we see 
between these two readings that the ‘English Department’ as a discursive regime replicates a 
problem analogous to the eighteenth-century conception of universal rights as deciphered by 
MacIntyre and Kazanjian. Only by placing Equaino’s work within the context of a national 
literature can Potkay and Gates even begin to decipher the generic implications of Equaino’s 
use of a Christian ontology. And the use of such an ontology can only be interpreted 
through the developmental narrative of political subjectivity of either nation state.  
            Potkay interprets the Interesting Narrative simply as a traditional Protestant conversion 
narrative. Ignoring Equiano’s opening dedication, “To the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, 
and the Commons of the Parliament of Great Britain,” and his stated reason for writing the 
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narrative—“to excite in your august assemblies a sense of compassion for the miseries which 
the Slave-Trade has entailed on my unfortunate countrymen”102—Potkay attempts to remedy 
Gates’ secular interpretation of the talking book.103 Focusing specifically upon the trope in 
order to counter Gates’ argument of secularity, Potkay claims the talking book is emblematic 
of an “ultimately theological curiosity:”  
It is in light of Equiano’s ultimately theological curiosity that his ‘great curiosity to 
talk to books’ muse be read: indeed, the book that Equiano as yet unwittingly desires 
to read is not just any book, nor just a synecdoche for Gates’ ‘Western letters,’ but 
specifically the Bible, a book that claims to explain the genesis of all things.104 
 
Though Potkay is correct to argue that any interpretation of the trope has to come to terms 
with its religious nature, to read the talking book simply as a “theological curiosity” is to 
erase its careful staging within the larger narrative context of Equiano’s initial experiences of 
western culture. As I’ve argued above, the trope appears only after Equiano, through his 
rhetoric of surprise, separates the west into two separate cultures, a capitalist culture 
emerging from Enlightenment rationality, the culture responsible for his slavery, and a 
Christian culture that rejects the practice of slavery altogether. Rather than reconciling the 
Christianity of the work with the text’s overall project of political emancipation, Potkay 
instead attempts to place Equiano within a longer British national tradition of conversion 
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narratives. Once he interprets the trope of the talking book as a religious one, however, the 
text’s other material serves his expectations of the religious genre. This fact we see perhaps 
most clearly in Potkay’s allegorical reading of Equiano’s abduction by slave traders as a 
journey into religious vocation, a Christian salvation: “The tug toward the solution is always, 
in these autobiographies, away from Africa.”105   
            In much the same way that Gates wishes to push the text into a well-establish 
paradigm of modernity expressed via generic conventions, Potkay pushes in the opposite 
historical direction, unable to consider the possibility that African writers adopted and 
adapted both Christian faith and Christian narrative forms to support psychological and 
political emancipation from slavery. Calcified within the parameters of British literary 
taxonomy, the Interesting Narrative, because it lacks the secularity of the novel, can only be a 
continuation of a traditional form, so that Equiano’s presentation of his biography becomes 
symptomatic of a private desire for Christian redemption, separate from his condition as a 
captured and enslaved African: “[Equiano] reads the pattern of his life as reduplicating the 
pattern of salvation history found in the Christian Bible.”106 We see the limitations of the 
dominant narratives of genre development at work here when Potkay assesses the Interesting 
Narrative’s auto-ethnographic opening as only a Puritan trope: “In early modern Britain, 
writing one’s life as a figural gloss on key Biblical passages was no more than all good 
Puritans were apt to do.”107 Potkay asserts both a dubious historical (“early modern”) and 
national (“Britain”) context to Equiano’s 1789 work, reducing the text’s overall purpose to a 
private spiritual act, nothing more than what earlier “good Puritans” had done, rather than 
Equiano’s stated political aims and a means of coping with his enslavement. Taking the 
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explicit intentions of the work seriously would suggest an alternative reading of this opening 
section. Equiano’s overt intentions as author require that tropology be understood 
differently. Rather than a means of self-examination for a convert seeking promise of 
salvation, here its purpose more obviously seems a rhetorical gesture aimed at garnering 
sympathy with a western audience. By presenting his own plight as an extension of a Judeo-
Christian tradition, tropology offers Equiano a literary strategy for making the strange 
familiar. Once the text becomes pigeonholed as a specific genre within a national literary 
tradition such a logical suggestion appears impossible. 
            If we turn to D. Bruce Hindmarsh’s historical account of conversion narratives in 
The Evangelical Conversion Narrative: Spiritual Autobiography in Early Modern England we see that 
Equiano’s most significant adaptation of a traditional trope from the genre is not the 
tropological reading of his own life that Potkay suggests, but rather what Hindmarsh calls 
the “uses of the law and gospel.” “Law and gospel,” 108  a prescription for Christian self-
examination expounded by early reformers defined both the pattern of Protestant self-
examination and narrative presentation of such self-examination from the sixteenth century 
onwards. Made popular by William Perkins, a sixteenth century English Puritan, in his work 
the Golden Chain (1590) law and gospel became “the Puritan theology that would provide the 
structure of countless autobiographies in the seventeenth century and beyond.”109 The 
conversion process of law and gospel functions as a two-part system, through which the 
convert’s initial contact with Christianity reveals a moral inadequacy as the convert compares 
her deeds to the moral law of scripture. The convert finds solace in gospel, the signs of 
salvation visible to the convert despite her personal shortcomings.  
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            Discerning the law through scriptural study, the convert utilizes it as a tool to 
measure her own sinfulness. In his practical instructions to the reader Perkins describes the 
process so: “If therefore, thou desirest seriously eternal life, first take a narrow examination 
of they selfe and the course of they life by the square of God’s law.”110 Addressing the reader 
directly, Perkins asserts that such a comparison of an individual’s actions to the law will 
necessarily lead to despair that can only be alleviated through a surrender of one’s own will 
to the divine: “bewailing thy misery, & despairing utterly of thine own power, to attaine 
everlasting happiness, though maiest renounce thy selfe and be provoked to seeke and sue 
unto Christ Jesus.”111 Such self-critique leads the convert to understand herself as an 
example of a flawed and sinful human nature and reveals the moral inadequacy of 
individualism.112  
            Gospel works to counter the despair induced by the discovery of the convert’s 
personal inadequacy by communicating to the believer that entrance into Christianity grants 
the means of overcoming personal failings. Hindmarsh illustrates the meaning of gospel in 
the evangelical sense through a quotation from William Tyndale’s sixteenth century 
introduction to the New Testament: “Evangelion (that we call the gospel) is a Greek word; 
and signifieth good, merry, glad and joyful tidings, that maketh a man’s heart glad, and 
maketh him sing, dance, and leap for joy.”113 The gospel as described by Perkins channels 
the divine, so that the convert must no longer rely solely on her individual human capacities. 
The gospel then is “the instrument, and, as it were, the conduit pipe of the holy Ghost, to 
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fashion and derive faith into the soule.”114 Where the law illustrates to the convert her 
failings, the gospel fortifies her human nature by allowing it to function as a “conduit” for 
the divine. Christian faith in this model thus reveals both the moral shortcomings of human 
nature and the knowledge that the individual believer must not rely solely on her isolated 
being in order to find spiritual salvation. We might say, then, that law and gospel critiques 
individualism, but also offers the convert a spiritual means of overcoming the moral 
limitations of such autonomy.  
            Turning to John Bunyan’s Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners (1666), we can see 
how this popular understanding of law and gospel took literary shape, for according to 
Hindmarsh Bunyan’s work in particular illustrates, “the pattern of conversion that became 
well established among the Puritans.”115 His description of Bunyan’s text as typical in its 
depiction of a series of spiritual fits and starts that ultimately end with the sinner being 
reassured of salvation offers us a prescription for the narrative shape of conversion:  
These accounts typically begin with serious religious impressions in childhood, 
followed by a descent into ‘worldliness’ and hardness of heart, followed by an 
awakening or pricking of religious conscience, and then a period of self-exertion and 
attempted moral rectitude, which only aggravates the conscience and ends in self-
despair. This self-despair, paradoxically, leads to the possibility of experiencing a 
divinely wrought repentance and the free gift of justification in Christ. Forgiveness 
of sins comes, thus, as a climax and a psychological release from guilt, and ideally 
introduces a life of service to God predicated on gratitude for undeserved mercy.116 
 
Hindmarsh stresses the psychological difficulty of the convert’s self-analysis, which in 
Bunyan manifests itself as the attempts at “moral rectitude” followed by periods of “self-
despair,” hallmarks of the genre. Hindmarsh’s narrative prescription suggests that tropology 
as a literary device must subordinate itself to the overall process of self-examination enabled 
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through law and gospel. His analysis implies that Potkay’s attempt to categorize Equiano’s 
text as a typical conversion narrative simply on the basis of biblical tropology falls short of 
the standard narrative and formal expectations of the genre.  
            If we turn for a moment now to a passage in Bunyan we see, for instance, the “self-
despair” effected by Bunyan’s radical self-examination result in him turning to the story of 
Lazarus in order to find psychological comfort. Tropology here and throughout Grace 
Abounding serves to alleviate the guilt and hopelessness of Bunyan’s own sinfulness—thus it 
functions as gospel—suggesting that tropology does not appear independently as a central 
feature of the conversion process, but stands in service to the law and gospel system 
described by Hindmarsh:  
[T]hrough my fear of miscarrying for ever (should I now die) I was as one dead 
before Death came, and was as if I had felt my self already descending into the Pit; 
methought, I said there were no way but to Hell I must; but behold, just as I was in 
the midst of those fears, these words of the Angels carrying Lazarus into Abrahams 
bosom, darted in upon me, as who should say, So it shall be with thee, when thou dost leave 
this World. This did sweetly revive my Spirit, and help me to hope in God.117 
 
Here Bunyan’s palpable anxiety results from his self-examination and leads him to imagine 
his own damnation. This initial moment results from his encounter with scriptural law. What 
interrupts this despair is Bunyan’s ability to understand the fate of his own soul to be the 
same as Lazarus’ fate. This is the moment of gospel, the joyful hopefulness that emerges 
from his ability to recognize his own life in scripture. Bunyan’s narrative shows us that 
tropology serves as simply one means of achieving gospel, of the convert recognizing 
himself as an individual included in Christian salvation, but certainly not the only means of 
achieving the turn from law to gospel, from personal guilt to spiritual joy.  
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            That Potkay reads Equiano’s talking book passage as the typical instance of 
Protestant conversion is fair enough, but Bunyan’s work shows us that Equiano’s shaping of 
his initial captivity as a version of the Old Testament story does not on its own mark the text 
generically as a conversion narrative, for absent from Equiano’s use of the conversion trope 
is a search for his own salvation. Equiano’s Interesting Narrative on the whole differs from 
Bunyan in its relative lack of moral self-examination. Instead, Equiano adopts the use of law 
into a means of self-protection within the Atlantic culture that enslaves him. Rather than to 
examine his own conscious, Equiano deploys divine law to show the impotence of those 
humans that enslave him and to institute a universal conception of law that recognizes his 
humanity at times when national English law fails to protect him and the property he earns 
through his own labor.  
            We might say that the difficulties Equiano experiences throughout the Interesting 
Narrative is one of mimesis. Understanding himself as a human subject, he attempts to 
imitate those around him by also accessing the freedom of the New World defined as the 
ability to trade and acquire capital as labor or as goods. Equiano’s attempts at securing 
property are narrated as a series of fits and starts throughout the text, attempts that more 
often than not end in failure precisely because of the “philosophical problematic” defined by 
Kazanjian: Equiano finds it difficult to accept that the form of the nation limits an allegedly 
universal right to property. The scenes of failed trade create a seemingly endless cycle of 
episodic frustration that resembles the sinner’s spiritual fits and starts within the conversion 
narrative as we saw in Bunyan.  Here in Equiano the frustration and anxiety emerges not 
from the failures of self in light of divine law, but rather due to the failures of civil law. If 
capitalist mercantilism is synonymous with modernity, than these episodes reveal that 
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modern subjectivity defined through access to a particular economic system does not make 
itself available to Equiano and other Africans.  
            One of Equiano’s most dramatic rhetorical uses of Christian law as an imagined 
means of overturning the limitations of civil law appears during one of his several attempts 
at claiming his own freedom. At the end of a naval expedition he and other sailors “[have] 
orders to go up to London with our ship, to be paid off.” Equiano, theoretically with 
English law on his side, expects “nothing but being freed”118 because he has been baptized 
and by the law’s of England no Christian can be enslaved. While the crew is still at sea, 
outside national boundaries, however, his master learns Equiano’s “dreams of freedom.”119 
Fearing that Equiano will no longer be his rightful property, the captain physically forces 
Equiano off the ship and into a barge to demonstrate his continuing power over Equiano’s 
person. Rather than risk Equiano’s emancipation once the ship reaches London and thus a 
loss of what he understands to be his own property, the captain immediately seeks to sell 
Equiano to another English sea captain.  
            Throughout this extended scene Equiano invokes his rights under English law, a fact 
acknowledged by many of his fellow sailors, suggesting their allegiance with Equiano as men 
who themselves experience difficulty acquiring property despite their white skin, but his old 
and new masters disregard Equiano’s claims. Equiano’s initial assertion, “I told him that I 
was free, and he could not by law serve me so,”120 enrages his master provoking Equiano’s 
sale. In effect the master demonstrates that in practice Equiano’s rightful self-possession will 
not be recognized, especially beyond the geographic bounds of England. Once sold to a 
captain headed for the West Indies, Equiano informs him that under the law his old master 
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“could not sell me to him nor to any one else.” Here Equiano specifically cites his rights:  “I 
have been baptized; and by the laws of the land, no man has a right to sell me.” The captain 
curiously replies that Equiano, “talked too much English,”121 alluding to Equiano’s 
predicament of claiming the laws of “the land,” while at sea, and the laws of a nation of 
which he is not a citizen. Without being recognizable as an Englishman by skin color or 
native tongue and not yet within the national boundaries of “the land,” where his citizenship 
might be rightfully processed and acknowledged through institutional systems, Equiano has 
little real or symbolic currency to access his theoretical rights. Curiously, it is at this very 
moment as English law fails him, and he is told that rights of personhood are literally a 
foreign language spoken by him, Equiano in a fit of frustration invokes divine law as an 
appeal against his new master, “as I could not get any right among men here, I hoped I 
should hereafter in Heaven.”122 At the very least in Equiano’s imaginary Christian law 
promises the rights denied him by political laws that can only recognize his humanity 
through inclusion within a nation state, a status denied him through his race which visually 
demarcates him as a foreigner to Englishman and by his existence at sea, outside the bounds 
of England. 
            Throughout the passage we see that those English sailors who find themselves in 
more servile positions emphasize their Christian identity over their national one, and thus 
express a greater capacity to build affective ties with Equiano despite racial difference. We 
see the most significant example of such ties between Equiano and Daniel Queen, one of the 
captain’s attendants, who is significantly older than Equiano and who among other things 
teaches him “to read in the Bible, explaining many passages to me.”123 Here, again Equiano 
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through reading accesses an alternative system of laws that recognize his subjectivity. 
Importantly, in this particular reading Equiano notes that he finds “the laws and rules of my 
own country written almost exactly here,”124 creating an ethical common ground between 
Queen and himself that creates a familial tie between the two men. Equiano notes that 
“[Queen] was like a father to me; and some used even to call me after his name: they also 
styled me ‘the black Christian.’”125 Where Equiano’s citations of English law are deemed by 
his new master to be a foreign language emerging from Equiano’s mouth, here biblical law 
permits other sailors to recognize Equiano as Queen’s son. Their epithet for Equiano while 
maintaining a consciousness of racial difference by particularizing the universal conception 
of a Christian, ultimately, at least through friendship, extends to Equiano the rights denied 
him by his masters because it permits white men to recognize him as fully human. This 
religious bond that develops into a symbolic familial bond ultimately allows both men to 
imagine Equiano being freed and participating with Queen in commercial practices denied 
him throughout the Interesting Narrative, a plan thwarted by the master’s sale of Equiano 
before reaching London. Equiano reports Queen’s assertions, “as I was as free as himself or 
any other man on board, he would instruct me in his business, by which I might gain a good 
livelihood.”126 Invoked as an imperfect remedy to the limited scope of theoretically universal 
egalitarianism, Equiano refigures the law as traditionally used in Protestant conversion 
narratives to create affective ties with Christian men and women and as a means of 
psychological self-protection when civil law denies him freedom and physical safety.  
            What we learn ultimately through Equiano’s use of Christian tropes as a rhetorical 
remedy for the limitations put on his freedom by civil law are the limitations of our own laws 
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regarding genre. If we derive our definition of modernity from the analysis of first-person 
narratives produced within America and European nations during the eighteenth century, 
modern literary cultivation can only be defined as the product of a secular subjectivity 
defined through the political geography of the nation state. Equiano’s texts teaches us, 
however, about the negative space of modernity, and that our conception of modernity itself 
is extrapolated from local cultures conceived through universal terms. Given that Equiano’s 
own compromised political subjectivity resulted directly from the conditions of a modern 
western economy, his text directs us to a theoretical blind spot within eighteenth-century 
literary and cultural studies. What we lose by adapting his text to our conceptions of 
eighteenth-century genres is an understanding of the significant appropriations Equiano 
made in order to propose an alternative model of personhood and society, one that attempts 
to resolve what David Kazanjian calls modernity’s philosophical paradox of relegating a 
theoretical universal egalitarianism to the practical confines of national citizenship. Equiano’s 
model of writing imagines a modern form of subjectivity because it imagines a universal 
egalitarianism, but it can only do so through a revision of the autonomous individuality 
promoted and enabled through other modern prose forms. 
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Charles  Brockden Brown’s  “Walste in ’s  School  o f  History”:  The Romance 
Writer  as  Virtuous Patr io t   
 
 
“There are two ways in which genius and virtue may labour for the public good: first 
by assailing popular errors and vices, argumentatively and through the medium of 
books; secondly, by employing legal or ministerial authority to this end.”1  
            
             —Charles Brockden Brown 
 
       
          Charles Brockden Brown’s most extensive presentation of his own narrative theory 
appears in the fictionalized essay, “Walstein’s School of History,” first published in the 
August-September 1799 issue of The Monthly Magazine, and American Review, which Brown 
also edited. The essay appears as a fictional translation “from the German of Krants of 
Gotha” and expounds Brockden Brown’s theory of literary production through the work 
and ideas of the fictional characters Walstein, a professor at Jena, and his most prominent 
student, Engel. Similarly to the opening pages of Brown’s novel, Wieland, “Walstein’s School 
of History” utilizes the late-eighteenth-century literary life of Weimar and Jena in Saxony to 
imagine the professional writer as ‘virtuous patriot,’  a neo-classical conception that emerged 
in late-seventeenth-century English political debates and posited the landowning aristocrat as 
disinterested public servant. During the revolutionary and early republican period the 
American founders redefined the virtuous patriot as a  ‘natural aristocrat,’ a man who came 
to public duty and social privilege through talent and merit rather than birth.2 Due to the 
                                                
1 Charles Brockden Brown, “Walstein’s School of History. From the German of Krants of Gotha,” in Wieland 
or the Transformation, with Related Texts, ed. Philip Barnard and Stephen Shapiro, (Indianapolis/Cambridge: 
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 2009),185-195. 
2 For further discussions of the American model of the virtuous patriot see Elizabeth Hinds, Private Property: 
Charles Brockden Brown's Gendered Economics of Virtue, 19-33; Paul Rahe, Republics, Ancient and Modern, Inventions of 
 111 
circulation of German literary and cultural sources in English-speaking intellectual circles 
during the 1790s, which familiarized Brown with the political influence German writers such 
as Christoph Martin Wieland, Friederich Schiller, and Johann Jakob Engel had upon the 
Enlightened Absolutism in the German territories, Brown was once again able to redefine 
the term, presenting the virtuous patriot not as a civic-minded magistrate or minister, but as 
romance writer.3 Despite the marginal social position of the writer in 1790s America, 
German literary production of the second half of the eighteenth century enabled Brown to 
envision literary life as “labour for the public good,” disinterested service to an inchoate 
republic, a function on par with “legal or ministerial authority.”4  
          By the 1790s the concept of virtuous patriotism in America was circulating in at least 
its third generation and though Brown’s understanding of disinterested civic duty is distinctly 
post-revolutionary, his formulations of civic virtue still carry the traces of the long century 
which conceived them. According to Pocock the concept of the virtuous patriot originated 
in the mid-seventeenth century in James Harrington’s political philosophy, and began to 
circulate again in English political debates as early as the 1670s as one of two rival 
“personalities” of property in order to highlight the moral threats to the civic status-quo 
implicit in capitalism. The revival of Harrington’s theories in the 1670s reintroduced into 
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English political rhetoric the concept of “propertied independence,” a model of political 
subjectivity that made the “moral personality” synonymous with “civic virtue,” a social 
position that could only be achieved through “the possession of land [that] brings with it 
unspecialized leisure” 5 and thus enabled the man of property to act as a disinterested party 
in civic affairs. This Harringtonian model of civic virtue initially offered a counter weight 
against the corrupting forces of the crown’s parliamentary patronage. Yet after the founding 
of the Bank of England in the mid-1690s, the disinterested and virtuous neo-Harringtonian 
personality provided, instead, a durable alternative to the “new class of creditors and 
speculators,” who made their wealth betting for or against the future stability of the nation. 
Where the man of landed property was seen as rational because his possessions were secure 
and real, a ‘real estate,’ the man of commerce was a threat to the public good because his 
investments were made in public stock, i.e. the National Debt, whose value was determined 
through speculation; that is, by an individual investor’s imagining “of a moment which will 
never exist in reality.” As the commercial personality of property gained economic force, 
Pocock explains, “government and politics seemed to have been placed at the mercy of 
passion, fantasy and appetite, and these forces were known to feed on themselves and to be 
without moral limit.”6 Simply put, the model of the virtuous patriot which represented a 
disinterested, community-minded morality was being replaced by a definition of property 
primarily characterized as private, self-interested, and imaginary. The transformation ensured 
“that political relations were becoming relations between debtors and creditors.”7  
       Thus the loss of landed wealth was understood as a loss of a communal moral ground 
because in politics the disinterested and virtuous patriot operated, at least theoretically, as 
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universal citizen. This universality arose from his self-reliance. His unspecialized economic 
existence allowed him to function as a professional citizen in the civic arena. Those who had 
to earn a living each day from their “specialty,”⎯lawyers, doctors, artisans, etc. 
⎯presumably had a limited, self-interested investment in politics resulting from their 
economic needs, and thus could not be trusted in civic positions because they were not able 
to make judgments for the entire polis. With the introduction of the financial investor as a 
major force in England’s economy, the political position of presumed moral objectivity 
occupied by civic-minded independent wealth was now seen as having been taken over by a 
powerful and specialized interest group, whose financial gain came from betting against the 
success of the nation.  
           Pocock’s description of the loss of landed wealth as the loss of an unspecialized and 
disinterested leisure class acting in favor of the public good allows us to link this particular 
model of civic virtue to Raymond Williams’ analysis of the concept of “culture” that emerges 
at the end of the eighteenth century. By reading Williams’ discussion as an extension of 
Pocock’s historical analysis, we can begin to see that with the loss of a disinterested civic 
moral position due to the specialization of wealth, culture is asked to act as the universalizing 
human perspective that landed wealth had earlier assumed. Pockock’s analysis permits us to 
see Williams’ initial description of the major function of culture in the period as an attempt 
to fill the moral vacuum left behind by the loss of the civic category of the virtuous patriot:  
I wish to show the emergence of culture as an abstraction and an absolute: an 
emergence which, in a very complex way, merges two general responses—first, the 
recognition of the practical separation of certain moral and intellectual activities from 
the driven impetus of a new kind of society; second, the emphasis of these activities, 
as a court of human appeal, to be set over the processes of practical social judgment 
and yet to offer itself as a mitigating and rallying alternative.8 
 
                                                
     8 Raymond Williams, Culture and Society 1780-1950 (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), 17. 
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Culture, Williams argues, attempts to unite those “moral and intellectual” capacities of 
political subjectivity that have been thwarted by a new social order defined by “the driven 
impetus” of market forces. Where earlier the conservative personality of the virtuous patriot 
functioned as a conceptual bulwark against the commercial personality associated with the 
then emerging liberal market forces, culture in the abstract is now asked to perform a kind of 
postpartum heuristic social work by providing “a court of human appeal.” It is invoked as a 
negative space of affect and cognition into which the political subject is able to retreat in 
order to recover all those human capacities erased from him through his chief civic function 
as economic actor in a state defined primarily by market forces. Williams’ analysis of the 
period’s separation of “moral” and “intellectual” activities from the driving economic 
“impetus” of a new market-based society underlines both the problem of specialization in 
the public arena and the disintegration of the cognitive and affective functions of the 
individual political subject due to such specialization.  
            The articulation of these structural divisions foreshadows the problems culture faces 
as a heuristic category in a market economy composed of specializations. If the emergence 
of a speculative economy forces the extinction of a civic moral apparatus by impoverishing 
the definition of political subjectivity, culture is asked to remedy this loss by imposing itself 
to “set over the processes of practical social judgment,” that is, to operate as a mode of 
moral judgment. But ultimately culture—defined here as the category of the universal meant 
to recuperate the moral and intellectual impulses of the political subject—will fail at this task 
for formal reasons alone. To borrow Marx’s vocabulary, though culture will be invoked 
ideologically as a desired superstructure, it can only function practically as another type of 
specialized labor emerging through new relations of production. Civic virtue in the neo-
Harringtonian model avoided such a degradation because of the official position of power 
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assigned to the landowning aristocracy in the traditional civic order. The attempt to relocate 
disinterested civic authority to culture in Britain, a move that begins roughly at the same time 
as the French Revolution, exposes culture to all the economic constraints facing a rising 
middle-class. Thus, culture’s definition as that category of human activity resistant to 
specialization is formally rendered a specialization in the face of capital. Its failure to exist as 
a public arena in which citizens relate to each other as such, rather than as representatives of 
their respective economic interests, is made legible by the fact that culture itself emerges as 
simply another labor, one in which the artist and the writer as professionals are subjected to 
market forces. Williams displays the irony of this fact through his discussion of Romantic 
writers. If we take further his discussion of Wordsworth’s “Preface to the Second Edition of 
Lyrical Ballads” we reach a clearer understanding of how a new capitalist economy both 
makes necessary the definition of culture in circulation and how it precludes it from 
operating as a universal category.  
           Wordsworth’s text from 1800 shows us how one hundred years after the Financial 
Revolution, which Pocock credits with revitalizing the aristocratic landowner as an 
archetypal figure for disinterested civic virtue, the ideological site for “common” or universal 
human experience is still the rural countryside where “the essential passions of the heart find 
a better soil” as opposed to the city where “the increasing accumulation of men, where the 
uniformity of their occupations produces a craving for extraordinary incident.”9 Wordsworth 
speaking from the other side of the economic revolution, argues that rural life cultivates in 
us an exemplary affective life, an aspect of our being that has been deadened by the 
repetitive, mechanistic labor found in the industrialized city. Though Wordsworth’s 
representative men are linked to the aristocratic landowner through the “soil,” he is talking 
                                                
     9 William Wordsworth, “Preface to the Second Edition of Lyrical Ballads,” in Critical Theory Since Plato, ed. 
Hazard Adams (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), 438-439.  
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about a different class of men, not those disinterested enough to function in an active civic 
sphere, but simply those engaged in “rural occupations,” that Wordsworth claims still permit 
them access to their capacities as humans rather than their functions as laborers. 
Wordsworth recognizes the rural inhabitant as someone who has escaped the dehumanizing 
elements of specialized labor and this again is another link between the rural laborer and the 
landed aristocratic; though the rural inhabitant lacks the independence of wealth, his work 
keeps him free from industrial specialization. But Wordsworth implies that the rural laborer 
cannot recognize himself as exemplary of the human condition, a means of species 
identification for others. This job Wordsworth ascribes to the poet and it is in the poet’s 
relationship to rural life through which the paradox of culture emerges. The poet, 
Wordsworth argues, functions as an expert in identifying those experiences that define 
humans as such through his ability to collect these experiences in his poetry through which 
readers can develop in themselves a species recognition. Poetry thus gains its moral ground 
as an arena for sympathy: “for short spaces of time to let himself…identify his own feelings 
with theirs.”10 Wordsworth’s articulation of the poet’s position, however, reveals that the 
poet cannot extricate himself from the economy of specialization that is to blame for the 
loss of the natural development of humans as such:  
[A poet] is a man speaking to men: a man, it is true, endowed with more lively 
sensibility, more enthusiasm and tenderness, who has a greater knowledge of human 
nature, and a more comprehensive soul, than are supposed to be common among 
mankind.11  
 
A moral crisis lurks in Wordsworth’s description. The poet claims for himself a heightened 
sense of human nature, an uncommonly easy access to what is common to us all, to the 
affective qualities that define us as an ‘us.’ Yet, poetry, and here poetry is simply one example 
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of the task culture is asked to perform at this historical moment, has been forced to act as a 
substitute for something that should operate ‘naturally’ within each of us. The claim in favor 
of the poet’s expertise is a claim against the universality of “human nature.” If we need an 
expert to teach us an affective sensibility that is presumably inherent to us as a species, the 
claim to universality is illogical. Wordsworth’s treatise reveals to us that once the universal 
has to operate under the auspices of a profession, then a full definition of humanity becomes 
available only as a commodity, an object of “taste” that we may choose to purchase or not, 
depending on our subjective whims. Culture, operating as purveyor of the ‘naturally’ human, 
structurally cannot impose itself as a universal “philosophy” once pushed into the position 
of a specialized skill set.12  
          Wordsworth’s “Preface” in its attempt to recoup through the category of cultural 
production a definition of humanity not at the mercy of market forces sheds light on the 
challenges facing post-revolutionary intellectuals who wished to assign culture the position in 
the civic arena occupied earlier by the aristocratic model of the virtuous patriot. By 
presenting the poet as a man possessing the particular ability to recover a universally human 
affective life through poetic production, Wordsworth implicitly acknowledges both the loss 
of a communal life of affects and the inability of culture to impose itself as anything other 
than another profession. 
            If we turn now to Charles Brockden Brown’s “Walstein’s School of History,” we see 
that the dominance of neo-republican concepts, specifically “natural aristocracy” and 
“virtue” in popular American political discourse of the 1790s, and Brown’s interest in 
eighteenth-century German literature, specifically Weimar Classicism, allow him to establish 
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a model of the writer as virtuous patriot that both operates as a component of established 
civic order and rejects authority based on wealth, birth, or religion.  
          Though the model of republican virtue in America rejects the traditional authority of 
an aristocracy, patriotic virtue sees itself as a conservative force against the liberal market 
forces taking shape in the new democracy. As early as 1779 in a letter to James Warren, 
George Washington, in the midst of fighting the revolutionary war, fears that a sense of civic 
duty,  of public “virtue,” is being lost to a class of individuals interested in “speculation:” 
“Our conflict is not likely to cease so soon as every good man would wish. The measure of 
iniquity is not yet filled; and unless we can return a little more to first principles, and act a 
little more upon patriotic ground, I do not know when it will—or—what may be the issue of 
the contest. Speculation—peculation—engrossing—forestalling—with all their 
concomitants, afford too many melancholy proofs of the decay of virtue…”13 Similarly, 
historian Gordon Wood writes that immediately following the American Revolution “the 
American people seemed incapable of the degree of virtue needed for republicanism. Too 
many…were too deeply involved in trade and moneymaking to think beyond their narrow 
interests or their neighborhoods and to concern themselves with the welfare of their states 
or their country.”14 Both Washington’s letter and Wood’s analysis present the anxiety of the 
founders who were troubled by the fact that the neo-classical conception of civic virtue 
which required citizens to see themselves as political actors willing to sacrifice individual gain 
for the public good was losing out to a liberal individualism that argued for the value of self-
interested actions.  
                                                
     13 George Washington, “Letter to James Warren, 1790” quoted in Elizabeth Hinds, Private property: Charles 
Brockden Brown's Gendered Economics of Virtue (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1997), 7. 
     14 Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 230.  
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             A similar anxiety becomes clear in the first issue of The Monthly Magazine, and 
American Review (April 1799), a periodical emerging from the intellectual activities of The 
Friendly Club, which according to Bryan Waterman was a primary example of “the 
gentleman’s conversation club, a principal Enlightenment form, [that] allowed its members 
to enact on a miniature scale their ideal principles for public debate, …a ‘juridical public 
sphere’ in which readers would converse about and judge morals and knowledge in relation 
to the material they voraciously read.”15  The magazine was edited by club member Charles 
Brockden Brown.  A letter to the editor entitled “On the State of American Literature” 
operates as an ersatz mission statement for the publication, welcoming the magazine as a 
remedial measure serving “the interests of letters and science in America.” The author of the 
letter, identified only with the initial “M,” was obviously not a reader at large given that this 
was the magazine’s first issue, but rather a member of the magazine’s staff, most likely 
Samuel Miller16. The letter argues that the development of the “literary character” in America 
is hindered by the “love of gain:” “[p]erhaps there never was such a theatre for speculation as 
the United States have presented for the last twelve or fifteen years.”17 This letter 
demonstrates that American intellectuals in particular were troubled by the general public’s 
desire for the quick acquisition of wealth at the expense of civic virtue. Though they share 
this suspicion of speculative capitalism with conservative forces in the nation, they see 
intellectual development rather than patriotism as virtuous. Like Washington’s letter, “On 
the State of American Literature” situates its argument in terms of a much longer neo-
classical republican tradition skeptical of liberal market forces. By positing literature, i.e. 
                                                
     15 Bryan Waterman, Republic of Intellect: The Friendly Club of New York City and the Making of American Literature 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 6-7. 
16 Bryan Waterman hypothesizes Miller to be the writer of this letter due to the similarity of concerns between 
this text and Miller’s known publications. 
     17 M, “On the State of American Literature,” The Monthly Magazine, and American Review, vol 1 (New York: T. 
& J. Swords, 1800), 16. 
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culture, in opposition to the “love of gain,” the letter signals The Friendly Club’s allegiance 
to a more progressive notion of virtue aligned with Enlightenment notions of intellectual 
self-development.  
           Charles Brockden Brown’s own vision of the writer as virtuous patriot emerges 
through the nexus of references and allusions in his “Walstein’s School of History.” 
“Walstein’s School of History. From the German of Krants of Gotha,” the full title of 
Brown’s first published statement on the art of writing, already begins to reveal the 
complexity involved in the practice of Brown’s narrative theory. Here, as he does throughout 
the essay, Brown conspicuously avoids the words “novel” and “romance” as generic labels 
for narrative fiction and instead chooses the designation of “history.”18 The title also 
deliberately erases Brown as the author of the essay by announcing the text not as a 
statement of Brown’s own ideas, but as a historical overview of another writer’s work, 
namely, “Walstein’s.” Not only does the title tell us that the text summarizes the ideas of 
Walstein, who we learn in the opening sentence was a professor of history at Jena, but the 
fictional framework announced by the title further expunges Brown from his author position 
by demarcating the work as a translation, “from the German of Krants of Gotha.” The text’s 
rhetorical structure thus ensures that Brown appears neither as the writer, who espouses a 
theory of narrative fiction as a genre of history, nor as the critic summarizing the work of the 
writer Walstein, who saw the historian’s work as a type of imaginative writing. Brown does 
not even appear as the translator of the text. The reader at most could assume Brown to 
have edited the text, which in its initial publication appeared in The Monthly Magazine and 
                                                
18 Though in “Walstein’s School of History” Brown only uses the generic designation of “history” for the kind 
of imaginative writing Walstein and Engel write, in his essay “The Difference Between History and Romance” 
[The Monthly Magazine and American Review 2:4 (April 1800)] Brown designates the kind of interpretive history 
that Walstein, Engel, and he himself write as “romance.” For this reason, I have chosen to use “romance” 
throughout my discussion of  Brown’s work. 
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American Review edited by Brown, which often published informative articles on European 
literature.19 The obvious questions then are why Brown would present his theory of fiction 
as the work of a fictional, presumably recently dead, German author and what relationship is 
there between the fictional framework of the essay and the theory of literature proposed 
within that framework? In examining the complex of figuration resulting from the essay’s 
numerous layers of narrative and literary references, it soon becomes clear that Brown’s 
rhetorical strategy of ‘a history within a history’ carefully avoids presenting his decisively 
secular argument for the writer as custodian of a nation’s moral life as a radical political 
concept, but rather as the natural continuation of a classical republican tradition. By doing so 
Brown conceptualizes a classical civic structure through which the writer as public 
intellectual propagates Enlightenment ideals as the dominant ideology of the republic. 
Through redefining narrative fiction as history and presenting this redefinition as a historical 
fact rather than as a new idea emerging from post-revolutionary political needs “Walstein’s 
School of History” fabricates a history that both justifies and demonstrates the writer’s civic 
role as part of western political tradition. The essay, then, is a rich example of the practice 
that it preaches. 
          Brown’s understanding of the relationship between imaginative writing and history 
first begins to emerge through the narrator’s description of Walstein’s beliefs on the subject 
in the opening of the essay. Through a sober accounting by the narrator, Krantz of Gotha, 
we learn that historical writing as practiced by Walstein and his students is a form of fiction 
that uses a historical past in order to create coherent and socially constructive narratives for 
                                                
19 The Monthly Magazine, and American Review (1799-1800) modeled itself after English periodicals and strove, 
among other things, to keep readers abreast of cultural developments in Europe. The following sampling of the 
magazine’s articles on European culture show that “Walstein’s School of History” would have seamlessly fit 
into the magazine’s usual coverage of foreign cultural affairs: “Account of the Political Journals, &c. in the 
Dominions of the King of Denmark,” (Oct 1800); “Literary Industry of the Germans,” (Jan 1800); “A View of 
the State of the Stage in Germany,” (Jun 1800); “Life of Augustus Burger,” (May 1800). 
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the present.  The method and style used by both Walstein and nine of his most “assiduous” 
students focuses on the explication of historical causes and effects: “[t]he same minute 
explication of motives, the same indissoluble and well-woven tissue of causes and effects, 
the same unity and coherence of design, the same power of engrossing the attention…”20 
Then, in introducing Walstein’s two major works, one on the life of Cicero, the other on the 
Marquis of Pombal, the narrator tellingly asks, “What link did [Walstein’s] reason discover, 
or his fancy create between times, places, situations, events, and characters so different?”21 
We learn that thematic unity, a single argument both within an in individual text and across 
all of a writer’s works, one deduced either through “reason” or fabricated through authorial 
“fancy” should be the primary objective of the history writer, more important than historical 
accuracy. Historical accuracy, the narrator suggests, is a fallacy. “Walstein was conscious of 
the uncertainty of history,”22 he assures us. Instead, history’s value is precisely the fictions it 
creates for the writer’s contemporary community. More specifically, history is to be shaped 
by writers for the purpose of interpellating individuals into the moral life of a community. As 
the narrator tells us, “Engel, the eldest of Walstein’s pupils, thought, like his master, that the 
narration of public events, with a certain license of invention, was the most efficacious of 
moral instruments.”23  
            Here, the reader begins to see that Walstein’s and Engel’s narrative theory argues for 
the imaginative writer as creator of what Alasdair MacIntyre calls a “classical”24 moral 
structure, a code that makes clear proper action for an individual, so that it is not at odds 
with the aims of the community at large. In other words, literature should produce an 
                                                
     20 Brown, “Walstein’s School of History,” 187.  
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     22 Ibid, 188. 
     23 Ibid, 191. 
     24 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 121. 
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ideological superstructure for a community. We also see that by imagining the writer as part 
of a community’s infrastructure, Brown avoids the contradiction of Wordsworth’s model of 
poet as professional. Where Wordsworth conceptualizes the poet in terms of a new social 
order, the neo-classical political discourse of 1790s America combined with Brown’s interest 
in narrative rather than poetry, gives Brown recourse to older strategies for unifying a 
community. As MacIntyre demonstrates, before the modern period, “the chief means of 
moral education [was] the telling of stories” and each classical culture “possesses a stock of 
stories which derive from and tell about its own vanished heroic age.”25 For Brown to 
diagnose through his fictional counterparts of Walstein and Engel the need for the modern 
fiction writer to aid in the implementation of a common culture suggests that he understood 
his contemporary moment in much the same way that MacIntyre sees the Enlightenment, as 
a fragmented culture in which the life of the individual is no longer wedded to the life of a 
community. If the purpose of classical narrative works, such as the epic poem and the saga, 
is to clearly define a community’s moral structure in order to ensure a compatibility between 
the telos of an individual life and the good of an entire community, then for Brown to imply 
the need for modern literature to do the same is to suggest that American civic life of the 
1790s demonstrates a dissonance between individual concerns and public life. MacIntyre 
helps illuminate this fact for us when he notes that in classical communities “poems and 
sagas narrate what happens to men and women, but that in their narrative form poems and 
sagas capture a form that was already present in the lives which they relate.”26 It is precisely 
this correspondence between the forms at work in the text and those outside of the text that 
differentiate a classical structure with Brown’s neoclassical proposal. Through the two 
imaginary works of Walstein, the life of Cicero and the life of Pombal, we see that the stories 
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of the past in Brown’s essay are not used to reinforce a social order already in place, but 
rather to argue in favor of implementing a secular social order, grounded in a belief that 
virtue emerges from the development of an individual’s reason. Brown’s presentation of his 
argument through Walstein’s writings on Cicero and Pombal suggest that these ideas have 
roots in both a distant classical past and the European Enlightenment.  
           The narrator names “intellectual vigour” as the “link” between Cicero and Pombal, 
the “link” either discovered or imagined by Walstein as the guiding moral of each 
biographical narrative. We are told by the narrator that Walstein’s seemingly very different 
stories, the “imaginary history[ies[“ of  Cicero and Pombal, share the common truth that 
political authority should be based on the “moral incident” of “intellectual vigour” rather 
than the “physical incidents” of “birth and marriage.” Here the narrator espouses the 
revolutionary era’s ideal of society that rewards merit, the belief that natural abilities rather 
than social position should decide, who attains political authority in a nation:27  
The authority of kings and nobles exemplifies the first species of influence. Birth and 
marriage, physical, and not moral incidents, entitle them to rule. The second kind of 
influence, that flowing from intellectual vigour, is remarkably exemplified in Cicero 
and Pombal. In this respect they are alike.28  
 
In choosing to present the life of Cicero as exemplifying political authority achieved through 
intellect, Brown, through the work of Walstein, offers a new interpretation of the Roman 
statesman, who in eighteenth-century American political debates was normally presented 
either in “elite-conservative idealizations…as a model of patrician virtue [or] dissenting 
positions that discredit Cicero by emphasizing his selfish desire for celebrity, for example, 
                                                
27 For more on the concept of natural aristocracy in the revolutionary period see Gordon Wood, The Radicalism 
of the American Revolution, (189-225).  
     28 Brown, “Walstein’s School of History,” 188. 
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rather than a virtuous concern for the collective public good.”29 Brown would later publish 
several works on Cicero, two essays, “On the Merits of Cicero” and “Ciceronians,” and a 
narrative sketch, “Death of Cicero. A Fragment.” All three pieces in turn critique Cicero’s 
vanity, the worship of Cicero in American politics in the 1790s, and Cicero’s elite 
republicanism based on his position as a wealthy patrician. The Cicero of Walstein, however, 
is not to be criticized, but admired for his defense of the Roman republic from the Cataline 
plot. The narrator relates no other specific references to Cicero’s life and the mention of this 
conspiracy is presented only through a comment focused on Walstein’s writing: “The 
conspiracy of Cataline is here related with abundance of circumstances not to be found in 
Sallust.”30 Implicit in this comment, given the Roman historian Sallust’s accepted authority 
on the subject, is Walstein’s narrative invention. In fact, the narrator explicitly compliments 
Walstein’s Cicero, his “imaginary history,” precisely for its ability to invent believable 
accounts of the Roman statesman. For instance, invented parts of the narrative, despite 
being “false,” are “admirable” because they are “so comformable [sic] to Roman modes and 
sentiments, so self-consistent.” Similarly, the narrator underlines that where Walstein lacks 
facts for his story, they are “invented with a boldness more easy to admire than to imitate.”31 
Clearly, the narrator is underlining Walstein’s implementation of his own theory of history 
writing. We can’t overlook, however, that by putting words into the mouth of Walstein’s 
critic, Krantz of Gotha, Brown is releasing his own myth of Cicero, one that indirectly 
argues for the intellectual as virtuous patriot. Here, Walstein, by taking “intellectual vigour” 
as the guiding virtue in his works, erases those aspects of Cicero, which Brown found 
pernicious to late eighteenth-century American politics. Walstein’s version erases the 
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patrician elitism and selfishness of Cicero, which Brown would critique directly in future 
writings, and instead rearranges the history so that Cicero emerges as a classical republican 
statesman, who gains authority not because of his elite social position but through his 
intellect. Readers encountering this essay in Brown’s The Monthly Magazine and American 
Review would have read Brown’s essay and assumed this version of Cicero not as emerging 
from the imagination of the young American novelist Charles Brockden Brown, but as an 
account written by a German historian, far removed from a newly democratic America, 
where political debates waged over the basis of political authority. Thus, the essay, through 
its recounting of the historical work of the fictional Walstein, permits Brown to display a 
new Cicero for his American readers, one that advocates a new model of authority based in 
intellectual ability, rather than wealth. 
            The description of Walstein’s Pombal, unlike the summary of his Cicero, focuses 
largely on the accomplishments of the work’s central figure, rather than Walstein’s writing 
abilities. Pombal appears as an idealized enlightenment reformer, who diminishes the power 
of Portugal’s “besotted minks, jealous and effeminate nobles, and its cowardly prince.” He 
rejects the “Romish religion” and “feudal institutions”32 as equally illegitimate political forces 
and succeeds to a certain degree in expelling them from the nation. Through his judgment of 
these institutions as illegitimate due to the means by which they have gained political power, 
he demonstrates his own virtue. His own right to power, his own “intellectual vigour,” is 
defined by his rejection of traditional authority and his implementation of an egalitarian 
Enlightenment ideology. Pombol’s adoption of the correct system of morality marks his 
intellectual abilities as such and demonstrates the way in which intelligence and virtue are 
inextricably entwined in the method of narrative writing proposed by Brown through this 
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essay. Further, Pombol’s narrative presents Brown the opportunity to indirectly critique 
political authority based on religious authority. Though the description of Pombol’s 
expulsion of the Jesuits would in its specifics be applauded by the Protestant elites in 
America, in the abstract, nonetheless, Pombal’s tale demonstrates the moral correctness of 
intellectual authority trumping religious authority.  
          Here through the parallels between the writing career of Walstein and the political 
achievements of Cicero and Pombal, Brown’s argument for the writer as virtuous patriot 
begins to surface. To the reader it soon becomes clear that like Cicero and Pombal, Walstein 
gained public authority through his intellectual abilities rather than social status. By creating 
works in which men gain authority based on intellect and thus virtuously defend their 
respective nations, Walstein himself becomes defender of the public good. He protects the 
nation from tyranny by instructing the public that the great political leaders of the past 
gained political authority due to their intellect. By using history to mythologize the 
intellectual as virtuous patriot, Walstein makes a circular argument for his own moral 
authority. This confusion between the civic achievements of Walstein and those of Cicero 
and Pombal is demonstrated in the narrator’s grammatically ambiguous description of “the 
happiness of mankind”:  
Walstein desired the happiness of mankind. He imagined that the exhibition of virtue 
and talents, forcing its way to sovereign power, and employing that power for the 
national good, was highly conducive to their happiness33  
 
Here the reader must question whether “the exhibition of virtue and talents” describes the 
act of writing or the actions of the heroes within the writing. The ambiguity permits the 
sentence to serve both as a description of the writer and a description of the writer’s 
subjects. Through writing about or “exhibiting” those who “exhibited” “virtue and talents” 
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the historical writer himself acts virtuously for he “believes himself displaying a model of 
right conduct, and furnishing incitements to imitate that conduct, supplying men not only 
with knowledge of just ends and just means, but with the love and the zeal of virtue.”34 
“Virtue” as defined in this essay thus has two meanings, acting virtuously and defining for 
your community what it means to act virtuously. If as MacIntyre argues, virtue is culturally 
specific, if there is no universal conception of moral behavior, then we can extrapolate that 
the act of defining virtue is in itself virtuous, for it enables the possibility for a system of 
morality to exist within a community.35 Definitions of virtue can only retain coherency 
within a social context, so the work of the writer is to make legible definitions of human 
excellence for this context. Through this reasoning, the narrator in his final comment on the 
work of Walstein, claims moral authority and thus political authority for writers in general: 
There are two ways in which genius and virtue may labour for the public good: first 
by assailing popular errors and vices, argumentatively and through the medium of 
books; secondly, by employing legal or ministerial authority to this end.36 
Modernity’s standard formulation of republican virtue as “labour for the public good” here 
is made more specific through the coupling of “virtue” with “genius” to imply the symbiotic  
relationship between morality and intelligence. We see, too, that defining “virtue” in 
relationship to “genius” necessitates a reordering of civic authority. “Books” are now the 
“first” means in operating for the public good, because the greatest public service is a 
discursive act: “assailing popular errors and vices, argumentatively.” In other words, the 
most virtuous act of civic duty is to educate the general public through reasoned, written 
accounts that correct common errors and thus instill a common sense of right and wrong. 
Krantz of Gotha’s evaluation of the work of Walstein leads thus to a reevaluation of 
traditional moral bases, so that now “legal [and] ministerial authority,”  i.e. governmental and 
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religious structures, are “second” in their effectiveness towards working for the public good. 
Brown’s fictionalized historical and critical evaluation of the German writer thus allows him 
to present within the American public sphere a more specific and radical model of 
disinterested, virtuous patriotism, one more in alignment with Godwinian doctrines of social 
improvement, than customary late-eighteenth-century American conceptions of republican 
virtue grounded in Christianity. Through Walstein, Brown envisions a social order, which 
supports the development of each citizen’s intellectual capacities primarily through a literary 
public sphere and curbs the authority of formal civic and religious institutions.  
            These conclusions radically challenge the status quo of 1790s America, which saw 
religion as necessary for the moral health of the republic. The notion that religion is 
necessary to republican virtue in revolutionary-era America surfaces in both official and 
popular forms. In 1787, for example, the Virginia Independent Chronicle ran an editorial in 
which an anonymous citizen argued:  
[Y]et the most approved and  wisest legislators in all ages, in order to give efficacy to 
their civil institutions, have found it necessary to call in the aid of religion; and in no 
form of government whatever has the influence of religious principles been found so 
requisite as in that of a republic. It requires but a slight degree of observation to be 
convinced that mankind require that awe of some power to confine them within the 
line of their duty.37  
 
The distrust of Enlightenment-era beliefs that a fully-developed capacity for reason would 
ensure the general morality of citizens in a republic emerges not just in the reflections of 
private individuals, but also in law itself. For instance, the third article of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, drafted by Samuel Adams in 1779 and adopted by the state’s 
legislature in 1780 states, “the happiness of a people, and the good order and preservation of 
                                                
     37 “A Proposal for Reviving Christian Conviction,” quoted in Paul A. Rahe, Republics Ancient & Modern, vol. 
3 (Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 207. 
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civil government, essentially depend upon piety, religion, and morality.”38 For Brown to 
replace “religion” with “intellect,” as the natural partner to “virtue” as he does is a radical 
revamping of republican ideology that dominated Brown’s American scene, one that no 
doubt would have opened Brown up to the charge of atheism.39 Though Brown’s 
reconception of the virtuous patriot as writer serves as a justification for the importance of 
his own vocation, the fact that intellectual labor replaces religion in his model of 
republicanism at least partially accounts for his choice to place this ideology in the mouths of 
distant German intellectuals.  
            Though Brown hides his authorship of this essay, presumably to evade controversy 
at home in America, and stages his radical revision of the virtuous patriot as a foreign 
import, he does, however, cleverly insert himself into the essay through the character of 
Engel. Any reader with a knowledge of Brown’s work would know that Brown rewrites the 
narrative of his own Arthur Mervyn as the German novel “Olivio Ronsica” by Engel, 
Walstein’s most important student.40 Where the first half of the text devotes itself to 
Walstein’s primary works, which examine grand figures upon the world stage, the second 
half of the essay in its discussion of Engel’s novel, argues for the importance of writers to 
portray “the relations in which men, unendowed with political authority, stand to each 
other...”41 Where Walstein’s work portrays actions and characters suited for national epics, 
Engel’s writing concerns itself with situations that arise around issues of “property” and 
                                                
     38 Samuel Adams, “The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights”, quoted in Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern, 
vol. 3, 207. 
39 Bryan Waterman in Republic of Intellect, Chapter 2, chronicles the social troubles of Elihu Smith, one of 
Brown’s closest friends, after Smith admits “his loss of faith in Christianity” in a letter to his friend, Theodore 
Dwight. Smith’s friends and peers quickly connect Smith’s religious doubts to his intellectual interests in 
“philosophy,” i.e. the works of European intellectuals, specifically Godwin and Wollstonecraft. Smith’s 
admission is quickly interpreted by his social circle as a challenge to the public authority of the ministry. 
     40 Brown, “Walstein’s School of History,” 193. 
     41 Ibid, 192. 
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“marriage,”42 middle-class subjects traditionally associated with the novel form. Such subject 
matter is valuable as a moral tool, Brown’s narrator argues, because the average reader 
identifies with the predicaments in which Engel’s characters find themselves: “But though 
few may be expected to be monarchs and ministers, every man occupies a station in society 
in which he is necessarily active to evil or to good.”43 Here again we see that despite Brown’s 
radical views regarding the basis of civic and moral authority, he eschews liberal 
individualism in favor of a classical social order in which each citizen understands his civic 
duties in terms of a shared morality. His vision for the writer as the propagator of virtue is 
less an argument for an entirely new model of civic order, than for the dissemination of a 
post-Enlightenment progressive value system through a neo-classical civic apparatus. As will 
become clear in the discussion of Wieland below, Brown is keenly aware that for a 
community to function it must have a coherent system of ethical beliefs. Where Brown 
differs from many of his contemporaries is his understanding that in the secular age it is the 
romance writer’s civic duty to define such a system publicly. 
            The narrator’s summary of “Olivo Ronsica,” illustrates for the reader the way in 
which works of literature can have a positive moral effect upon average people in familiar 
situations. In Engel’s story of Olivo the reader learns that even in situations of 
powerlessness, ignorance, and deprivation, an individual can act virtuously. Olivo, the 
narrator informs us, is “a rustic youth,” who leaves his provincial home due to “domestic 
revolutions,” “destitute of property, of friends, and of knowledge of the world.” “Virtue and 
sagacity,”44 we are told, will help him acquire all these things which he lacks. Upon entering 
the German city of Weimar, Olivo demonstrates his virtue through his contact with “a 
                                                
     42 Ibid, 192. 
     43 Ibid, 193. 
     44 Ibid, 193. 
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vicious character,”45 Semlits, who is unable to corrupt the youthful hero. Olivo ends his 
contact with Semlits, once he learns of the man’s moral corruption, but then becomes 
gravely ill due to a pestilence “prevalent throughout the north of Europe.”46 While under the 
care of a physician, Olivo relates his “previous adventures” and slowly is restored to health. 
Olivo’s narrative is exactly the story of Arthur Mervyn, Brown’s novel set in Philadelphia 
during the 1793 yellow fever epidemic. The insertion of Brown’s own novel here disguised 
as the work of Engel makes it clear that the supposed tradition of Walstein and his students 
is synonymous with Brown’s own understanding of the romance form.  Given that 
Walstein’s “imaginary histories”47 resemble earlier epic forms in their presentation of grand 
leaders successfully defending the integrity of their respective nations, but still share the 
same moral imperatives of Engel’s writing, which chooses humbler characters and 
circumstances as its subjects matter, we see that Brown understands the novel to perform 
the same moral task in the post-revolutionary era, which the epic did for the classical age. If, 
as MacIntyre argues, “human life has a determinate form, the form of a certain kind of 
story,”48 then part of the task of the writer is to understand what form the human story is 
taking in his respective historical moment. For this reason Brown’s stealthy inclusion of his 
own work in a narrative of German literary history cannot be interpreted solely as a gesture 
of political self-protection for his radical position on the role of the writer in a republic. 
Instead,  we must  recognize that “the progressively coded German literary wave of the 
1790s”49 did offer Brown not only ways of writing the stories of new life forms made 
                                                
     45 Ibid, 193. 
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     47 Ibid, 189. 
     48 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 122. 
     49 Barnard & Shapiro intro. to Brown, “Walstein’s School of History,” 185. 
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possible by the age of revolution, but also ways of imagining the writer’s role in influencing 
the new political structures that will ultimately influence the forms of life possible.  
            Brown’s insertion of Arthur Mervyn points to one formal kinship between Brown and 
his German contemporaries. As Barnard and Shapiro suggest, “in anagrammatical fashion”50 
the title of Engel’s “Olivo Ronsico” seems to allude to Christoph Martin Wieland’s hero 
Don Silvio von Rosalvo in his romance, Der Sieg der Natur über die Schwärmerei oder die 
Abenteuer des Don Silvio von Rosalvo (1764), published in English in 1773 as Reason Triumphant 
over Fancy; or the Adventures of Don Silvio of Rosalvo. Wieland imitates Don Quixote in this comic 
work in order to poke fun at his own earlier pietism expressed in his writings from the 
1750s, which were strongly devotional and which he later abandoned for a more worldly, 
rationalistic philosophy.51 Though the narratives of “Olivo Ronsico” and Don Silvio von 
Rosalvo have little in common, the rejection of the religious life for an intellectual one in 
Wieland’s romance expresses a stance compatible with the implicit agenda of Brown’s essay. 
To allude to Christoph Martin Wieland serves Brown’s overall conception of the romance 
writer espoused in “Walstein’s School of History” in two more important ways. First, the 
self-formation (Bildung) of the youthful hero that operates as a narrative telos in Arthur 
Mervyn marks Brown’s novel as an American variant of the German Bildungsroman, of which 
Wieland’s History of Agathon (1766-1767) is considered the first example and which appeared 
in English translation in 1773. To invoke Wieland indirectly, then, within an allusion to his 
own novel, is for Brown to acknowledge the German author as an important precursor to 
Arthur Mervyn’s literary form. Though Wieland’s History of Agathon takes place in Athens in 
the late 5th Century B.C., Agathon, like Brown’s Arthur, is a youth of no particular 
                                                
     50 Ibid, 185, 
51 For more about C.M. Wieland see Brender, Irmela. Christoph Martin Wieland. 3rd ed. Reinbek bei Hamburg: 
Rowohlt, 2003; Oellers, Norbert. Weimar: Literatur und Leben zur Zeit Goethes. 2nd ed. Stuttgart: Reclam, 2009;  
Zaremba, Michael. Christoph Martin Wieland : Aufklärer und Poet : eine Biografie. Köln: Böhlau, 2007.  
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importance. Through a set of contradictory statements emerging from the opening claim of 
Wieland’s “Author’s Preface” to Agathon, 52 Wieland fashions a critical statement on the art 
of fiction writing very similar to the one espoused by Brown in “Walstein’s School of 
History.” Wieland inaugurates his work with a statement that both attests to Agathon’s 
authenticity as a translation of an ancient manuscript rather than an invented tale, and 
doubts his readers ability to accept this claim of authenticity as true: 
The Editor of this History sees so little probability of being able to persuade the 
public, that it was really taken from an old Greek manuscript, that he thinks it best to 
be silent on this point, and to leave the reader entirely at liberty to think as he 
pleases.53  
 
Like the work of Walstein and Engel, Wieland deems Agathon a “history,” rather than a 
romance or novel. Further, he states that the basis of the work’s importance should be its 
authenticity as an ancient document, “that it had been found among the records of ancient 
Athens,” but the information within the manuscript itself is too insignificant to persuade 
readers of its importance. What we learn from the manuscript, Wieland claims here, are the 
mundane facts of Agathon’s existence. We learn the date of his birth, marriage, and death, 
the disease from which he died, and the number of offspring he left in the world. Because of 
this fact, Wieland laments,”[W]hat could induce any one from such anecdotes as these, to 
read his history, even though it could incontestibly [sic] be proved, that it had been found 
among the records of ancient Athens?”54 Despite the manuscript’s age, its portrayal of an 
insignificant figure implies that readers will find no inherent value in the work. Wieland, 
                                                
52
 There is no evidence that Charles Brockden Brown knew German, so it is generally assumed by scholars that 
he only read German works in translation. For this reason, throughout this chapter I have chosen to use the 
18th century English translations of Wieland’s work, i.e. the translations which Brown himself would have read. 
The translation of Agathon is from 1773 and the translator is anonymous. 
     53 C.M. Wieland, The history of Agathon, by C.M. Wieland. Translated from the German original, with a preface by the 
translator (London, 1773. Eighteenth Century Collections Online), xviii. 
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 Ibid, xvii. “[W]as würde uns bewegen können, seine Geshichte zu lesen, und wenn es gleich gerichtlich 
erwiesen wäre, daß sie in den Archiven des alten Athens gefunden worden sei?”  
 135 
however, almost immediately contradicts these opening statements by denying the text’s 
originality and declaring that the value of Agathon’s story arises from its presentation of an 
identifiable human character:  “[t]he truth…of a work of this kind…must depend entirely 
upon it’s [sic] consistency with the general customs of the world.”55 The text that was in the 
preceding paragraph “found among the records of ancient Athens,” is now a “work” that 
through an author’s technical abilities attains “truth” through “consistency.” Consistency we 
soon learn means that the text is not obligated to present an objective history, but that the 
“author,” i.e. Wieland,  must invent a coherent narrative, if the “history” is to have any “use” 
for its readers: 
…the characters, therefore, are not to be arbitrarily drawn according to the fancy and 
peculiar design of the author, but derived from the inexhaustible fund of nature 
itself. In the winding up of several parts, the probability of the events in 
themselves…must be carefully preserved…Besides this, the peculiar characteristic of 
the country, of the spot, and of the age…should be constantly kept in view, and the 
whole narrative so put together, that no sufficient reason may be assigned, why the 
events should not have happened exactly as they are told, or why they might not 
happen again. Such an appearance of truth as this, can only render a work of this kind 
useful, and this the author takes upon himself to promise to the readers of The History 
of Agathon.56 (xviii) [my italics] 57 
 
Though The History of Agathon  began from a manuscript, which contained little significant 
narrative of an ancient person’s life, the work of the author is to invent an elaborate life in 
literature for him. We are told at the end of this passage that only through such an 
“appearance of truth” can Agathon’s history be “useful” to the reader and render the work 
                                                
     55 Ibid, xviii. “Die Wahrheit, welche von einem Werke, wie dasjenige…gefodert werden kann und soll, 
besteht darin, daß alles mit dem Lauf der Welt übereinstimme.”  
     56 Ibid, xviii 
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einmal wirklich geschehen werde. Diese Wahrheit allein kann Werke von dieser Art nützlich machen, und diese 
Wahrheit getrauet sich der Herausgeber den Lesern der Geschichte des Agathons zu versprechen.”  
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worthy of study. But what is it exactly that makes the work “useful”? The difference between 
the description of the original manuscript in the preceding paragraph and the “useful” 
narrative described above is the difference between a narrative of arbitrary detail and one 
composed of probable causes and effects. The challenge to the author is not to “arbitrarily” 
draw a character, but to compose one from the “fund of nature.” Here Wieland calls for a 
mimetic relationship between the literary persona and people as they appear in the world. In 
essence, he presents what is not considered the difference between classical literature and the 
novel as a modern form. The work of the writer is to imbue a literary character with a 
personality drawn from real life and to ensure that the character acts in accordance with his 
personality throughout the work. This same attention should be applied to the narrative 
itself. In the events depicted, nothing “improbable” should occur. In other words, effects 
must be equal to causes, actions to motives. Obeying these laws of consistency should not 
result in a narrative that proves there once existed in ancient Greece a youth named 
Agathon, but rather the narrative should prove that if there had ever been a youth in ancient 
Greece named Agathon, it is not unlikely that he may have behaved in this way. Again, 
Wieland is after “the appearance of truth” rather than truth. The difference between “the 
appearance of truth” and truth itself is the difference between the subjunctive and the simple 
past. The author is not beholden to what “was” in the objective sense. Instead, he is 
obligated to intuiting the logic of the world of the past, which now only exists in writing. His 
work is successful as long as what is shown is not impossible, as long as the reader does not 
question, “why the events should not have happened exactly as they are told, or why they 
might not happen again.” The narrative is useful then, because it shows likely characters 
acting in likely ways. The reader by observing this probable world is able to observe probable 
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actions and see their probable results. The reader thus gains risk free human experience 
through observing an actor not unlike himself operate in a world not entirely unlike his own.  
            Wieland’s dedication to the historical past as a site for imaging probable humans 
taking probable actions links him to neoclassical traditions interested in grand epics, but his 
choice of an average youth, whose life has no direct impact on the course of historical 
events, but rather is a search for personal meaning connects Agathon to the modern novel.   
By placing an ‘everyman’ hero within a neoclassical setting Wieland’s narrative appears as a 
hybrid of Walstein’s and Engel’s works. The similarity of purpose between Wieland’s feigned 
historical framework and Brown’s fictional construction of German literary history in 
“Walstein” suggests Brown’s knowledge and admiration for Wieland’s narrative theory and 
methods. Brown’s interest in using fictional narrative for the “minute explication of 
motives” for existing societal conditions, such as he does in his novel Wieland, which 
explores the socio-historical reasons for a violent family murder, suggests that Brown was 
able to adapt Wieland’s narrative theories to suit the historical conditions of his own age.   
            Many references within “Walstein’s School of History” suggest that not only 
Wieland’s work influenced Brown’s literary production, but also that Wieland’s public life in 
Weimar served as a model for Brown’s conception of the romance writer. When Brown 
transposes his own Arthur Mervyn to Engel’s “Olivo Ronsico,” he changes the setting of his 
own Philadelphia to Wieland’s Weimar, where the German poet served as tutor to the 
princes and remained a man of letters at court for the majority of his mature life. We can 
assume from Brown’s other political beliefs that he would not have favored Weimar’s 
Enlightened Absolutism as an ideal political form, but the fact that Wieland, who abandoned 
an austere pietism for rational philosophy, functioned officially within the court as tutor to 
future rulers, must have seemed to Brown as a step closer to the realization of a political 
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order in which “intellectual vigour” gained political authority. No doubt, the turmoil of 
1790s American politics, the struggle for authority between elitist federalism and market-
oriented democracy, did not offer Brown any hope that the new nation would take seriously 
the romance writer as deserving of political authority. We can assume that Brown saw the 
difference in cultural positions between Wieland and himself something like the differences 
between Cicero and Pombal, each man “pursuing his end by the means suited to his own 
condition,” adapting his values to the circumstances of his own political reality.  
            Brown demonstrates his admiration for Weimar Classicism in general throughout 
“Walstein’s School of History” through many allusions, suggesting that he saw not only 
Wieland, but the entire community of writers working in and around Jena and Weimar as 
already beginning to influence political life through their respected positions as German 
writers and intellectuals. The many references in Brown’s essay suggest that Brown was not 
inspired by one German writer in particular, but saw that the literary life in these German 
cities exhibited an integration between literary production and civic life that was not possible 
in Brown’s America.  For example, as Barnard and Shapiro carefully note, the names Brown 
chose for the fictional writers Walstein and Engel reference two important figures of 
eighteenth century German literary life, Frederick Schiller and Johann Jakob Engel. Walstein, 
Barnard and Shapiro argue, “likely refers to the work of Frederick Schiller,”58 specifically 
Schiller’s play History of the Thirty Years War. The name is an alternative English spelling in the 
period for Wallenstein, and refers to a general who appears in this particular play and other 
works by Schiller. It seems that Brown chose the name Walstein, not because he wanted to 
refer to the character in Schiller’s works, but because he wished to reference Schiller himself. 
Schiller, who like the fictional Walstein was a professor of history at Jena, wrote many 
                                                
     58 Barnard and Shapiro, intro to Brown, “Walstein’s School of History,” 185. 
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fictional works based on major historical events. Like Walstein’s “Cicero” and “Pombal,” 
which aimed to show that political authority should be based in intellectual abilities, rather 
than birthright, Schiller’s works often used history as vehicles for progressive politics.  
            Brown names Engel after the real life German writer Johann Jakob Engel, a 
professor of moral philosophy, logic, and history, who served as an advisor to Frederick the 
Great. Like Wieland, Engel’s intellectual life served as the basis for some measure of political 
authority, if only through an advisory position. To Brown, who was interested in reaching 
and educating a wide audience of readers through his creative works, Engel’s reputation for 
making philosophical topics “approachable for nonelite audiences”59 must have also been 
admirable. These writers were well known to the most important political figures of their 
time and their reputation as men of letters granted them official positions in the civic order. 
Brown, who was unable to attend university due to his Quaker faith and is presumed to have 
given up novel writing because of  financial insecurity, must have seen Engel’s position as an 
advisor to Frederick the Great and Wieland’s post as tutor to the princes at the court of 
Weimar, as the beginnings of a modern enlightened social order, in which a writer was 
granted authority for his ability to reason and develop this capacity in others.  
            If we turn for a moment to the novel Wieland; or The Transformation. An American Tale 
(1798) we can diagnose some of Brown’s imagined consequences for a society that lacked a 
shared ethical ground that he imagined literary culture could provide. Here again Brown 
utilizes the cultural life of eighteenth century Germany, this time as a means of comparison 
to between Enlightened Europe and his own contemporary America by imagining the socio-
political motives behind a brutal family murder in rural Pennsylvania. Brown used James 
Yates’ murder of his wife and four children in rural New York State in 1782, as inspiration 
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for the gothic novel, an act which Yates claimed was inspired by divine voices. In 1796 the 
murders received renewed attention when an account of the event was published in The New 
York Weekly Magazine; or Miscellaneous Repository and early drafts show that Brown modeled 
Theodore Wieland, the murderer in his novel, after Yates.60 Though Brown chooses this 
particular event around which to structure his narrative, his subtitle, The Transformation: An 
American Tale and his theory of the novel as a form of diagnostic history writing highlights 
that the negative changes which occur in the Wieland family over the course of three 
generations in some sense contribute to a cultural climate in which such a murder could take 
place. For this reason the opening pages of the novel are especially important, for here we 
learn that much about what goes wrong in the Wieland family has to do with the differences 
between an eighteenth-century German literary world and a monadic Protestant American 
culture. 
            That Brown chooses to make his American family a branch of the real and famous 
contemporary German poet’s family highlights the comparative aims of Brown’s work. The 
“transformation” of the American clan, of the branch of the Wieland family that moves 
progressively west over the course of three generations has everything to do with the cultural 
structures available in each geographical location. In the first few pages of the narrative we 
move from the grandfather’s Saxony, to the father’s England, and then finally, to the 
daughter and son’s rural Pennsylvania farm where the story proper begins. Saxony functions 
much like the culture Brown idealized in “Walstein’s School of History,” while England 
represents a society fractured by Post-Reformation. America appears simply as a private 
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Hackett Pub Co, 2009).  
 
 141 
family farm where each member of the family operates under his or her own private belief 
stystem. Unlike Brown’s Arthur Mervyn, Wieland is not a tale of self-development, but rather 
an account of a family’s demise as it moves further and further away from socio-political 
structures that provide a communal set of ethics.  
            Clara Wieland, sister of the murderer Theodore Wieland, narrates the tale 
retrospectively, at the request of an unnamed person and she begins her story with her 
Grandfather Wieland, a German noble and a native of Saxony, who in essence represents the 
family in its most virtuous state, and Enlightenment ideals in their most developed form. 
Despite being disowned and disinherited from his noble family for marrying a local 
merchant’s daughter, Wieland attempts to earn a living via the arts, the only ‘trade’ available 
to him: “His youth had been eagerly devoted to literature and music.”61 In the process,  Clara 
claims, her grandfather became “the founder of the German Theater.”62 Clara also notes that 
“the modern poet of the same name is sprung from the same family, and, perhaps, surpasses 
but little, in the fruitfulness of his invention, or the soundness of his taste [my]”63 
grandfather. Tellingly, the elder Wieland wrote in “the Saxon dialect,”64thus contributing to a 
symbolic formation of nation-state identity by moving away from the classical languages, 
especially Latin, associated with the Catholic Church’s political domination of Europe.  
            Through his literary career the Wieland grandfather instantiates the kind of 
progressive secular civic life imagined by Brown as the most virtuous republican form. By 
naming this family after the poet Wieland and having Clara reveal that the German poet is 
descended from the same family, Brown implies an alternative narrative for the family. The 
actions of the novel which take place “between the conclusion of the French and the 
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beginning of the revolutionary war.” From this we can assume that “the modern poet” 
Wieland would be a contemporary of Clara and Theodore. If Theodore’s murders are the 
ending of an “American tale,” the implication here is that the alternate “German tale” ends 
in literary production rather than murder.  
            The first fateful occurrence which sets the stage for the Wieland family’s demise 
results from the death of the grandfather and his wife at an early age. Their deaths cause 
Clara’s father, a young boy at the time, to be sent by his merchant grandfather to be 
“apprenticed to a London trader [in] mercantile servitude,”65 a position of indentured 
servitude not much higher than a slave’s. Unlike his father, the son remains uneducated and 
uncultured except “with a view to this profession.”66 Where the Grandfather Wieland was 
ancestor to Weimar Classicism, Clara’s father remains an uncultivated laborer. The father’s 
life changes when by chance he begins to read the only book in his “garret,” though earlier 
“he entertained no relish for books, and was wholly unconscious of any power they 
possessed to delight or instruct.”67 After throwing the book carelessly across the room one 
evening,  he notices that it has fallen open to the words “Seek and ye shall find”68 and he 
begins to read it voraciously. What is especially relevant here is that the book is not a Bible, 
but a fugitive Huguenot text, “an exposition of the doctrine of the sect of Camissards” that 
“abounded with allusions to the Bible,”69 but itself is no Bible. The reading, then, does not 
interpellate the father Wieland into a larger institutionalized religious tradition, but serves as 
the means for him to create a highly private belief system. The young man understands this 
text to be the single source of religious revelation: “This [the book] was the fountain, beyond 
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which it was unnecessary to trace the stream of religious truth; but it was his duty to trace it 
thus far.”70 Even though the text eventually leads him to acquire a Bible, the central text of 
all branches of Christianity, his reading of the Bible is marred by his original engagement 
with sectarian literature:  
A Bible was easily procured, and he ardently entered on the study of it. His 
understanding had received a particular direction…Every fact and sentiment in this 
book were viewed through a medium which the writings of the Camissard apostle 
had suggested. His constructions of the text were hasty, and formed on a narrow 
scale. Every thing was viewed in a disconnected position. One action and one 
precept were not employed to illustrate and restrict the meaning of another. Hence 
arose a thousand scruples to which he had hitherto been a stranger. He was 
alternately agitated by fear and by ecstacy [sic].71  
 
Where Walstein demands a unity of form and a delineation of causes and effects in order for 
a narrative to produce an edifying effect upon its reader, here the Wieland father’s reading 
causes a sense of fragmentation “a thousand scruples” unable to be mastered via reason, but 
rather causing him “fear” and “ecstacy.” Bible fails at bringing Wieland into a shared world 
view for it is filtered through a sectarian vision. Rather than interpellating him into a social 
order, his reading of the Bible disturbs his own sense of self.  
            Brown uses literature itself as the source of the vastly different experiences between 
grandfather and father. The grandfather by virtue of his education in literature founds a 
national German theater, a means of creating a new political formation in the aftermath of 
the Reformation. The father, however, through his chance, but dedicated engagement with a 
radical sectarian religion loses the possibility of a national identity, for he must leave England 
“on account of his religious tenets.”72 Having been deprived inclusion in the national life of 
both Germany and England, he escapes to America.  
                                                
70 Ibid, 10. 
     71 Ibid, 10. 
     72 Ibid, 9. 
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            Through these parallel stories Brown presents an argument for the possibility of 
literature to create both a coherent moral system and a shared culture in an age where 
religion has begun to divide traditional society. Brown’s description of the Wieland family in 
America is marked by a dangerous inability for family members to share a belief system. 
They thus fail to have a common interpretation of the world around them. Soon after the 
father arrives in America, where he wishes to convert “the unbelieving nations,” i.e. the 
native Americans, he abandons his plan to proselytize, choosing instead to buy land and 
slaves. This “[gives] him who was poor in Europe all the advantages of wealth.”73 Strangely 
religious, Clara notes, “He allied himself with no sect, because he perfectly agreed with 
none.”74 Despite his original impulse to convert non-believers, he does not instruct his 
family in the faith as he understands it to have “been expressly prescribed to him.” Clara’s 
mother, raised as a Moravian, continues her practice in that tradition without any conflicts 
with the father: “My father refused to interfere in her arrangements…Other modes, if 
practised [sic] by other persons, might be equally acceptable.” 75  In other words, the Wieland 
house is one of  religious plurality and toleration. So little commonality is found among the 
members that the family seems not to even share a belief in the same God. Clara in 
describing the temple her father built on the property for his own worship states, “This was 
the temple of his Deity.”76  
          The opposition of world views within the family becomes especially clear in the 
dialogue surrounding the father’s death. One evening, while praying alone in his temple, he is 
struck down by a fiery force, which burns his skin and turns his clothes to ash. His injuries 
are severe, but he lives long enough to communicate to the family that he was punished for 
                                                
     73 Ibid, 11. 
     74 Ibid, 11. 
     75 Ibid, 13. 
     76 Ibid, 12. 
 145 
not converting the natives, as he was called to do. His brother-in-law, a surgeon, is a man of 
science and skeptical of the father Wieland’s claims and believes the injuries to be the result 
of spontaneous combustion rather than divine intervention. Brown’s own skepticism 
regarding the religious nature of the incident is expressed in a footnote, claiming that such 
“symptoms” were recently documented in a Florentine medical journal.77 Though Clara is 
too young to make sense of her father’s death, she notes that in hindsight it has caused her 
confusion:  
Is it a fresh proof that the Divine Ruler interferes in human affairs, meditates an end, 
selects, and commissions his agents, and enforces, by enequivocal sanctions, 
submission to his will? Or, was it merely the irregular expansion of the fluid that 
imparts warmth to our heart and our blood, caused by the fatigue of the preceding 
day, or flowing, by established laws, from the condition of his thoughts?78 
 
It is with these words that the reader enters the narrative proper, the story of the murders 
which Theodore Wieland commits in the name of God. By the end of the novel we see that 
Theodore Wieland accepting the first idea “that the Divine Ruler interferes in human affairs” 
by commanding his believers is enough for him to believe the voices in his head encouraging 
to slay his wife and children. Wieland’s ability to explain his murders as an obedience to a 
highly personal God worshipped through a highly personal religion makes this novel a 
critique of the radical self-authorizing individualism emerging from Protestant sectarianism.  
            The pluralism of world views emerging from such religious divisions, Brown’s novel 
implies, leads to the kind of moral incoherency inherent in Theodore’s self-defense. By 
referencing the German literary culture of Weimar Classicism through direct references to 
Christoph Martin Wieland, Brown suggests that the moral incoherency of eighteenth-century 
America, which results from competing religious views, could be reconciled through the 
                                                
     77 Ibid, 19. 
     78 Ibid, 18-19. 
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implementation of a unified moral code based in secular literary production such as he 
proposes in “Walstein’s School of History.” Though Brown’s commitment to a secular 
national culture marks him as an Enlightenment figure, his dedication to a classical social 
order defined as a shared code of ethics reveal him to be a staunch critique of liberal 
individualism. Brown’s redefinition of the virtuous patriot as romance writer proposes that 
earlier classical civic structures can be adapted to a post-revolutionary, Enlightened world.  
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An American Pic turesque :  Margaret  Ful l er ’ s  Summer on the Lakes 
 
 
“I have not been particularly anxious to give the geography of the scene, inasmuch as 
it seemed to me no route, no series of stations, but a garden interspersed with 
cottages, groves and flowery lawns, through which a stately river ran…What I got 
from the journey was the poetic impression of the country at large; it is all I have 
aimed to communicate.”1 
 
            In making sense of the composition of Summer on the Lakes—specifically the author’s 
frequent interruption of the empirical facts of the journey “with random associations or with 
insertions of brazenly extraneous matter, especially with ad hoc poetic flights,” 2 as one 
frustrated reader put it, sympathetic critics have clung to Fuller’s own formulation of her 
compositional strategy as “the poetic impression of the country at large,”3 a statement she 
makes at the end of the text’s third chapter. Latching on to this allusion to a distinctly 
Romantic form of sensibility implicit in her phrase “poetic impression,” Fuller’s  champions, 
generally speaking, attempt their defense of the work’s form through attenuated notions of 
Romantic aesthetics.  
            Susan Belasco Smith, paraphrasing Lawrence Buell, for instance, suggests in her 
introduction to Summer on the Lakes that the overall popularity of the travel genre in the 
nineteenth century was due to “the rise of romanticism with its stress on individual 
experience.”4 Her analysis emphasizes the importance of the perceiving subject, suggestive 
of the valorization of sensibility in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, though Smith stops 
                                                
     1 Margaret Fuller, Summer on the Lakes, in 1843, ed. Susan Belasco Smith (Urbana and Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 1991), 43. 
     2 Perry Miller, ed., Margaret Fuller: American Romantic (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., 1963), 116. 
     3 Fuller, Summer on the Lakes, 43. 
     4 Susan Belasco Smith, introduction to Summer on the Lakes, in 1843 by Margaret Fuller (Urbana and Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 1991), xii. 
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short of acknowledging the text’s affinity with any particular strain of Romanticism. Instead, 
she aligns the genre with gender rather than the practices of a specific aesthetic movement, 
“Summer on the Lakes follows the tradition of portfolio and sketchbook writing that began at 
the turn of the nineteenth century and was largely an art form practiced by women.”5 
Similarly, John Matteson, Fuller’s most recent biographer, references Romanticism in his 
assessment of the text’s form by aligning the composition with the German literary culture 
Fuller knew so well,6 claiming that “[t]he patchwork nature of Fuller’s narrative is due in part 
to her wanting to infuse her book with some of the spirit of the German Romantics.”7 His 
identification and definition of a specific Romantic aesthetic or practice remains as cursory 
as Smith’s, only substantiated by the claim that German Romantics remain “generally less 
concerned with telling logically connected stories than they were with revealing philosophical 
and psychological truth.”8 Stephen Adams in his article, “‘That Tidiness We Always Look for 
in Woman’: Fuller's Summer on the Lakes and Romantic Aesthetics”9 due to his title appears to 
promise a more thorough engagement with aesthetic theory, but inevitably eschews the 
subject through a thematic reading of the works’ disparate materials. Conceiving of 
“Romantic literary experimentation”10 as a formal literary category in itself, Adams argues 
“[p]erhaps the letters, tales, poems, extracts from books, and other materials ostensibly 
unrelated to the trip do not merely pad out an otherwise skimpy narrative, but help control 
                                                
     5 Ibid, xiv. 
6 Fuller translated Goethe’s Tasso, Eckermann’s Conversations with Goethe, and two epistolary novels by Bettina 
von Arnim, Goethe’s Correspondence with a Child and Die Günderode. For more on Fuller’s work as a translator see 
Colleen Glenney Boggs, “Margaret Fuller's American Translation,” American Literature , Vol. 76, No. 1 (Mar., 
2004), pp. 31-58.  
     7 John Matteson, The Lives of Margaret Fuller (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Co., 2012), 235. 
     8 Ibid, 235. 
     9 Stephen Adams, "That Tidiness We Always Look for in Woman": Fuller's ‘Summer on the Lakes’ and 
Romantic Aesthetics,” Studies in the American Renaissance, (1987): 247-264, accessed March 26, 2013, Article 
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30228135. 
     10 Ibid, 261. 
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and direct the book’s shape and major themes.”11 Flattening the definition of the Romantic 
travel narrative as a genre to “some kind of voyage out and back,”12 he groups Summer on the 
Lakes with works such as The Prelude, Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage, “Song of Myself,” Walden, and 
Moby-Dick, arguing that a “voyage” functions as a “loose narrative spine” for such 
“Romantic experimentation” because “[t]he focus shifts from the landscape…to subjective 
or inner exploration.”13 Thus, with his thematic analysis  Adams never adequately reads 
Fuller’s work through the aesthetic philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth century.  
            I begin with these representative examples of common explanations of Summer on the 
Lakes because they display a general critical predilection in the study of nineteenth-century 
American literature to comprehend European Romanticism as simply a monolithic late-
eighteenth-early-nineteenth-century literary privileging of subjective experience. In doing so 
such readings perform a great disservice to Summer on the Lakes as a text, and Fuller as an 
author and intellectual. They also obfuscate one of the most significant examples in 
American literature of an adaptation of a particularly European conception of literary and 
aesthetic cultivation for the very literal and literary purposes of cultivating a new American 
landscape.14 Fuller’s text betrays a deep understanding and engagement with the codes, 
conventions, and theories of the British picturesque movement, an awareness she already 
                                                
     11 Ibid, 248. 
     12 Ibid, 251. 
     13 Ibid, 251. 
14 To emphasize the pervasive academic understanding of the text as one of solely regional interest, I find it  
important to note that the most recent scholarly edition of Summer on the Lakes, edited by Susan Belasco Smith 
and published in 1991, appeared in the “Prairie State Books” series of the University of Illinois Press. The 
mission statement for the series emphasizes the text as one of mostly local interest: “In conjunction with the 
Illinois Center for the Book, the University of Illinois Press is reissuing in paperback works of fiction and 
nonfiction that are, by virtue of authorship and/or subject matter, of particular interest to the general reader of 
the state of Illinois.” More recent editions of the text appear from independent presses as a print-on-demand 
title.  
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suggests through her most basic authorial choice: to write a domestic travel narrative as “a 
poetic impression of the country at large.”15  
            Many critics interpret Fuller’s understanding of American literature as “a new 
poetry” and “new intellectual growth”16 due to the geographic and historical divide between 
the United States and Europe, as a call for an American literature devoid of any connection 
to Old World literary traditions. Smith, for instance, writes that Fuller was “a leading 
proponent of the development of a uniquely American literature that would not be imitative 
or repetitive of British traditions.”17 Fuller’s own writing, however, never makes such 
wholesale divisions between American and European cultural productions, a result of her 
deep engagement with European literature. Colleen Glenney Boggs argues in particular that  
“translation enabled Fuller to define cultural identity as a model of personhood that depends 
on a dialogue with others in a nation whose culture emerges in global contexts.”18 Fuller’s 
own words amend Boggs’ assertion, focusing less on a model of subjectivity, than a theory 
of cultural capital focused on European sources.19 In her article “Americans in Europe”20 
from 1847, for instance, Fuller identifies three types of Americans she encountered during 
her time abroad as a journalist. The first she names “the servile American,” whose main 
interest as a European traveler is “to spend his money and indulge his tastes.”21 His ultimate 
end is to gather enough European cultural ‘accoutrements’ in order to “win importance at 
                                                
     15 Margaret Fuller, Summer on the Lakes, 43.  
     16 Ibid, 18.  
     17 Susan Belasco Smith, “Introduction,” in Margaret Fuller, Summer on the Lakes, xv. 
     18 Colleen Glenney Boggs, “Margaret Fuller’s American Translation,” American Literature, Volume 76, 
Number 1, March 2004. 
19 Boggs’ essay emphasizes the important role translation played in shaping Fuller’s understanding of culture as 
transnational, arguing that for Fuller American Literature was “domestically and globally transnational.” (33) 
Supporting this proposition with a reading of a single passage from Summer on the Lakes, she suggests that Fuller 
treated European and Native American culture as equally valuable and developed. As I show throughout this 
chapter, Fuller’s relationship to the U.S. expulsion and genocide of Native Americans was complicated and 
often contradictory. Though Fuller’s understanding of culture was transnational, it was also deeply Eurocentric.  
     20 Margaret Fuller, At Home and Abroad; or, Things and Thoughts in America and Europe, ed. Arthur B. Fuller 
(New York: The Tribune Association, 1869).  
     21 Ibid, 250.  
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home” “among those less traveled and as uninformed as himself.”22 The second type Fuller 
names “the conceited American, instinctively bristling and proud of—he knows not what. 
He does not see, not he, that the history of Humanity for many centuries is likely to have 
produced results it requires some training, some devotion, to appreciate and profit by.”23 
Fuller ultimately valorizes the third species of American, “the thinking American,” who 
studies and adapts European culture to benefit the situation of his new nation. Here, more 
conspicuously than in her second example’s reference to “training,” Fuller presents a model 
of intellectual cultivation. She does so through an extended botanical metaphor, where 
individual plants transported to the U.S. stand in for the transmigration of cultural objects 
and traditions from a European into an American context: 
 …a man who, recognizing the immense advantage of being born to a new world 
and on virgin soil, yet does not wish one seed from the past to be lost. He is anxious 
to gather and carry back with him every plant that will bear a new climate and new 
culture. Some will dwindle; others will attain a bloom and stature unknown before. 
He wishes to gather them clean, free from noxious insects, and to give them a fair 
trial in his new world. And that he may know the conditions under which he may 
best place them in that new world, he does not neglect to study their history in this.24 
 
Fuller’s trope imagines European cultural practices as botanical samples that the “thinking 
American” consciously transplants from their original context to the “virgin soil” of 
America, “not wish[ing] one seed from the past to be lost.” Understanding Europe as a past 
in which he shares, a past figured as both geographic and temporal, the thinking American in 
his desire to adapt cultural practices to new socio-historical contexts must learn their 
“history,” so as to best revise them for a new world context. Fuller’s emphasis on “history” 
presents an understanding of cultural practices as socio-historically specific, but also as an 
inheritance—a heritage to which the American has a right. Such a heritage is mobile, 
                                                
     22 Ibid, 251. 
     23 Ibid, 251.  
     24 Ibid, 253. 
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portable in Fuller’s description, emphasizing the modern conception of metaphorical 
cultivation as a form of personal capital. By figuring intellectual capital as a living, material 
heritage she emphasizes the responsibilities the American has towards cultural reproduction 
through transplantation. Knowing that with all transplantation the “plant” risks 
“dwindl[ing],” and that different “soil” will “attain a bloom and stature” unlike the original, 
the “thinking American” has an obligation to “know the conditions under which he may 
best place them in that new world,” in which he may best grow the cultural capital to which 
he has been given access.  
            Fuller published this extended meditation on the value of European cultural 
practices for the new nation as part of her work as a foreign correspondent in Europe, but 
her engagement with the picturesque in Summer on the Lakes demonstrates that already in 
1843 she understood the deep relationship between real and imaginary cultivation, and 
understood the inherent value of intellectual capital both for an individual and a nation. Her 
statements on the thinking American’s relationship to European culture and her own writing 
practice reveal that Fuller’s conception of an original American literature was not a culturally 
isolationist one. She understood that European culture offered Americans strategies for 
imagining themselves as a nation. The originality of American literature and thought for 
Fuller emerges from the fact that American writers by necessity need to adapt inherited 
forms to new socio-political terrains. The innovation inherent to such cultural transposition 
becomes apparent in Summer on the Lakes itself. Fuller’s picturesque does not differ from the 
British tradition in its imposition of aesthetic enclosure upon a natural terrain recently 
subjected to physical enclosure, though, as will become clear below, the particulars of the 
American situation require her to revise the types of social divisions facilitated by the 
aesthetic in order to ultimately affirm a conception of national unity.  
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            As a set of eighteenth-century codes and conventions at work in landscape 
gardening, landscape painting, loco-descriptive poetry, and domestic travel guides, the 
English picturesque cultivated in its viewer what Christopher Hussey, the first modern critic 
of the aesthetic, describes as the “habit of viewing and criticizing nature as if it were an 
infinite series of more or less well composed subjects for painting.”25 Current criticism of the 
aesthetic shows that the picturesque “habit” can already be identified as early as 1730 in the 
tropes of James Thomson’s poem “The Seasons” and in the conventions of the mid-century 
landscape paintings of Thomas Gainsborough, whose paintings in particular influenced the 
framing of views in the period’s guidebooks of the English countryside in which writers 
often referenced the painter’s work in their verbal descriptions of particular ‘natural’ scenes 
and encouraged their readers to attempt landscape sketches of their own. Art historian Ann 
Bermingham notes that it wasn’t until the 1790s that William Gilpin and Uvedale Price 
published the first formal theories of the aesthetic by enlarging Edmund Burke’s category of 
the beautiful.26 In Three Essays: On Picturesque Beauty, On Picturesque Travel, and On Sketching 
Landscape, for example, Gilpin expands beauty as an aesthetic category through his 
discrimination between the beautiful and the picturesque, where the beautiful describes 
those objects “which please the eye in their natural state,” and the picturesque  those “which 
please from some quality, capable of being illustrated by painting.”27 Because of the aesthetic’s 
stress upon the creation of painterly effects, it valorized roughness, irregularity, and 
                                                
     25 Christopher Hussey, The Picturesque: Studies in a Point of View (New York and London: gp Putnam’s Sons, 
1927), 1.  
26 “By beauty I mean, that quality or those qualities in bodies by which they cause love, or some passion similar 
to it. I confine this definition to the merely sensible qualities of things, for the sake of preserving the utmost 
simplicity in a subject which must always distract us, whenever we take in those various causes of sympathy 
which attach us to any persons or things from secondary considerations, and not from the direct force which 
they have merely on being viewed.” (91) Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the 
Sublime and Beautiful, U of Notre Dame, Notre Dame London, 1968.  
     27 William Gilpin quoted in Ann Bermingham, Landscape and Ideology: The English Rustic Tradtion, 1740-1860 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1989), 63. 
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variousness found in Great Britain’s landscapes, which were believed to be more pleasing in 
painting than the smooth, regular, and balanced objects of ideal beauty.  
             The work of art historians and literary scholars of the British eighteenth-century, 
specifically Alan Liu, Raymond Williams, John Barrell, Nigel Everett, Ann Bermingham, 
Martin Price and Thomas Pfau have over the past fifty years produced much significant 
work that explores the picturesque’s function as, in Pfau’s words, a “historical 
unconscious,”28 operating at a time in which the modernization of the British economy was 
rapidly transforming the social landscape of the nation. This body of scholarship enables us 
to begin to understand the significance of Fuller’s adoption and adaptation of the aesthetic 
for her own literary negotiation of a politically charged American terrain. Originally the 
picturesque emerged as the social organization of the British countryside radically changed 
due to improvement and enclosure, and the national economy transitioned to an imaginary, 
speculative form via the creation of a national debt.29 As a series of cultural practices the 
picturesque allowed a new and economically precarious middle class engaged in the distinctly 
modern process of self-making to cultivate and enclose the national landscape symbolically 
through the development of an imaginary form of capital defined as “taste.” As Alan Liu 
writes, “the picturesque was a deep imagination of the economic institutions then 
transforming feudal notions of property into the new sense of exchangeable 
                                                
     28 Thomas Pfau, Wordsworth’s Profession: Form, Class, and the Logic of Early Romantic Cultural Production (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1997), 29. 
29 In his essay “The mobility of property and the rise of eighteenth-century sociology,” Pocock underlines the 
role of imagination in an economy based in capitalist speculation: “The price [government stocks] command is 
determined by the present state of public confidence in the stability of the government, and in its capacity to 
make repayment in the theoretical future. Government is therefore maintained by the investor’s imagination 
concerning a moment which will never exist in reality. The ability of merchant and landowner to raise the loans 
and mortgages they need is similarly dependent upon the investor’s imagination. Property – the material 
foundation of both personality and government – has ceased to be real and has become not merely mobile but 
imaginary.” (112) The picturesque we might say was a means of displaying one’s portable property in person, a 
definition that helps us understand that modern property in all its forms is imaginary and portable.   
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proprietorship.”30 Thus as a set of shared cultural practices grounded in formalized viewings 
of the national landscape the picturesque enabled a developing British bourgeoisie to engage 
in an aesthetic and symbolic commodity exchange and thus to distinguish itself both from an 
ancien regime supported through a system of familial and political inheritance and from rural 
labor largely disenfranchised by the same economic changes that created the middle class. 
“[T]he wild regions of mountain and forest,” as Raymond Williams writes, “were for the 
most part objects of conspicuous aesthetic consumption.”31 With its ability to transpose land 
into a symbolic and portable form of property, the picturesque as a historical unconscious 
helped Britain redefine itself for a modernity that equated nationhood with bourgeois 
ideology.  
            In her adoption and adaptation of the British picturesque for Summer on the Lakes 
Margaret Fuller demonstrates an understanding of the aesthetic’s ability to function as a 
symbolic form of nation building. From Fuller’s perspective as a Great Lakes tourist in 1843 
the national situation reveals itself in many ways to be homologous to eighteenth-century 
Britain. Fuller’s frequent allusions to Wordsworth and the overall familiarity she displays 
with picturesque convention suggests that she was fully aware of the fact that the Great 
Lakes as a new tourist destination functioned as an American counterpart to England’s most 
popular picturesque tourist destination, the Lake District, not only for the superficial 
similarity of landscape, but also for the symbolic role both territories played in a 
psychological struggle to define each nation.  Though in the social structure of the United 
States there was no landed gentry to displace the rural poor, the Midwestern settlements and 
cities through which Fuller traveled depicted the effects of a particularly American version of 
‘enclosure’ and ‘improvement’. The 1830 federal Indian Removal Policy had ensured that by 
                                                
     30 Alan Liu, Wordsworth: The Sense of History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 94. 
     31 Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 128. 
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the summer of Fuller’s journey “most of the Native Americans east of the Mississippi had 
been defrauded and displaced.”32 This fact defined the terrain visually for Fuller and other 
tourists, who were aware that they traveled through settlements, rather than to the frontier: 
“When Fuller arrived in the Midwest in 1843, the Great Emigration of white settlers along 
the Oregon Trail was just underway, and traveling to Niagra Falls, Chicago, and the territory 
of Wisconsin was no longer a journey to the frontier.” Fuller’s own vocabulary throughout 
the text draws comparative allusions to the British picturesque, as if only a recourse to a 
familiar aesthetic and literary practice could aid her to negotiate such alien physical and 
psychological terrain. In the epigraph to this chapter, for instance, she notes her visual 
apprehension of the landscape as an enclosed space, “no route, no series of stations, but a 
garden interspersed with cottages, groves and flowery lawns” to which her “poetic,”33 
sensibility makes claims, a symbolic possession made possible by the very real displacement 
of a native population. Fuller’s perceptions of the displaced Native Americans bear the 
picturesque manner in which Britain’s rural poor appear in English Romantic lyric.  In 
observing “picturesque groups” of Indians at a temporary encampment, which Fuller 
watched from the window of her boarding house, for instance, she describes their behavior 
as portraying “all the gipsy charm and variety,”34 alluding to the convention of the wandering 
gypsy within picturesque landscape painting and locodescriptive poetry.35  Through her 
                                                
     32 Christina Zwarg, Feminist Conversations: Fuller, Emerson, and the Play of Reading (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1995), 99. 
     33 Margaret Fuller, Summer on the Lakes, 41-42.  
     34 Ibid, 108. 
35 This passage reveals Fuller’s typical reliance on literature to mediate her experiences, a rather picturesque 
‘move,’ as will become clearer below. In witnessing the “gipsy charm” she immediately invokes Sir Walter 
Scott: “If such romantic sketches were suggested to him, by the sight of a few gypsies, not a group near one 
these fires but would have furnished him material for a separate canvass…” (108) Notice also her description 
of literary writing as “canvass.” As the passage continues, she also invokes the work of Henry Schoolcraft, who 
conducted ethnological research on Native tribes as part of his appointment as U.S. Indian Agent at Sault Ste., 
Marie, Michigan in the 1820s. In 1936 he negotiated with the Ojibme tribe so that they ceded over 13 million 
acres to the U.S. through the Treaty of Washington. Fuller appears to refer to his work Narrative of an Expedition 
Through the Upper Mississippi River to Itasca Lake (1834) when she notes, “…these tribes possess great power [of 
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‘quoting’ of such standard conventions of the picturesque, Fuller announces to the 
nineteenth-century reader well-versed in Romantic literature and aesthetic practices her own 
text as a version of the picturesque, thus prescribing an interpretative grid for her reader. 
                                                                                                                                            
storytelling], if only from the fables taken from their stores, by Mr. Schoolcraft.” (108) We can assume that 
Fuller read Schoolcraft after her journey, while she conducted research for the book in the Harvard Library. 
For more on Schoolcraft see, Bremer, Richard G., Indian Agent & Wilderness Scholar: The Life of Henry Rowe 
Schoolcraft, Clarke Historical Library, Central Michigan University, 1987.  
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Vision for  a Nation  
            As a historical and collective unconscious aiding England’s transition from a quasi-
feudal structure to a modern, capitalist, economy, the conventions and practices of the 
picturesque at times facilitated seemingly competing interests, alternately providing its 
practitioners symbolic means for establishing rigid class divisions and for conceiving the 
British nation as a unified and egalitarian whole. As the work of critics over the last fifty 
years shows, these multiple ‘picturesques’ ultimately wrought a definition of nation 
synonymous with middle-class ideology. In reviewing the most salient ideological features of 
the aesthetic practice in a British context, we establish the foundation for comprehending 
the implications of Fuller’s adaptation of the picturesque.      
            As an art-historical phenomenon the picturesque suggests that the division between 
pre-modernity and modernity in the west is defined by the rise of the nation-state as a by-
product of the Reformation. In his exploration of the picturesque’s aversion to narrative and 
its idea of vision as pure form, “form, or ‘picturicity,’ [as] cognate with experience,” Alan Liu 
traces its development from an “Anglican reform” to an aesthetic facilitating acts of 
imaginary nation-building. Presenting western painting as an initially Christian “institution,” 
Liu argues that by removing the narrative element within painting the picturesque cut its ties 
with “the major institution served by narrative,” 36 the Roman Catholic Church. To illustrate 
this point, he analyzes Claude Lorrain’s “Landscape with Hagar and the Angel” from 1646, 
an influential precursor of the British picturesque landscape, which greatly revised the 
traditional manner of figuring biblical narrative. Specifically, Claude relegates Hagar and the 
Angel to “the middle distance” of the canvas, rather than the traditional central position, 
thus forcing the biblical narrative to compete with the landscape itself as subject matter. 
                                                
     36 Alan Liu, Wordsworth, 87. 
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Taking its cue from Claude, the picturesque, as we see in the paintings of Gainsborough and 
John Constable, for instance, goes one step further, erasing the demoted biblical narrative 
altogether, and elevating landscape as form to the ‘content’ of the work. Thus, “the 
picturesque, we can say, forgot half the Classic picture—the narrative.”37 In its rejection of 
narrative, then, the picturesque functions as an “evacuated [Catholic] liturgy,” a Protestant 
“counter-institution.”38  
            Art historian James Simpson helps us to better understand the connection between 
the Reformation’s institutionalized iconoclasm, and the picturesque as painting evacuated of 
its narrative content. “Taste,” Simpson contends, “with its focus on form, is a strategy 
designed to look at Rome again.”39 The Enlightenment “by creating an autonomous space 
for Art” in which images no longer functioned as objects that mediated the viewer’s 
relationship to a transcendental sphere essentially “conceded the fundamental critiques of  
Protestant iconoclasts.”40 The category of the aesthetic with its focus on the expertise of the 
viewer, on the viewer’s ability to judge the quality of an image as such, permitted post-
Reformation Europe to return to the art originally produced as an extension of Catholic 
liturgy and practice, for aesthetics “neutraliz[ed] [the image’s] power to enthrall.”41 The 
disinterested viewer produced by Enlightenment rationality understood to “[f]ocus on the 
form, ignore the content.” Because of this ability to empty images of their religious power, 
Simpson argues,  “the category of the aesthetic is itself, in sum, a historical product of 
iconoclasm.”42 The picturesque, then, following Simpson’s logic through Liu’s account of the 
aesthetic, represents a category of imagery that fled ‘Rome,’ never to return, so not only did 
                                                
     37 Ibid, 75.  
     38 Ibid, 75. 
     39 James Simpson, Iconoclasm in the Anglo-American Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 133. 
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the picturesque elevate the mundane to an acceptable subject matter for art, it invited its 
viewer to reduce even such earthly content to only form.   
            This elevation of the national landscape to a worthy subject for painting evidences a 
more significant ideological shift in the history of European modernity. Anglicanism as a 
religious counter-institution operated as an arm of the state, so that “an understanding of the 
picturesque as a religious institution can only be provisional because the meaning of 
Reformation in England was also, more basically, nationalism. It was state.”43 But already in 
its early forms, as Joseph Leo Koerner shows us, the iconoclasm of Protestantism fostered a 
model of community that lent itself as a model for the modern secular state. In its efforts to 
eradicate the errant belief structures of Catholicism based in iconography and ritual, 
“[b]eginning in 1518, Luther himself had preached in the practical sphere, outlining proper 
ways to confess, pray, work, celebrate and die. Elevating matters of private conscience to the 
level of public creed, such reforms also redefined community itself.” Community now was 
not defined by “the sum of persons with divergent local and familial fealties who happen to 
live in one place,” but “became an overarching unity to which all members actively had to 
conform, both by confessing common beliefs and by adhering to a common way of life.” 
Decentralized from Rome, local communities shared “a homogeneity of thought and 
action”44 fostered by print technologies. This Protestant redefinition of community that 
Koerner describes sets the ground for the modern conception of the nation-state. Such 
reformed church communities in their careful fostering of beliefs bear the markings of 
interpretative communities that Thomas Pfau sees as the beginnings of a middle-class self-
recognition, as we’ll see below. 
                                                
     43 Alan Liu, Wordsworth, 88. 
     44 Joseph Leo Koerner, The Reformation of the Image, (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 91-92. 
 161 
            As an aesthetic whose development travels from religious counter-institution to state 
apparatus, the picturesque displays Protestantism’s general evolution from “valuation of the 
fulfillment of duty in worldly affairs as the highest form which the moral activity of the 
individual could assume” to the “spirit of capitalism”45 as traced by Max Weber. What begins 
in painting as a reformatory religious impulse ends as an affirmation of “worldly affairs,” one 
that equates nationhood with property. In this equation of estate with state, painting now 
provided the viewer a means of apprehending symbolically both private and national 
territories, enacting a Lockean conception of citizenship in which property defined freedom. 
The picturesque as a habit of tourism fostered by a proliferation of tourist guides by writers 
including Gilpin and Wordsworth furthered this elision of state and estate so that a new 
‘middling class’ found itself exercising the same imaginative rights as the landed gentry.46 
This class, however, had to “apprehend” public territory, “invest[ing] unowned property in 
the Lakes with imaginative capital earned in the urban areas.”47 In doing so, a middle-class 
found itself in imaginative possession of the nation ‘in general.’ The “‘feeling’ of economic 
affluence and psychological confidence”48 gained through such aesthetic practices parallel the 
important and expanding role of new money in the nation’s transition to a speculative 
economy, where capital became increasingly portable and imaginary. As we’ll see below for 
Fuller this particular elision of picturesque tourism and the production of national identity is 
the most salient effect of her adoption of the British aesthetic. Though Fuller continually 
insists on denying the inherent cooperation between aesthetic sensibility and national 
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expansion, her ability to ‘capture’ the Great Lakes as a landscape via the picturesque by 
definition suggests the “psychological confidence” Pfau describes, an entitlement to visual 
possession of terrain.   
            A significant formal effect of picturesque practice also adopted by Fuller operates as 
a form of collective denial. The abandonment of narrative in favor of a formal 
discrimination of rural Britain, in addition to providing an urban and provincial middling 
class with a sense of national identity, provided the middling and landowning classes a means 
of psychologically obfuscating the economic plights of the rural poor instigated by the 
modern economy from which these classes benefited. Martin Price’s description of the 
“dramatic emphasis”49 within the picturesque suggests that Liu’s assessment of the aesthetic 
as pure form may not only be an “evacuation” of religious narrative, but a repression of the 
new and very real national narrative. Specifically, Price’s analysis of “crumbling form(s)” 
garnering the aesthetic “interest” of the picturesque viewer suggests that formal 
discrimination operated as a means of collective repression, for the conventions of the 
picturesque stipulated the formal abstraction of objects inherently burdened with human 
narrative:  
The picturesque in general recommends the rough or rugged, the crumbling form, the 
complex or difficult harmony. It seeks a tension between the disorderly or irrelevant 
and the perfected form…Where it concentrates upon a particular object, the aesthetic 
interest lies in the emergence of formal interest from an unlikely source (the hovel, 
the gypsy, the ass) or in the internal conflict between the centrifugal forces of 
dissolution and the centripetal pull of form (ruined temples, aged men). Clearly this is 
a dramatic emphasis.50 
 
Though at the theoretical-level the picturesque writer and traveler understood him or herself 
as seeking formal features intriguing to the eye, seemingly abstracted effects of broken light 
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and disrupted line, Price here notes that those effects were found in objects pointing to 
human dissolution or in human figures marked by time and poverty. The “conflict between 
the centrifugal forces of dissolution and the centripetal pull of form” seemingly allegorize 
the historical shifts negotiated via the picturesque. The forces causing the ruin of one form 
of life gathered into a counter-force instigating new social formations.  
            We see in J. Hassell’s Tour of the Isle of Wight from 1790, for instance, how at times the 
vacant formalism of the picturesque gaze submerged the elements of the human drama 
implicit in the aesthetized surfaces of rural British life. In its dedication to a form of realism 
perhaps more aptly described as a refusal of complete abstraction, however, the aesthetic 
could never completely erase the narrative evidence of rural poverty through its particular 
brand of formalism: 
 At the entrance of Newtown we are met with one of those subjects so often 
touched by the pencil of Mr. Gainsborough; a cottage overshadowed with trees; 
while a glimmer of light, just breaking through the branches, caught one corner of 
the stone and flint fabric, and forcibly expressed the conception of that great master. 
A few faggots, with a cart under a shed, formed the shadow part of the foreground 
and the New Forest, rearing its leafy tenants above the proudly swelling waves, 
closed the distance.51 
 
Here Hassell displays his expertise in identifying the picturesque in the actual countryside. 
Tutored by his study of Gainsborough’s visual art, Hassell describes the rural scene of labor 
and poverty as one evacuated of human form and arranged into abstracted elements that 
‘glimmer,’ ‘break,’ and ‘overshadow.’ Because such disassociated formal discriminations are 
dependent upon evidence of rural life (cottage, cart, shed), the “dramatic emphasis” that 
Martin Price describes emerges, or, perhaps more accurately, never quite submerges. The 
very need for the picturesque to find its form in what Price names “an unlikely source” 
suggests an “internal conflict,” for the abstracted elements are not located in the scene itself, 
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but arise from the viewer.  Hasserl viewed through Price illustrates a separation at the heart 
of the picturesque, the aesthetic permitting a certain class of Briton to no longer identify the 
land as a site of rural labor, but one of his or her own leisure. Raymond Williams describes 
such disassociation as inherent to any conception of landscape: “A working country is hardly 
ever a landscape. The very idea of landscape implies separation and observation.”52  
             Through John Barrell’s discussion of the portrayal of labor and leisure within the 
picturesque we see how the aesthetic disassociation of the leisure class lent itself to a false 
identification with rural laborers through forms of self-projection. Through an iconography 
that imagines the viewer’s leisure as a luxury available to the rural poor we see the 
sophistication of the picturesque to create illusions of a national unity. John Barrell’s 
readings of James Thomson’s The Seasons and Gainsborough’s painting “Landscape with a 
Woodcutter Courting a Milkmaid” in The Dark Side of the Landscape offers an analysis of 
eighteenth century English landscape art that helps us to understand the picturesque’s ability 
to officially promote “the liberal ideology of a rich, happy, harmonious land,”53 i.e., a unified 
Great Britain, while at the same time displaying dramatic but unacknowledged divisions of 
class. In particular his readings illustrate the extent to which concealment as a formal 
convention within the picturesque, perhaps best exemplified by the divisionary play of light 
from which Barrell takes his studies title, performs the work of national ideology.  
           In Thomson’s poetry, for instance, “the main concern is to present an image of 
English social life as in all important respects egalitarian and without conflict.” The English 
countryside “is the reward of all who work whether the responsible gentleman, shooting and 
fishing for relaxation, the busy citizens, visiting the country for recreation, or the industrious 
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swain, whose health is guaranteed by his outdoor life.”54 Though the poem does portray “a 
society…which may well permit inequalities of wealth” the rhetoric, Barrell notes, makes it 
difficult to translate “the labels ‘rich’ and ‘poor’…into the more divisive distinctions of 
‘consumer’ and ‘producer.’”55 The landscape maintains its sense of unity through the poetry’s 
“ambivalent use of language,” a language that deters the reader from associating the 
divisions of class with the realities of the modernization of economy. The success of the 
poem relies upon the fact that despite “the unity of Happy Britannia [being] fraught with 
contradiction,” such contradiction goes relatively unnoticed, so that, for instance, the casual 
reader might take the equation of the swain’s labor with the leisure activities of the tourists 
and gentleman at face value and ignore that in fact the poem “portray(s) the repressive 
actuality, that the sweets of  life are reserved for the rich.”56  
            Barrell finds a similar discordant parity between labor and leisure in the figures of 
Gainsborough’s painting “Landscape with a Woodcutter Courting a Milkmaid.” Just as in 
Thompson’s poem, Gainsborough’s canvas presents a country landscape that “invites us to 
endorse the statement that the rural life is a blend of Pastoral and Georgic,” for it shows 
figures both at work and play. The painting, however, presents only rural laborers, where the 
central focus is upon the figures of a woodcutter and milkmaid not at work, but occupied in 
a leisurely flirtation. In the background a laborer plows a field, suggesting to Barrell an 
ideological imperative at work in representations of England’s rural labors. The painting 
operating with a kind of visual ambivalence staged by the representation of labor and leisure 
as an unproblematic and complementary pair offers the eighteenth-century viewer “[the] 
justification of the social and economic organization of England,” easily presenting one of 
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two arguments, depending on the temperament of the viewer: either that “labour is a happy 
and leisurely affair, or that leisure is a brief interlude, only, in a serious life of labour.” 
Because the milkmaid and her suitor pose in a manner that suggests both “a courtly and a 
rustic identity,” the painting makes an aristocratic leisure part of a rustic vocabulary, 
suggesting to the viewer that leisure and labor are available in equal parts to all members of 
British society, rather than the reality, as Barrell notes: “But, as one nearly contemporary 
economist was moved to admit, ‘it is not the same man that first works, and then reposes; 
but it is because the one works that the other rests’.”57 In Summer on the Lakes we’ll see such 
projections recalibrated. Specifically, Fuller’s rhetorical alignment of her own sensibility with 
the Native population will seemingly separate her from the project of national expansion, 
but just as Barrell’s pressure upon the codes in Thompson and Gainsborough reveal class 
strife, an examination of Fuller’s tropes easily unveils an ideological unity between her own 
picturesque tourism and the American project. 
            Ann Bermingham identifies another route of disassociation available to the 
picturesque viewer through the aestheticization of rural poverty, a convention that Fuller 
also will adapt to negotiate psychologically the extermination of the U.S. native population. 
As Bermingham notes, in addition to modes of formal contemplation that allowed the 
viewer to submerge evidence of human activity within rural scenes, the aesthetic also 
facilitated an imaginary historical separation between the urban and provincial life forms and 
the life forms of rural Britain. In its elegiac modes Bermingham argues that the picturesque 
reconceived the worker disposed by the agrarian revolution as an anachronism. By 
aesthetisizing “derelict habitations, mills, and so forth” it falsely “demodernized [the] plight” 
of rural labor, so that the dramatic currents Martin Price finds circling beneath the aesthetic 
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surface not as a narrative of contemporary life, but as remainders of a historical past. Rural 
life, then, appeared as an English past “which had been, or was being lost,”58 rather than as a 
contemporary social world reeling from the effects of the nation’s transition to a modern 
economy in which the viewer was deeply implicated. Ann Bermingham emphasizes that this 
landscape “cut two ways,” for it seemingly celebrated this lost past, yet “the manifest 
desolation of the landscape could work as a justification for transforming it to a more 
efficient, vital one.”59 Either pull incorporated rural poverty into a celebration of the nation 
itself, either as a grand heritage or as a modern wonder. Fuller in particular figures the 
disappearing Native population into a narrative of national heritage, where Fuller’s rhetoric 
subsumes the Indian into a noble lineage of western cultural ancestry.  
             Where Liu, Price, and Barrell help us to begin to see the operations of the 
picturesque as a historical unconscious in its ability to obfuscate and amend economic 
realities, Bermingham’s discussion of Uvedale Price, whose formal theories of the aesthetic 
appeared in the 1790s alongside Gilpin’s writings, suggests that the aesthetic conventions of 
the picturesque provided strategies for the rural gentry to conceal consciously the dramatic 
effects of enclosure upon the rural landscape. Tracing Price’s criticism of the landscape 
practices of Capability Brown and Humphrey Repton, who “[equated] taste with the 
heightened display of property and the appropriation of nature to personal use,”60 
dramatically and often violently transformed the landowners relationship to the rural village, 
often even “removing villages inconveniently near a mansion or favoured view.”61 Uvedale 
Price’s criticisms of the landscape designs of Capability Brown and Humphrey Repton 
betray an anxiety surrounding the ‘improvements’ that had begun to dismantle the 
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paternalistic relationship between landowners and rural peasantry. Though as a gentleman 
farmer Price benefited economically from the agrarian revolution, as a man of taste he 
criticized such invasive landscape designs that transformed and often dismantled the local 
community: “He who destroys dwellings, gardens and enclosures, for the sake of mere 
extent and parade of property, only extends the bounds of monotony, and of dreary selfish 
pride; but contracts those of variety, amusement and humanity.”62 Price’s language here 
suggests what Nigel Everett calls the Tory idea of landscape, a conservative allegiance to 
paternalistic notions of a landowner’s responsibility to the rural community thriving upon 
and around his estate. But as Bermingham argues, though Price’s rejection of the work of 
Brown and Repton seems to suggest a conservative impulse against the new economy by 
favoring a landscape that “depended on the maturing effects of time”63 rather than grand 
and invasively transformative designs, Price’s writings evidences a fear of Jacobin backlash 
against the enclosure and improvement from which he himself benefited. Price believed the 
less imposing and picturesque garden would protect landowners, “guarding us against 
democratic opinions.”64 For this reason Bermingham finds Price essentially complicit with 
the modernization the picturesque landscape attempted to hide, for in providing an 
alternative to “the Brownian landscape garden” Price wished to protect himself and other 
landowners from “the malice of democracy in the ‘leveling’ and ‘sweeping away’ that 
brought it into being.”65 Price serves then as an example of a self-conscious exploitation of 
the picturesque in its ability to mask modern capitalist conceptions of class relationships as 
continuous with its paternalistic past. 
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            But the work of Malcolm Andrews and Thomas Pfau suggests that Price’s overt use 
of the picturesque for preserving the traditional power of a landed gentry was not the most 
significant cultural work performed by the aesthetic. Andrews argues that at the beginning of 
the eighteenth century, when the picturesque first emerged it bore an Augustan influence 
that suggests it was “a kind of intellectual recreation favoured by a self-confident elite [with 
an] education in the classics.”66 By the “third quarter of the century,” however, “Milton and 
Thomson are beginning to seem rivals to Homer and Virgil,”67 in other words, the cultural 
capital of the elites is replaced with the secular vulgate of a burgeoning middle-class. By 
exhibiting itself through a literature accessible to those without training in the classics, the 
picturesque begins then to cultivate “taste” in a new community of practitioners. The 
picturesque, that is, begins to serve as a means for the middling classes to develop their 
property in person.  
            Such development of an individual’s taste through aesthetic practice, Thomas Pfau 
argues, appeared as an innate natural sensitivity, allowing members of a growing middling 
class to develop a shared seemingly moral ground. Though a facility in identifying and 
reproducing picturesque views depended chiefly on formal discriminations actively cultivated 
in the viewer through rigorous practice, the subject nevertheless perceived such 
discriminations as “an originary and unimpeachably authentic affect—[a] core sensibility or 
‘feeling.”’68 By demanding the viewer’s attention to “texture and color, character as opposed 
to beauty, the artistry of time and accident”69 the picturesque seemingly evidenced the 
viewer’s sensibility, what Ildiko Csengei defines as “refined emotionalism.”70 Because taste 
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and sensibility expressed themselves affectively, thus disguising their origins as learned 
discriminations, their expressions suggested a natural, biologically-based capacity in an 
individual, implying a natural selectiveness for divisions of social class, for “taste [was] 
granted to only a few and inaccessible to vulgar minds.”71 Taste as evidence of affective 
sensibility ultimately signaled moral superiority as Martin Price notes, because it implied “an 
intensity of awareness.”72 Fuller text similarly attempts to evidence her moral superiority 
through displays of taste. Her designation of the texts as a collection of “poetic impressions” 
would signal such sensibility to the eighteenth-century reader. As we’ll see below Fuller uses 
taste as the primary means of differentiating herself morally from the American project of 
territorial expansion. 
            In its British context the class distinctions, Thomas Pfau argues, resulting from 
formal picturesque practices enabled a newly created middle-class in England to recognize 
itself. Specifically, the intensity of the formal discriminations demanded by the aesthetic 
produced “what today are known as interpretative communities in the very process of 
delineating their distinctive cultural capital.” “Elaborating such a capital in an insistently 
formal and disciplinary manner,” Pfau elaborates, “such communities delimit, refine, and 
police their boundaries, at first as a strictly aesthetic ‘movement’ centered around a number 
of representational media, objects, and practices and, eventually, in the reflexive form of a 
social ‘class.’”73 Where the aristocracy inherited its social identity, a middle class produced it 
through shared picturesque practices. As an American displaying her knowledge of these 
very same forms Fuller revises her own national identity, so that the picturesque permits her 
to portray herself as British in character, again disassociating herself from those aspects of 
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American ideology which she finds troubling. Her ability to use the aesthetic as a shorthand 
for British culture in general suggests, as most scholarship on the picturesque already argues, 
that though the aesthetic represented the ideology of the middle-class such ideology had 
become synonymous with British national identity.   
            The appearance of naturalness that Pfau describes in the middle class’ performance 
of taste, however, never appears in Fuller. In fact, though she consciously discriminates and 
categorizes individuals according to their particular exhibitions of taste, sensibility and 
cultivation are throughout the text portrayed as the productions of conscious intellectual 
labor, visible forms of cultural capital emphasized through Fuller’s extensive and 
conspicuous intertextual references. Fuller’s use of the picturesque in Summer on the Lakes, as 
Edward Cahill’s recent work on aesthetic philosophy and early American literature shows, 
does not represent an isolated American example adaptation of the British aesthetic, but 
rather represents a particularly evolved and deliberate instance of a generally pervasive 
American “borrowing of recognizable rhetorical forms with specific political implications.”74  
In attending to Fuller’s rather late adaptation of the picturesque—Summer on the Lakes 
appeared in 1843, but because of Price’s and Gilpin’s theoretical publications the 1790s are 
generally considered the aesthetic’s most influential—we see that such aesthetic language 
does not operate transhistorically, but rather mutates as it is summoned to mediate 
homologous socio-historical terrains. In examining the operations of Fuller’s picturesque in 
Summer on the Lakes we see how the aesthetic aids a singular conscience grappling with the 
moral implications of American expansionism to ultimately translate actions of the state into 
an ethical and acceptable vocabulary.    
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An American Pic turesque           
             As a socio-cultural phenomenon the British picturesque discussed above could be 
described as a national project for its multivalent existence permeated leisured and literary 
society allowing it to operate as a kind of learned dialect for the upwardly mobile and 
privileged classes benefiting from the nation’s transition to a modern economy. The literary 
public sphere, as evidenced through such periodicals as The Spectator, The Tatler, and The 
Monthly Magazine, travel guides such as Thomas West’s Guide to the Lake District,75 as well as 
the widely disseminated loco-descriptive poetry of Pope, Gray, Thompson, and 
Wordsworth, ensured that members of certain classes were easily and often unconsciously 
interpellated into its vocabulary and ideologies. Given its emergence within a uniquely 
English class system, the picturesque as a set of popular cultural practices could never take 
root in exactly the same manner outside of a British national context, though we find its 
conventions and codes employed regularly in American writing especially after 1783, when  
Britain officially recognized the United States as a sovereign nation. State agents, for 
instance, employed the rhetoric of the picturesque in their documentations of new federal 
territories. We see this for example in Manassseh Cutler’s pamphlet An Explanation of the Map 
Which Delineates That Part of the Federal Lands, Comprehended between Pennsylvania West Line, the 
rivers Ohio and Scioto, and Lake Erie, assessing the newly federalized part of the Ohio Valley in 
1787, and in John Filson’s The Discovery, Settlement, and Present State of Kenucky from 1784, as 
well as in William Bartram’s Travels from 1791.76  
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            Fuller’s work distinguishes itself from other examples of an American picturesque, 
however, for its extended meditations upon the moral implications of American 
expansionism and her attempts to employ the aesthetic to solve the historical 
contradictions produced through such expansionism. Essential to her symbolic resolution 
of such contradictions is her explicit invocation of taste, her desire to offer the reader 
“poetic impressions,” signaling what John Guillory describes as a Wordsworthian model of 
poetic character that announces itself not through the production of a distinctive form of 
speech, but rather through “the character of the poet, whose refined sensibility reproduces 
the aristocrat’s, but in the register of sensibility alone.”77 Though Fuller invokes sensibility 
as the key distinction of an individual possessing poetic character, unlike Wordsworth who 
sought to reproduce ‘common speech’ so that the rigorous cultivation necessary to 
composing poetic works remained invisible to its readers, Fuller seems to take great 
pleasure throughout her work in displaying the labor cultivation requires.78 She makes her 
own expertise and the expertise of others visible not trough an elevated or artificial diction 
but through what Christine Zwarg calls a “saturation of textuality.”79 This strategy might be 
better described as a ‘saturation of intertextuality’ for the Summer on the Lakes makes 
copious citations—some lasting several pages—from various other written works, in 
addition to a seemingly endless stream of short and direct references to various texts and 
writers, not to mention the less obvious allusions embedded within her own language. 
Citations and summaries from Fuller’s reading, her own poems and the poetry of others, as 
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well as extensive narrative digressions instigated by her experiences during her travels 
regularly interrupt the account of her journey, so that the reader often has the impression 
that she has found herself immersed in one of Fuller’s commonplace books, rather than a 
travel narrative. This compositional mode augments the definition of the picturesque as 
nature that resembles painting, for it ultimately presents an understanding of empirical 
reality as coextensive with literary imagination, so that “the activities of travel and reading 
[are made] synonymous.”80 Fuller appears both wholly dependent upon aesthetic 
production to mediate ‘real life’ and willing to display such mediation.   
            Fuller’s exhibition of her own knowledge through citation and reference might easily 
be explained in terms of her biography. Tutored rigorously and relentlessly throughout her 
childhood by her father, her education equaled and often surpassed those of the most 
economically privileged and intellectually ambitious American men, gaining her entrance into 
correspondence and conversation with New England’s most prominent thinkers.81 Her 
intellectual relationship with Emerson led to her position as editor of The Dial, the 
Transcendentalist journal, and she made a modest, if often precarious living, as teacher, 
editor, and journalist, eventually leading to a career as America’s first foreign correspondent. 
Such an interpretation, however, limits us in understanding the political significance of her 
adaptation of the picturesque for her travel narrative. Most importantly, her choice to 
mediate her journey through an extensive nexus of aesthetic codes and literary intertextuality 
that often confuses empirical and imaginary terrains functions as a complex, if unconscious 
strategy for Fuller to mark her own sensibilities as European rather than American, so that 
her own actions superficially differentiate themselves from the American materialism she 
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deems immoral for its general acquisitive nature and its specific treatment of the native 
population. The frequent collapse of Fuller’s seemingly distinct categories suggest that like 
the British picturesque, Fuller’s own version of the aesthetic aims to resolve the conflicts of 
a historical unconscious, for her rhetorical strategies allow her to justify morally the very 
same expansionist national policies that she excoriates throughout the text, and to identify 
her own poetic sensibility as an American one, despite having gone to great lengths to 
position her personal cultivation as an extension of a distinctly European sensibility.  
            Where the British picturesque deploys taste as a means of an imaginary system of 
class stratification, Fuller employs taste as a means of distinguishing national sensibilities. We 
see this early in the text when she opposes “sensibility” with “utility” by comparing her own 
engagement with Niagara falls to that of a fellow onlooker who interrupts her viewing. 
Fuller’s description of her own experience of the scene goes to great lengths to model for 
the reader an engagement with the natural world that is primarily aesthetic. Like the 
narrators of English guidebooks, who aid tourists in their search for the most picturesque 
vistas of a region, Fuller demonstrates her own aesthetic expertise through an authoritative 
description of the proper position for viewing the falls, declaring to the reader that “as 
picture, the Falls can only be seen from the British side.”82 (Worth noting here is her qualifier 
“as picture” ensuring that the adjective “British” not only applies to the physical terrain but 
to the cultural practice, so already her picturesque directives are coded as non-American.) 
Appropriately, from this “British” position the falls display the necessary obfuscation of the 
aesthetic, so that they appear as “veils” creating “magical effects” of “light and shade.” 
Despite her rhetorical exhibition of  picturesque convention, ultimately she admits that her 
                                                
82 For instance, Wordsworth in his Guide to the Lakes, writes “At the outlet of Gowbarrow Park, we reach a 
third stream, which flows through a little recess called Glencoin, where lurks a single house, yet visible from the 
road. Let the Artist or leisurely Traveller turn aside to it, for the buildings and objects around them are 
romantic and picturesque.” pg. 16, 5th ed. 1835, OUP, 1970.  
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favorite viewing position does not produce a picturesque effect, but rather a sublime one: 
sitting “close to the great fall” her powers of discrimination are overwhelmed by the waters 
so that “all separate consciousness [is] quite lost.”83 Rather than instigating a feeling of 
subjective universality as Kant specifies in his treatise on the sublime, for Fuller the 
experience distinguishes her from a character, who she deems typically American.  
            Fuller makes such national distinction clear in the description of her second visit to 
the “British side.” This time the sublimity of the falls is ruined for her by another American’s 
response to the scene, one emblematic of the national character: “[J]ust as I had seated 
myself, a man came to take his first look. He walked close up to the fall, and, after looking at 
it a moment, with an air as if thinking how he could best appropriate it to his own use, he 
spat in it.” Here the American character is one of vulgar acquisition, too debased by its “love 
of utility”84 to comprehend the beauty of its own national riches. (Fuller’s italics) The rhetoric 
of Fuller’s analysis accentuates the man’s national identity as an American by supporting her 
own analysis with references to European writers, a move that obfuscates Fuller’s own 
American identity, given that her values are in allegiance with her European sources. In 
order to stress the overdevelopment of what Pocock calls “the commercial personality” as a 
general American malady through this singular incident at the opening of her narrative, she 
references Charles Dicken’s famous criticism of American materialism, and directly cites the 
words of Prince Puckler Muskau, a Prussian aristocrat famous for his creation of a park 
influenced by his study of English gardening practices.85  
                                                
     83 Margaret Fuller, Summer on the Lakes, 4-5. 
     84 Ibid, 5. 
85 See Charles Dickens, Dickens on America and the Americans, Austin : University of Texas Press, (1978); For 
more on Puckler Muskau see Peter James Bowman. The Fortune Hunter: A German Prince in Regency England. 
Oxford: Signal Books. (2010). 
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            Puckler Muskau’s words in particular augment the dramatic effect of Fuller’s 
experience, for he warns that modernity’s proclivities for utilitarianism increase “the 
probability of men coming to put the bodies of their dead parents in the fields to fertilize 
them.”86 This quotation increases the moral stakes at play in the opposition between Fuller’s 
and the spitting man’s relationship to the falls. “Utility” becomes an American inability to 
recognize land as symbol, as either a national or ancestral heritage, so that the falls risk being 
reduced to a giant spittoon and parental graves double as crops. Fuller in differentiating her 
own aesthetic engagement with the terrain creates a necessary, if unconscious, illusion that 
relating to the land aesthetically absolves her and anyone else exhibiting taste of an immoral 
appropriation of territory.  
            For her American readers such overt invocations of European culture operate both 
heuristically and ostensively in this regard. For readers already familiar with either Prince 
Puckler Muskau or Dickens’ writings on America, the passage evidences their possession of 
the cultivation necessary to separate themselves from the spitting American. Similarly, such 
allusions provide ignorant but ambitious readers an opportunity for cultivation through self-
tutelage. Thus, as a rhetorical form Fuller’s writing offers American readers both the 
diagnosis and the cure for a moral disease. But we would be incorrect to interpret Fuller’s 
work as the beginning of something akin to a project for national cultivation, a desire to 
instill all Americans with the European culture she continually practices and praises, for her 
final remarks in the passage suggest that such moral amnesty can be achieved for the nation 
as a whole through the taste of just a few. The remarks of Puckler Muskau and Dickens, 
Fuller believes “will not…be seen on the historic page to be truly the age or truly the 
                                                
     86 Ibid, 5. 
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America,” because “[a] little leaven is leavening the whole mass for other bread.”87 The role 
she begins to create for herself here and develops throughout the text resembles 
Wordsworth’s88  definition of the poet as “a man…endowed with more lively sensibility, 
more enthusiasm and tenderness, who has a greater knowledge of human nature, and a more 
comprehensive soul, than are supposed to be common among mankind.”89  
           Another incident at Niagara will help us better understand the power of the 
picturesque in the hands of Fuller for both psychologically appropriating the new territories 
of the nation and erasing the moral conflicts inherent in doing so, all the while granting 
Fuller herself a veil of sensibility that appears to separate her from acts of appropriation. 
Only at Niagara, at the very beginning of her journey, does Fuller experience the landscape 
as sublime, as a threatening force of nature, and only in these moments of sublimity does she 
imagine the Indians themselves as a threat to her own safety, though the threat is pure 
fantasy, for at the falls she never actually encounters any members of the native population. 
This fact is significant for it shows us that the territories through which she journeys are 
already ‘enclosed,’ already easily adaptable to a landscape aesthetic and its surveying gaze. 
Only due to the natural intensity of the waterfalls themselves does the scene defy the topoi 
of the picturesque as Fuller attempts to view them, thus losing the ability to perceive the 
terrain as a topography, as a space defined and controlled by the conventions of a culture 
practice. Her immediate unconscious identification of the falls’ resistance to the picturesque 
as synonymous with a native population still in control of the terrain displays the capacity of 
the picturesque for awarding its practitioners a psychological authority regarding the 
                                                
     87 Ibid, 5. 
88 Throughout the text through reference and allusion Fuller displays the influence of Wordsworth. No doubt 
the fact that she was also writing a ‘Guide to the Lakes’ was not lost on her. For a description of her meeting 
with Wordsworth in see “Letter II” in “Part II: Things and Thoughts in Europe” of At Home and Abroad: Or 
Things and Thoughts in America and Europe, the anthology edited and published posthumously by her brother 
Arthur in 1869. 
     89 William Wordsworth, “Preface to Lyrical Ballads,” in Hazard Adams, Critical Theory, 441. 
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acquisition of physical territory, exemplifying Nigel Everett’s assessment of the aesthetic and 
its practices “as a cultivated management of landed property.”90  
            Initially, the falls themselves are an aesthetic disappointment. Because of Fuller’s 
extensive preparation they yield “nothing but a quiet satisfaction,” where normally 
habituation to a scene via “drawings, the panorama, &c,” preparation to view the landscape 
“as picture,” as described by William Gilpin above result in an experience of beauty, the falls 
resist such appropriation. Fuller’s habituation to the site, her “clear notion of the position 
and proportions of all objects here,” her knowing “where to look for everything,” and the 
scene’s fulfillment of her expectations (“everything looked as I thought it would,”)91 result in 
aesthetic boredom. Only by repeatedly returning to the falls for concentrated observation 
does she eradicate the influence of these preparatory visual representations, thus opening up 
the possibility of a rewarding aesthetic experience for herself.  
            By doing so, however, she transforms her experience qualitatively, inducing a 
sublimity that challenges the coherence of her subjectivity by overwhelming her perceptions: 
“Daily these proportions widened and towered more and more upon my sight, and I got, at 
last, a proper foreground for these sublime distances.”92 Such expansion, the ‘widening’ and 
‘towering’ of the scene, ultimately induces a “dread” in Fuller. Tellingly, without the aid of 
picturesque convention, Fuller loses the ability to impose herself upon the terrain, to control 
the land by delineating it as landscape. Having abandoned her original intentions of viewing 
the falls as a topography, she opens herself to a particular “mood of nature” that suppresses 
her perceptions, noting that “the perpetual trampling of the waters [that] seized my senses” 
made it possible “that no other sound, however near, could be heard.” With her senses 
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overwhelmed she begins to “look behind [her] for a foe” for “the Indian was shaped on the 
same soil.”93 Her abandonment of picturesque practice in favor of sublime experience 
becomes synonymous with a psychological and imaginary surrender of territory, of “soil,” 
inducing in Fuller fantasies of her own murder at the hands of “naked savages:”  
For continually upon my mind came, unsought and unwelcome, images, such as 
never haunted before, of naked savages stealing behind me with uplifted tomahawks; 
again and again this illusion recurred, and even after I had thought it over, and tried 
to shake it off, I could not help starting and looking behind me.94 
 
This early experience illustrates for us the sympathetic aims between picturesque sensibility 
and the utility that she condemns in her fellow Americans, a utility that results in “warlike 
invasion” and “the rudeness of conquest.”95 Picturesque sensibility, however, expresses itself 
here, through the threat produced by its collapse, as one in collusion with such “warlike” 
American expansionism, though Fuller continues to condemn utility and the conquest it 
instigates throughout the text. That she persists to differentiate her own aesthetic personality 
from American utility via the picturesque, despite the emergence of this contradiction in the 
opening sequences of the work, evidences that the ruse of sensibility aids in an unconscious 
negotiation of Fuller’s own conflicted relationship to American expansionism.  
            Through John Barrel’s work on Thompson and Gainsborough above we saw that 
the rhetoric of the picturesque appears “fraught with contradictions,” so that in its strained 
portrayal of the “unity of Happy Britannia” the deep class divisions of British society reveal 
themselves, despite the rhetoric’s efforts to deny them. Fuller’s rhetoric, we might say, 
operates in reverse, for it labors to present deep ideological and moral divisions by opposing 
utility with sensibility, yet through the contradictions in her own writing, as we already saw 
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above, sensibility ultimately aids in the nation building begun by utility. Fuller’s picturesque 
ultimately serves the interests of a unified ‘Happy America’ through a rhetoric that 
continually undermines the very categories it attempt to asserts, most obviously in her 
hierarchy of national sensibility. This hierarchy places Americans “seeking their fortune in 
the west” at the bottom. Indians appear next, above Americans, for they display a natural, 
uncultivated sensibility, while Fuller and European settlers, because of their rigorously 
cultivated taste via the picturesque, emerge at the top.96 This paradigm seemingly places 
Fuller in allegiance with the native population and against the materialistic aims of her fellow 
Americans, however, Fuller’s sensibility emerges as a fully developed form of taste, one 
which trumps the instinctual, primitive taste of the native population, so that Indian culture 
itself appears outmoded and anachronistic.  
            In her first sighting of Indians, for instance, Fuller, as a passenger on a boat 
“[c]oming up the river St. Clair,” ostensibly valorizes the natural “wildness” that initially 
instigated her “dread” at Niagara, for she opposes it to the “rudeness of the white settler” in 
her short description that bears many conventions of the picturesque:  
They were camped out on the bank. It was twilight, and their blanketed forms, in 
listless groups or stealing along the bank, with a lounge and a stride so different in its 
wildness from the rudeness of the white settler, gave me the first feeling that I really 
approached the West.97 (12)  
 
Not surprisingly, Fuller spies the Indians at twilight. As we saw above in the theoretical 
evaluations of the aesthetic, the picturesque favored moments expressive of immanent 
transition—displays of diurnal (“An Evening Walk”), physical (crooked paths, shadows and 
                                                
96 Lydia Maria Child’s novel Hobomok: A Tale of Early Times (1824), presents a similar paradigm of taste. The 
heroine Mary Conant marries the Indian, Hobomok, when she believes that her British fiancé, Charles Brown, 
has been killed, largely because Hobomok presents an innate sensibility reminiscent of Brown’s cultivated 
tastes, while she perceives her father and his Puritan community as completely lacking in aesthetic sensibility. 
     97 Ibid, 12. 
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shifts of light), or temporal liminality (ruins and aged people), a visual and poetic convention 
that functions as an allegory for the historical transitions the aesthetic attempted to 
negotiate. “Twilight,” as an invocation of picturesque code hints at the elegiac stance Fuller 
will ultimately take towards the native Americans, displaying an adaptation of the British 
tendency to figure the rural laborer as a representative of an earlier historical period, rather 
than a victim of contemporary events shifts, thus “demoderniz[ing] his plight.”98   
           Fuller’s privileging of the Indians’ “wildness” over the “rudeness” of the settlers—the 
settlers’ “habits of calculation…talking not of what they should do, but of what they should 
get in the new scene” appears on the surface as a Rousseauian critique where the white  
settlers stand as example of Rousseau’s “fatal enlightenment of civil man” while the  Indians 
exist as a moral mid-way point of social evolution, “placed by Nature at equal distance from 
the stupidity of the brutes” and such “fatal enlightenment.”99 Through such a critique Fuller 
seemingly offers a critique of modernity and its possessive individualism. The picturesque 
rhetoric of the passage despite its surface allegiance to the sensibility of the native operates 
as an exhibition of symbolic labor on the part of Fuller so that her exhibition of cultivation 
through the conventions of the picturesque trump the natural and uncultivated taste implied 
by “wildness” according to a logic more in keeping with Levi-Strauss’ model “[savage] mind 
in its untamed state as distinct from mind cultivated or domesticated for the purpose of 
yielding a return.”100 Where cultivation of taste requires conscious labor, as Fuller’s many 
citations remind us, “wildness,” despite being coupled with the display of an aristocratic and 
picturesque repose signaled through “lounge,” nevertheless suggests an animal-like 
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behavior.101 But according to the laws of possessive individualism, only through labor can 
one be guaranteed possession of an object. Where the sublime of “wildness” represents an 
untamed nature incapable of possession, Fuller’s picturesque cultivation infuses the 
landscape with her own claims to possession. 
            More than a valorization of Indian sensibility this anecdote functions as a 
recuperation of Fuller’s own command of the territory, eliminating the threat she 
involuntarily experienced at Niagara. Here “wildness” as a descriptor disenfranchises the 
Indians from any claim to the territory, though it syntactically operates as a term opposing 
the acquisitiveness of the white settler, as a marker of the dynamic sublime it must yield to 
the cultivation implicit within the picturesque. As an instinctive form of taste “wildness” still 
marks the Indian as a “mood of nature,” rather than a fully-formed subject. The “listless” 
behavior, too, suggests that this “wildness” thwarted by the invasion of white settlers now 
has no power for expression, for despite the fact that this sighting of natives results in 
Fuller’s “first feeling that [she] really approached the West,”  picturesque convention grants 
her perceptions an authority that controls and abstracts the Indians through its codes into 
“blanketed forms” rather than the imaginary savages at Niagara.  
            This symbolic management of Native Americans by Fuller has been misread in two 
recent readings of the Niagara scenes. These readings deny Fuller’s racism by arguing Fuller’s 
ultimate rejection of the picturesque and the hegemonic power of western expansion it 
represents. Such readings not only betray a shallow understanding of the picturesque, but 
also project a contemporary conception of a feminist politics in order to preserve Fuller’s 
                                                
101 Repose as a symbolic gesture imitative of aristocratic leisure is one of the dominant tropes in the 
picturesque. Liu writes: “Awareness of form, indeed, was repose, the sense of arrest in experience.” Here the 
“lounge” is a “repose” projected onto the Indians by Fuller, who now in full command of picturesque 
convention, needs no longer fear for her safety and can project her own middle-class subjectivity onto the 
native population. The “wildness” is defeated and reduced to “taste.”   
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feminist status as the author of Woman in the Nineteenth Century. Such readings block that 
Fuller’s wielding of the period’s dominant discourses grants her a cultural capital that grants 
her social privileges normally denied women of her period. By interpreting her use of the 
aesthetic’s elegiac mode described by Bermingham above as an expression of Fuller’s 
rejection of picturesque politics. By interpreting her use of the aesthetic’s elegiac mode 
described by Bermingham above as an expression of Fuller’s rejection of picturesque 
politics. We see such critical discomfort in Fuller’s adoption of aesthetic discourse, for 
instance, in Michaela Bruckner Cooper’s essay “Textual Wandering and Anxiety in Margaret 
Fuller’s Summer on the Lakes,” where she argues that Fuller’s conspicuous displays of cultural 
capital represent a male discourse which “Fuller tries self-consciously to allay, if not 
escape.”102 By making this argument Bruckner Cooper can separate Fuller from the racist 
and nationalist implications of her implementation of picturesque convention. But given 
Fuller’s explicit account of her sublime fantasy of murder at the hands of Indians, it’s 
difficult to accept Bruckner Cooper’s assessment that “[i]n her description of Niagara Falls, 
Fuller sets the tone for her subsequent efforts at anxiously employing and questioning 
traditional modes of representation.”103 Bruckner Cooper also misreads Fuller’s sympathetic 
tone not as part of a picturesque strategy that allows Fuller to ultimately accept the 
decimation of Native American as the natural disappearance of an anachronistic culture, but 
as a rejection of the picturesque itself: “[S]he also voices the fear that dominant 
representations, such as those generated by conventions of the picturesque, crowd out 
stories about the lives of women and Native Americans.”104 Similarly, Jeffrey Steele in his 
chapter “Charting Disharmony: The Flawed Literary Personae of Summer on the Lakes” 
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portrays aesthetic discourse as a pervasive social force that Fuller attempts to resist, rather 
than as a form of cultural capital from which she benefits: “What is remarkable about 
Summer on the Lakes is the extent to which Fuller…begins to disrupt the picturesque aesthetic 
with other modes of response that evoke—at various points—maternal love, political 
analysis, and mourning.”105 These ‘disruptions’—the text’s conspicuous intertextuality—
however, functions to increase Fuller’s cultural capital by displaying her own cultivation as a 
marker of her sensibility, i.e. her moral superiority. Such contradiction, as we saw above, is 
essential to the labor of the picturesque in its function as a historical unconscious.106   
            If we return now to Fuller’s praise of native American culture, we can begin to see 
how her initial defense ultimately provides her the ground to justify the decimation of the 
Indians themselves. When comparing the sensibility of the Indians to that of the “white 
settlers,” Fuller praises the former unambiguously. Contrasting the way each group 
establishes a homestead, for instance, she goes so far as to suggest that the respect for the 
beauty of the land that the Indians display through their choice of constructing dwellings 
that make little impact upon the terrain should grant them rightful ownership. She notes that 
where “so many dwellings of the new settlers, which showed plainly that they had not 
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form of hysteria. For this reason, the picturesque through its ability to present certain subjectivities as atavistic 
offers Fuller an unanticipated avenue of emancipation from negative conceptions of feminine ‘enthusiasm.’ In 
claiming fully the cultural capital of the picturesque she figures herself as Romantic genius. It is precisely her 
embrace of such hegemonic discourse that provides her a means of subverting, however problematically, the 
gender norms to which she herself was subjected. 
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thought beyond satisfying the grossest material wants,…were very repulsive,” “[i]n the traces 
of the Indians, who chose the most beautiful sites for their dwellings, and whose habits do 
not break in on that aspect of nature under which they were born, we feel as if they were the 
rightful lords of a beauty they forbore to deform.”107 Here an ability to recognize natural 
beauty becomes the criteria for recognizing the Indians as “rightful lords,” trumping white 
settlers ‘gross material want.’ This logic, however, eventually permits Fuller to deny the 
Indians any claims they might have on the land in favor of the American project in general, 
for though most “white settlers” privilege utility and material gain, the sensibility of some 
settlers and Fuller herself display a distinctly European recognition of beauty thus providing 
a “little leaven” for the “whole mass” of American settlement. 
            For instance, settlers like the “English man, who…wish[es] to pass the evening of an 
active day amid the quiet influences of country life,” pose a challenge to the sensibility of the 
Indians themselves. He, too, exhibits the ability to recognize beauty, for, as Fuller notes, he, 
in correct picturesque fashion, initially rigorously studied “books about this country” making 
him so familiar with the localities that, “on coming here at last, he sought and found, at 
once, the very spot he wanted, and where he is as content as he hoped to be, thus realizing 
Wordsworth’s description of the wise man, who ‘sees what he foresaw.’”108 This Englishman 
has “a large and handsome dwelling” surrounded by “barns and farm yard, with cattle and 
poultry.” The way in which these buildings are situated on the land itself, however, suggest 
his awareness of the natural beauty of the site, for “a wood surround[s] the house, through 
which paths are cut in every direction.” And as if in support of Uvedale Price’s non-invasive 
landscaping theory, the Englishman has employed “the framework of wood” so that the 
buildings themselves, despite their size and number, “have a very picturesque and pleasing 
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effect.”109 Anecdotes such as this one complicate and eventually override Fuller’s original 
claim that the Indians have rights to the land due to their exhibition of taste.             
            By grounding her criteria for rightful land possession in taste Fuller also permits her 
own gaze to operate as a means of enclosure that practically operates underfoot as she treads 
further into the region. As a process of visual domestication her picturesque gaze functions 
as an “endlessly repeatable enclosure of pure picturicity.”110 Here Specifically, Fuller employs 
the disassociation implicit in the judgment of picturesque landscape as a means of 
aeshteticizing her own travels as they unfold. Describing her group’s need to cross difficult 
terrain by foot, for instance, Fuller objectifies her personal experiences:  
We ladies crossed on a little footbridge, from which we could look down the stream, 
and see the wagon pass over the ford. A black thunder cloud was coming up. The 
sky and waters heavy with expectation. The motion of the wagon, with its white 
cover, and the laboring horses, gave just the due interest to the picture, because it 
seemed as if they would not have time to cross before the storm came on…111 
 
Here again Martin Price’s analysis of “the dramatic emphasis” within the picturesque offers 
us a vocabulary to understand “the due interest” Fuller perceives in the composition she 
presents. As we saw above in the theoretical evaluations of the British picturesque, the 
aesthetic favored moments expressive of immanent transition—displays of diurnal (“An 
Evening Walk”), physical (crooked paths, shadows and shifts of light), or temporal liminality 
(ruins and aged people). Within the British picturesque the countryside becomes a scene 
where such transitions can be aestheticized as a lurking threat, where, in the words of Price, 
“the centrifugal forces of dissolution and the centripetal pull of form” become apparent and 
pleasing to the viewer. This is where the “interest” can be garnished from the “laboring 
horses,” the possibility that the whole enterprise might fail, should the clouds break. As we 
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saw above, in the British context the “drama” inherent to individual scenes functioned as an 
aesthetic metonymy for Britain’s transition to a speculative economy. Through our 
familiarity with the world of the eighteenth-century British countryside, we might be 
tempted to say that Fuller’s gaze, finds “due interest” (i.e. pleasure) in the potential failure of 
the wagon’s crossing, as if her visual perceptions operated as a kind of hedge fund of the 
imagination. But such a reading only works, if the social coordinates remain British. The 
upwardly mobile picturesque tourist had seemingly much to gain from the dissolution of the 
paternalistic relationships of rural life and the implementation of capitalist social 
relationships, but this economic paradigm did not exist in Fuller’s world. Fuller, we can’t 
forget, is one of the passengers on this wagon. 
            Had such a ‘scene’ been identified by the trained eye of a British tourist, we might, 
from the ideological aims of the picturesque examined above, understand the viewer, i.e. 
Fuller, as socially distinct from the scene viewed, as wishing to differentiate herself from the 
men driving the horses and wagon. Within a British paradigm the lurking possibility of 
destruction attains dramatic effect, for it implicitly narrates a story in which the picturesque 
viewer unconsciously finds pleasure in the decay of a traditional economic system. The 
“interest” in the decay of that earlier system is an interest in the countryside becoming 
available as an imaginary and concrete property for the viewer. In this particular example, 
however, Fuller aestheticizes the very objects that grant her entrance into the terrain. This 
possibility results from a fortuitous overlap between the rusticity of picturesque convention 
and the realities of nineteenth-century middle class travel in the U.S through “what was then 
considered the far western frontier.”112 Fuller and her companions traveled by “train, 
steamboat, carriage, and, at times, on foot to make a roughly circular tour of the Great 
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Lakes, beginning with Niagara Falls, extending as far north as Mackinac Island and Sault Ste. 
Marie, as far west as Milwaukee, as far south as Pawpaw, Illinois, and ending back at 
Buffalo.”113 Though both the English and American Lake Districts served as middleclass 
tourist destinations, the newly settled American lakes made it difficult, at least at the level of 
scenery, to distinguish the middle-class traveler from the rustic inhabitant. The lack of a 
traditional and rigid class system and an authentic aristocracy in the States also made the 
economic line between the middle-class tourist and the rustic settler much less clear. Within 
the American economy where land was plentiful and cheap, the rustic personas populating 
the landscape, resemble, economically speaking, England’s precarious and growing middle-
class, rather than a rural peasantry in demise. For these reasons Fuller’s disassociation, we 
must assume, serves a different purpose than it did within the British picturesque.  
            Given Fuller’s earlier assertion that sensibility rather than utility must be the criteria 
through which to establish land rights, such disassociation functions as a means of her own 
immediate claim to the land, instantly transforming territory into landscape as she treads. 
She, unlike the “white settlers” she criticizes, exhibits taste just as the Indians do, but 
precisely because her ‘taste’ reimagines a terrain already conquered and settled by the U.S., 
by these “white settlers,” her picturesque journey ultimately operates as the final phase of 
settlement, for in the words of Liu the picturesque ultimately is “an imagination of state.” 
Here again we are also reminded of Levi-Strauss’ distinction between savage and cultivated 
mind, in that mind is “cultivated or domesticated for the purpose of yielding a return.”114 
The scene returns interest on Fuller’s investment precisely because metaphorical and literal 
cultivation cooperate to complete a westward expansion. 
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            Though we might excuse the example above as a personal negotiation of Fuller’s 
entrance into a seemingly foreign territory, two particular examples code Fuller’s picturesque 
gaze as a means of identifying the bounds of American territory, exposing the manner in 
which “the regime of perspective…is the regime of military surveillance, of cartographic 
advance.”115 In the first Fuller finds herself atop “Fort Holmes” where she and her traveling 
companions “[have] the most commanding view of the lake and straits, opposite shores, and 
fair islets.” Spreading out from the fort is “an old French town, mellow in its coloring, and 
with its harmonious effect of a slow growth, which assimilates, naturally, with objects round 
it.” By identifying the town below as French, Fuller accounts for its display of taste, both in 
its unimposing use of the land and “[t]he people in its streets, Indian, French, half-breeds, 
and others…who live a life of taste and inclination, rather than of the hard press of business, 
as in American towns elsewhere.”116 The history of Fort Holmes, however, brings to surface 
the contradictions in Fuller’s rhetoric of national division, for though everything and 
everyone in the town exhibits a taste seemingly at odds with Fuller’s understanding of 
American character, the fort, which affords her a “commanding view” and “crown[s]” the 
town “most picturesquely,” had been won by the Americans from the British during the War 
of 1812, a war declared by the U.S. at least in part due to the British support of native 
Americans against U.S. expansionism. This scene in particular allegorizes Fuller’s overall text 
quite nicely. Perched up upon a U.S. military stronghold, our picturesque narrator gazes 
upon an American town, imagining it to be a cosmopolitan mixture of harmonious 
European and native American taste and by doing so allows herself to take visual possession 
of the terrain by erasing all the signs of utility and military force that she herself finds so 
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reprehensible in America’s history. Her “commanding” aesthetic gaze, however, could only 
have been achieved through the violent overtaking of the fort. The primary function of her 
gaze operates as the final step in such settlement, for it cleanses the terrain of its history, 
codes the town itself as non-American, and thus seemingly eliminates in the symbolic the 
conflicts of a historical unconscious. Sensibility, then, reveals itself to be a morally purified 
utility. 
            Yet despite these perpetual contradictions in the text, Fuller’s direct claims condemn 
the national project in regards to its effect upon the Indians to the very end. By the final 
chapter, however, her voice is one of resignation: “I have no hope of liberalizing the 
missionary, of humanizing the sharks of trade, of infusing the conscientious drop into the 
flinty bosom of policy, of saving the Indian from immediate degradation, and speedy 
death.”117 The problem with such declarations is that their tone suggests that Fuller has been 
engaged in a defense of the Indian all along, but her rhetoric, as we’ve seen above, has been 
at the very least ambiguous in its allegiances. That she makes this particular comment 
towards the end of the text suggests that she comprehends her own efforts as separate from 
the official U.S. position. But such statements can only be understood as the results of a 
picturesque denial, for though this articulation of a “speedy death” is the first overt 
acknowledgment of the Indian’s decimation, Fuller had already staged the Indians as an 
effectively ‘dead’ culture in a very  early description of her visit to an “ancient Indian village,” 
which cleared of living Indians already exists as a tourist site for Anglo-Americans.  
            In commenting on the site the Indians chose for the village, she notes “[a]s usual, 
they had chosen with the finest taste,” a judgment she makes after viewing an arrangement 
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of graves, “regularly arranged mounds.”118 The site’s graves prompt Fuller to reimagine 
native American culture as part of a European heritage so that she appropriates native 
Americans into a narrative of western civilization: “The whole scene suggested to me a 
Greek splendor, a Greek sweetness, and I can believe that an Indian brave, accustomed to 
ramble in such paths, and be bathed by such sunbeams, might be mistaken for Apollo.”119 In 
this elision of ancient Greek and native American culture, Fuller positions herself and the 
nation as a whole as cultural descendents of a people who in actuality were still struggling for 
existence. Her earlier acknowledgement of a wild Indian sensibility now becomes directly 
appropriated into her more developed taste by serving as a pre-cursor to her own sensibility, 
a heritage to which she has every right to claim. She herself seems to believe her own 
figurative sleight of hand, for she visits the village on the Fourth of July and through 
witnessing the taste of her alleged ancestors makes the site a source of national pride 
befitting the holiday: “certainly I think I had never felt so happy that I was born in 
America.”120 This incorporation of the native American culture into a developmental 
narrative of western civilization prompts Fuller to giver her fellow Americans permission to 
celebrate the birth of the nation without guilt: “drink the health of their country and all 
mankind, with a clear conscience.”121 Fuller’s elegiac mode of perceiving native culture quite 
literally presents itself as an extension of state institution when she argues for the importance 
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“a national institute, containing all the remains of the Indians,--all that has been preserved by 
official intercourse at Washington, Catlin’s collection, and a picture gallery as complete as 
can be made, with a collection of skulls from all parts of the country.”122 Here in Fuller’s 
pedagogical attitude towards the literal remains of the native Americans we see once again 
that Fuller’s conception of cultivation is co-extensive with American state power. 
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The Labor o f  Poetry  
            Understanding Fuller’s literary description of her journey as a late and symbolic 
phase of the U.S. acquisition of the Great Lakes territory clarifies for us her writing as an 
important symbolic extension of U.S. policy. She herself describes Summer on the Lakes as a 
“poetic impression of the country,” one which alters the view of the land so that it appears 
as “no route, no series of stations” for collective and individual economic gain (note the 
teleological implications of both descriptors and the allusion to social mobility inherent in 
“station”), but rather as “a garden interspersed with cottages, groves and flowery lawns, 
through which a stately river ran,”123 i.e. a landscape. If we return to her comment at Niagara 
that “a little leaven is leavening the whole mass,”124 we can understand this statement now as 
something akin to Wordsworth’s conception of the poet as “a man…endowed with more 
lively sensibility.”125 In other words, what is “poetic” about Fuller’s writing is not any formal 
poetry within the text per se, but the continuous exhibition of an affect that by the time 
Wordsworth wrote his manifesto came to define the “profession,” to use Pfau’s term, of the 
poet. For this reason Fuller is Romantic, for she has learned from Wordsworth that now, as 
Guillory summarizes it, “the burden” is on “the character of the poet, whose refined 
sensibility reproduces the aristocrat’s, but in the register of sensibility alone.”126  
            That such sensibility has emerged as a professional specialization due to the realities 
of a new economy is a fact that Fuller herself notes as she describes to the reader the task of 
writing Summer on the Lakes: “In times of slower growth, man did not enter a situation 
without a certain preparation or adaptedness to it. He drew from it, if not to the poetical 
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extent, at least, in some proportion, its moral and its meaning.”127 Echoing Wordsworth’s 
famous phrase that a “multitude of causes, unknown to former times…blunt the 
discriminating powers of the mind,”128 Fuller describes a world of capitalist expansion and 
professional specialization, where affective reflection no longer operates as a widely 
exercised human capacity. As Fuller notes, earlier “the woodcutter did not cut down so 
many trees a day, that the hamadryads had not time to make their plaints heard…But now 
the poet must be at the whole expense of the poetry…The poet must describe…adding the 
beauty, and leaving out the dirt.”129 Where economic factors impose themselves both on 
natural and imaginative terrain, it’s the poet’s job to propagate an altered vision of this new 
reality, one that obfuscates the destruction caused by production and consumption, the 
economy’s “dirt.” It’s only through description imbued with sensibility, a recirculation of 
visual data through conventions of the imagination, that the environment can be given any 
beauty. That publication of Summer on the Lakes resulted in Fuller being offered a position as 
a correspondent at Horace Greeley’s New York Tribune further evidences the fact that the 
expression of affect in the form of literary production now doubled as an example of a 
specialized professional competency. 
            A poem by Fuller that ends Summer on the Lakes provides an example of how such 
historical “dirt” might be covered by the poet’s labor. “The Book to the Reader who Opens, 
as American Readers Often do, at the End, with Doggerel Submission”130 appears on the 
surface as both an appeal for American cultivation and a slight to the general level of literacy 
amongst Americans, the title quite literally suggesting that Americans do not know which 
end of the book is up. The poem’s submission to the doggerel style further emphasizes the 
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lack of sophistication among American readers. Despite the title, however, the substance of 
the poem itself expresses no satire. Rather, the poem appears as a sincere appeal by the book 
for American readers to submit to lessons of cultivation and sensibility within.               
            The central trope of the poem focuses on the making of a blackberry jam by a 
country housewife, so that sensibility is literalized in the sense of taste. The housewife 
expresses her wisdom by  making the blackberry jam with “foreign sugar,” which enhances 
the natural taste of the wild fruit, providing a mixture of frontier ‘wildness’ and refined 
import. The book coaxes the reader in its final stanza to “try a little” with the evening-
bread.”131 The jam, then, appears to be a metaphor for Summer on the Lakes itself, a 
production that harnesses the country’s ‘wild fruit’ and improves it through the ‘imported 
sugar’ of the picturesque, an American landscape cultivated through a British literary 
aesthetic.  
            What complicates the message of the final stanza is the narrative that precedes it, one 
that repeats the aesthetic preferences that appear throughout the book as a whole, a 
privileging of cultivated over “wild” sensibilities. The poem begins as the story of an urban 
cousin visiting her cousin in the country “at the time of blackberries.” The country cousin 
warns her urban visitor not to go picking the berries, for “in the thickets…they ripen best,” a 
fact that places her urban cousin’s gentility at risk: “You tear your dresses and you scratch 
your hands.”132 She instead insists that the cousin wait “Another year,” when the wild 
thickets will be “open fields.” The prediction that the “thicket” will so soon be a  “field” 
voices an anticipated development of the land itself that will shift the terrain from one of 
wild sublimity to a domesticated picturesque.  
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            Where the urban woman echoes Fuller’s own subjective position in her role as 
narrator in the text as a whole, the country cousin, who navigates the wild thickets with 
“housewife skill [and] has filled the shelf/ With blackberry jam,” resembles those settlers in 
possession of European sensibility, who nevertheless have ambitiously agreed to settle new 
terrain, like the Englishman Fuller has met during her journey. The shared sensibility, a taste 
which both women possess,  reveals itself as the basis for the cousins’ sympathy with the  
colonial enterprise in general. The country cousin, for instance, knows that her productions 
will be overwhelming to the palate, if made solely from wild ingredients. She, as an appeal to 
taste, must make the jam, “Not…with country sugar, for too strong/The flavors that to 
maple juice belong;/ But foreign sugar, nicely mixed 'to suit/The taste,' spoils not the 
fragrance of the fruit."133 The literalization of taste in this example again becomes an 
aesthetic battle writ small, where the sublime symbolized as a jam made from solely “wild” 
ingredients threatens to overwhelm the palate. Once the refined sugar, a colonial import is 
introduced, the taste of the fruit as such can be maintained. The urban cousin expresses a 
taste similarly in need of colonial products noting, “the best pleasure such a fruit can 
yield,/Is to be gathered in the open field;/And, for occasions of festivity,/West India 
sweetmeats you had better buy."134 In this literalization of taste the “pleasure” increases 
according to how much the originally wild fruit has been refined. So a berry produced 
through cultivation is preferable to a wild berry, but true celebrations demand the fruit to be 
transformed into candy and confections, the sweet meats of the colonized West Indies.  
            What becomes important here is the role of each cousin in creating a world in which 
material production can cater to taste. The rural cousin possessing a personality capable of 
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entering the “wild” begins a domestication of terrain, an agricultural cultivation that will 
eventually turn the wild blackberry into a farmed one. Once the land is cultivated, the urban 
cousin may arrive without risking injury to her own affective sensibility. Like the poet Fuller 
described earlier, she, as the possessor of the most refined sensibility (she knows when sweet 
meats are in order), she validates her ‘rustic’ cousin’s call for ‘foreign sugar’ and also furthers 
the demand for products of colonial markets. She enters the scene once the land has been 
acquired, suggesting a rejection of the utility needed for settlement, but her taste because it 
necessitates colonial production, implicitly sanctions settler utility. Exhibited through the 
topos of taste, the demands of the cousins become an allegory for affective depth and thus 
provide moral obfuscation, if not total justification, through the purview of aesthetic 
pleasure. Fuller’s final poem in its references to colonial production metonymically once 
again figures the picturesque as an extension of state power.  
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